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ABSTRACTS

The Nixon-Kissinger Foreign Policy System and U.S.-European Relations: Patterns of Policy Making

By W. L. KOHL

No single model adequately explains the American foreign policy-making process. At least six models are required, singly or in some combination, to understand recent American foreign policy formation under the Nixon Administration. The six models are: democratic politics, organizational process/bureaucratic politics, the royal-court model, multiple advocacy, groupthink, and shared images or mind-sets. After a review of the rules of the foreign policy game in Washington and the main elements of the Nixon-Kissinger National Security Council system, the article seeks to apply the models to a number of cases in recent American policy making toward Europe. U.S.-Soviet relations, the "Year of Europe," and Nixon's New Economic Policy of August 1971 are examined as cases of royal-court decision making. A second category of cases exhibits mixed patterns of decision making: SALT, the Berlin negotiations, U.S. troops in Europe, MBFR, and U.S. trade policy. Bureaucratic variables alone explained policy outcomes in international economic policy making in the autumn of 1971, and an organizational process model was found to be dominant generally in the formation of recent international monetary policy, led by the Treasury Department. The conclusion considers the relationships between the models and certain kinds of policies.

Just Wars and Limited Wars: Restraints on the Use of the Soviet Armed Forces

By C. D. JONES

According to Soviet military theorists, the war aims of a government determine not only the scale of military action and diplomatic alliances, but the "moral-political factor," the extent to which soldiers and civilians regard a war as "just" and support the policy of their government. Soviet theorists caution that if both soldiers and civilians regard a war as "unjust," the government runs a greater risk of military setbacks. If such setbacks occur, domestic opposition to the war may develop and domestic tensions that existed prior to the war may become exacerbated. In pursuing "unjust" war aims, a government risks "moral-political" threats to the morale of its troops, the stability of its home front, and the legitimacy of the regime.

Inclusion and Mobilization in European Leninist Regimes

By K. JOWITT

Political development in Leninist regimes can be understood in terms of the relationships among elite-designated tasks, corresponding political uncertainties, and regime structures. The post-Stalin period has seen a crucial change in relations between polity and society. Whereas under Stalin the relationship between political-organizational status and socio-occupational status was hierarchical and mutually exclusive, after Stalin ruling Communist parties have allowed social elites to complement socio-occupational and political-organizational roles. The major political problem in contemporary Leninist regimes arises from the potential conflict between innovative attempts in this direction and the party's continued pre-emption of any potential political arena or role not coterminous with party organization and membership.

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

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The Influence of Small States upon the Superpowers: United States-South Korean Relations as a Case Study, 1950-53

By C. J. PARK

One of the important developments in world politics during the cold-war era was the relationship between the superpowers and small nation-states. In contrast to the period before the cold war, small nation-states had considerable latitude for maneuvering in pursuit of their own interests. This phenomenon was largely rooted in the imperatives of the cold war. The relationship between the United States and the Republic of Korea during the period of the Korean War is critically analyzed in light of the new reality in international relations. South Korea tried to influence the conduct of the United States in Korea by employing five techniques: (1) a public call for assistance; (2) a public call for mutual cooperation against the common enemy; (3) a calculated policy proposal for bargaining advantage; (4) refusal to cooperate; and (5) moral suasion. These techniques are examined, with the conclusion that of the five, (1) and (2) were effective; (3) and (4) were least effective; and (5) was most effective.

The Role of Deterrence in NATO Defense Strategy: Implications for Doctrine and Posture

By D. N. SCHWARTZ

The basis of NATO deterrence strategy is the manipulation of the nuclear "threshold." When NATO's conventional component is strong and the exact nature of its nuclear threshold is uncertain to Warsaw Pact countries, NATO's deterrent will be strong. Attempts to improve the "quality" of the nuclear arsenal by making the outcome of nuclear conflict more predictable weaken NATO's deterrent power. It is the possibility that NATO may use nuclear weapons, as well as the uncertainty of the consequences of such use, that strengthens the deterrent. The number of nuclear weapons in the NATO arsenal could be reduced with no appreciable damage to the deterrent posture. Qualitative improvements in the conventional component, while increasing deterrent strength, also serve as safeguards in case of deterrence failures. To the extent that political unity within NATO increases the predictability of a NATO response to Warsaw Pact aggression, it is possible that political disunity actually adds to deterrent strength.

The Meaning of Democratic Participation

By W. R. SCHONFELD

Political scientists sharply disagree over the meaning of democratic participation. For some (such as Sidney Verba and Norman Nie who adopt an asymmetric perspective), participation denotes the *influence* ordinary people have over the selection of superiors and the policies they adopt. For others (such as Carole Pateman who adopts a symmetric perspective), participation refers to *direct involvement* in making decisions and policies. Alongside their conceptual differences, the two schools of thought employ contrasting definitional strategies and focus primary attention on distinct empirical settings. Despite the apparent incompatibility of the two perspectives, they may be synthesized into a single coherent conception by considering the *importance* people attribute to their membership in the polity and in other social units.

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

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

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THE NIXON-KISSINGER FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEM AND U.S.-EUROPEAN RELATIONS: Patterns of Policy Making

By WILFRID L. KOHL*

NO single model explains adequately the American foreign policy-making process. At least six models are required, singly or in some combination, to understand recent American foreign policy formation under the Nixon Administration. In analyzing the foreign policy process of any country, it is essential first to identify the type of its political system and then to understand how political power is distributed within it, especially as concerns foreign policy making. It is also important to comprehend the style of the leader and other key foreign policy decision-makers at any given time. This allows one to distinguish the types of policy-making processes most likely to occur within a particular political system at that time.

This paper begins with a brief discussion of six models, and then reviews the rules of the foreign policy game in Washington and the style and general characteristics of the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy system in which the models operated. We then proceed to consider how the models help us to explain a number of specific cases of policy making on issues of U.S.-European relations.

I. Six Models of Foreign Policy-Making[1]

1. *The Democratic Politics Model.* According to this model, foreign policy is closely linked to domestic politics. The policy-making process

* This preliminary research report is a revised version of a paper delivered at the 1974 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August 29–September 2, 1974. I am grateful especially for critical comments on the original manuscript from Edward L. Morse, Joseph S. Nye, Uwe Nerlich, John Yochelson, Lynn E. Davis, and Harald B. Malmgren. In addition to open sources, I have drawn on a series of interviews with government officials conducted over the past several years, and on my own experience as a member of the National Security Council staff during 1970–71. Appreciation is expressed to the Council on Foreign Relations, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and the Institute on Western Europe, Columbia University, for support during various phases of this research.

[1] I use the term "model" to mean "conceptual framework" for the purpose of *explanation* of certain kinds of foreign policy decisions or actions. By implication, these models may also be used for *prediction*, but that is not the primary focus in this paper.

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is seen as involving not only the White House and Cabinet Secretaries, and under them the bureaucracies of the executive branch, but also the public arena—especially the Congress, and through it interest groups and attentive publics. At election time, it also involves public opinion in the broadest sense. The process of making foreign policy is seen as a task of persuasion, of working toward the broadest possible consensus. It also involves the politics of regulating and distributing domestic resources. Theorists who have explored and developed this model include Roger Hilsman, Samuel P. Huntington, Richard E. Neustadt, Warner R. Schilling, and Theodore J. Lowi.[2] To cite just one example, this model applied to American foreign policy in the formulation of a bipartisan consensus at the time of the launching of the Marshall Plan and the founding of NATO when, under the leadership of Senator Arthur Vandenberg and others, the Congress was very much involved in the foreign policy process.

2. *Bureaucratic Politics.* In contrast to the first model, this paradigm —as it has recently been elaborated—focuses exclusively on the executive branch of the government. The central argument here is that all or most of foreign policy can be explained as outcomes of organizational decision making and/or intragovernmental bureaucratic bargaining games. Decisions are reached for the most part at sub-Presidential levels within one agency or by interagency compromises. Among the guiding principles are: "organizational position determines policy stance," or "where you stand depends on where you sit"; the impact of organizational routines, standard operating procedures, and vested interests; and the politics of interagency compromises. The key proponents of this model, which is now very much in vogue, are Graham Allison (for our purposes here we have grouped together Allison's Models #2 and #3) and Morton Halperin. Classic illustrations of the application of this model are the cancellation of the Skybolt missile and the history of the U.S. multilateral force proposal (MLF). Critics point out,

[2] See for example, Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership* (New York: John Wiley 1960); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press 1961); Warner R. Schilling, "The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950," in Warner R. Schilling, Paul T. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets* (New York: Columbia University Press 1962), 1-267; Theodore J. Lowi, "Making Democracy Safe for the World: National Politics and Foreign Policy," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press 1967), 295-331; and Roger Hilsman, *The Politics of Policy-Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs* (New York: Harper and Row 1971).

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inter alia, that the model does not explain foreign policy initiatives taken personally by Presidents.[3]

3. *The Royal-Court Model*. Foreign policy making under this model is highly centralized in a monarchical mode, dominated by the King or President or Head of Government, and/or his key advisor(s). The personality of the key decision-maker and his operating style become crucially important. This was the model of foreign policy formulation under Cardinal Richelieu, foreign policy advisor to Louis XIII; it also applies to Metternich, Bismarck, and General de Gaulle. We will examine further on whether and to what extent it applies to Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. For, as one astute observer of the American Presidency puts it, the President "is a reigning monarch" and "The White House is a court. Inevitably, in a battle between courtiers and advisers, the courtiers will win out."[4] The elite recruited for the presidential court—be they learned men, super-managers, ex-politicians, technicians, or politicial cronies—are chosen because they share the President's basic assumptions and world view. They are his closest counsellors, subject to his whims, charged with seeing that his decisions are implemented. When they possess his highest confidence, frequently they determine the shape of policies within given presidential guidelines.

4. *Multiple Advocacy*. Although perhaps more an ideal type than a model in the sense of the others, a multiple-advocacy system of foreign policy making has been defended vigorously by Alexander George.[5] This is in effect a mixed system that draws on a carefully nurtured and structured debate among competing policy advocates (for instance, government departments), managed deliberately at the center

[3] Cf. Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown 1971); Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," in Raymond Tanter and Richard H. Ullman, eds., *Theory and Policy in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1972), 40-80; Morton H. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 1974). See also Richard E. Neustadt, *Alliance Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press 1970).

For critical discussion, see Stephen D. Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important?" *Foreign Policy*, No. 7 (Summer 1972), 159-79; and Robert J. Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique," *Policy Sciences*, No. 4 (1973), 467-90.

[4] George E. Reedy, *The Twilight of the Presidency* (Mentor Pocket Edition; New York: New American Library 1970), 99. For a related recent discussion, see also Amos Perlmutter, "The Presidential Political Center and Foreign Policy," *World Politics*, XXVII, No. 1 (October 1974), esp. 99-106.

[5] Alexander L. George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 66 (September 1972), 751-85.

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by a neutral custodian, probably the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. His task is to ensure that there be no major maldistribution among the various actors in terms of power, information, staff resources, and access to the President. The result is a system of managed bureaucratic politics which, George argues, would make possible a rational consideration of policy alternatives. The President himself should participate in the process of deliberation early on, not just at the end when final options are developed or recommendations agreed upon. In terms of historical examples, we find few perfect applications of this model. The one that fits best is the definition of the Presidential National Security Advisor that McGeorge Bundy brought to his job early in the Kennedy Administration. (There are, however, important exceptions later, when Bundy himself became a policy advocate, for instance on Vietnam.)

5. *Groupthink*. In a recent study, Irving L. Janis argues that small-group decision making can develop its own dangerous and distorted dynamics when group loyalty and cohesion become so strong as to limit the testing of all alternative courses of action and result in bad judgment. The danger lies in the build-up of pressures for conformity. As Janis explains, "The more amiability and esprit de corps among the members of a policy-making in-group, the greater is the danger that independent critical thinking will be replaced by groupthink, which is likely to result in irrational and dehumanizing actions directed against out-groups." Not all group or committee decision making develops into groupthink. Groups "whose members have properly defined roles, with traditions and standard operating procedures that facilitate critical inquiry," can function rationally and exercise effective judgment. But Janis has shown that his groupthink model can tell us much about the causes of several foreign policy fiascoes, for instance, the Bay of Pigs, the invasion of North Korea, Pearl Harbor, and the escalation of the Vietnam War.[6] It is a psychological model with potentially broad implications for understanding certain patterns of foreign policy decision making.

6. *Shared Images, Perceptions, or Mind-Sets.* Although a possible contributing factor to Model 5 (and also to Model 3), this model is broader and does not depend on group dynamics. It is rooted in common socialization processes of certain elites or opinion leaders that result in similar assumptions and outlooks on international affairs. The

[6] Irving L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1972). The quotations are from p. 13.

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notion of an operational code or mind-sets or belief systems indicates what this model is about. It is not difficult to find cases when common perceptual lenses among key decision-makers have foreclosed or clouded consideration of alternatives in American foreign policy: for example, the case of successive administrations deepening America's involvement in the Vietnam War for fear of being soft on communism and losing the cold war. According to at least one analyst, U.S. foreign policy from World War II to the late 1960's was dominated by an establishment united by a bipartisan philosophy of "liberal internationalism," anticommunism, and "an aspiration to world leadership."[7]

II. The Nixon-Kissinger Foreign Policy System

Under the American presidential system, the President is much more than *primus inter pares*. The Constitution grants the President powers that allow him to be the key actor in foreign policy—if he wants to be. In the early period of the Republic, the President shared a number of foreign policy powers with the Congress. More recently, as we know, presidential power in foreign affairs has grown awesomely, particularly under the Nixon Administration.[8] In short, in terms of power relations, the American Government is a hierarchical system as regards the conduct of foreign policy.

An incoming President can define his own foreign policy role and set up his own decision-making system. He sets the foreign policy objectives of his administration and the tone; he appoints key Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officials, thus determining patterns of influence. In our system, presidential power has been bolstered by the fact that Cabinet officers tend not to be major political figures in their own right who themselves might aspire to presidential office one day. Usually, they are technicians or experienced generalists, selected because of their expertise and their loyalty to the President, and because they share the President's basic assumptions and objectives. They are thus "his men" first of all.[9] They cannot, of course, ignore Congress, especially when ap-

[7] Cf. Godfrey Hodgson, "The Establishment," *Foreign Policy*, No. 10 (Spring 1973), 3-40; also, for general treatment, Alexander L. George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making," *International Studies Quarterly*, XIII (1969), 190-222; and Halperin (fn. 3), 11-16. On Vietnam policy, see David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (New York: Random House 1972); and John C. Donovan, *The Cold Warriors: A Policy-Making Elite* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath 1974).

[8] The development is traced in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Imperial Presidency* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1973).

[9] The last President to appoint a major political figure as Secretary of State was Harry Truman, who offered the post to James F. Byrnes, his rival for the Vice Presi-

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propriations for their departments are involved. But they tend not to have the independence of British Cabinet Ministers, usually politicians, or the *Hausmacht* of a German Minister, who quite often has his own party base.

Obviously not all Presidents choose to play an active role in foreign policy; much depends on a President's interest and style. In the postwar period, to take only recent examples, we have seen a number of patterns.[10] Harry Truman was a strong President interested in foreign policy who, in his second Administration, chose a strong Secretary of State—Dean Acheson. Another pattern saw a weaker President but one with extensive foreign experience, Eisenhower, choose a strong Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, and employ more formal foreign policy machinery. During the Eisenhower Administration, the National Security Council (NSC), established by statute in 1947, saw its first extensive use as a formal institution. John F. Kennedy, a President with a passionate interest in foreign affairs, played down the NSC, preferring more informal decision making. His Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, turned out to be a weaker figure, and Kennedy played a key role himself, along with McGeorge Bundy, his National Security Advisor, in foreign policy making on major issues. He was a person who wanted to participate early in the formulation of alternative courses of action, not just at the final stage when a decision memorandum reached his desk. Kennedy would not hesitate to telephone State Department desk officers personally to obtain their views on developing problems or situations. Informal decision making continued under President Johnson, with little use of the full National Security Council mechanism. Johnson preferred to discuss his most important decisions with his closest advisors. Vietnam policy was made at the "Tuesday lunches." Dean Rusk's importance and role as Secretary of State was enhanced, and the small but highly effective NSC staff built up by Bundy diminished in size and importance. Walt Rostow, Johnson's National Security Advisor, served more as a personal counsel to the President than as a neutral foreign policy coordinator. On European and foreign economic issues, some quiet coordination continued under Francis Bator, Rostow's deputy.

When Richard Nixon took office, he was determined to take charge

dential nomination in 1944, and later regretted it. Cf. Louis Koenig, *The Chief Executive* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World 1964), 220. More recent partial exceptions are Melvin Laird and John Connally, Cabinet appointees under President Nixon who had some political following of their own.

[10] Cf. I. M. Destler, *Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1972), chap. 5.

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of foreign policy and to reestablish formal procedures for policy making. He appointed Henry Kissinger as his Assistant for National Security Affairs to help him do so. The Eisenhower-type NSC system was reactivated, but "without the concurrences."[11] William P. Rogers, a longtime friend of the President, but a man with little background in foreign affairs, was appointed Secretary of State. But Kissinger rapidly became the President's key foreign policy advisor.

The purpose of the Nixon-Kissinger NSC system was to centralize decision making in the White House on key issues of foreign policy and to prevent decision making through bureaucratic politics. According to the President's first Foreign Policy Report, "The new NSC system is designed to make certain that clear policy choices reach the top, so that the various positions can be fully debated in the meeting of the Council. . . . I refuse to be confronted with a bureaucratic consensus that leaves me no options but acceptance or rejection, and that gives me no way of knowing what alternatives exist."[12] The core of the system was a network of interagency committees at the Under-Secretary level, all chaired by Kissinger. Especially important have been the Senior Review Group (SRG) for general foreign policy issues; the Verification Panel (VP) for arms control issues; and the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) for crisis management. These committees were used to force the foreign policy/national security agencies to produce a series of studies (NSSM's, or National Security Study Memoranda) to be reported to the White House and provide a range of options, rather than agreed positions, on many issues. After deliberation and consultation with Kissinger, frequently following discussion at a Cabinet-level NSC meeting, the President would issue a National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM).[13]

[11] Quoted, *ibid.*, 118.

[12] Richard M. Nixon, *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, A New Strategy for Peace.* Report to the Congress, February 18, 1970, p. 22.

[13] Not all of the committees, it should be noted, were successful. The Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC) failed to gain control over the defense budget process. And the Under Secretaries Committee (USC), charged with monitoring policy implementation in several areas, turned in a mixed performance, as noted further on. For more detailed accounts of the structure of the NSC system, see *ibid.*, Part I, and Nixon, *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, Building for Peace.* Report to the Congress, February 25, 1971, Part VI; also the series of articles in the *New York Times*, January 18-24, 1971, later issued as a pamphlet entitled "United States Foreign Policy in the Nixon Administration"; Edward A. Kolodziej, "The National Security Council: Innovations and Implications," *Public Administration Review*, XXIX (November/December 1969), 573-85; Samuel C. Orr, "Defense Report: National Security Council Network Gives White House Tight Rein over SALT Strategy," *National Journal*, III (April 24, 1971), 877-86; John P. Leacacos, "Kissinger's Apparat," *Foreign Policy*, No. 5 (Winter 1971/72), 3-27; and Destler (fn. 10), especially chap. 5.

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The other important element of the system was the NSC staff, which during the first Nixon term was fairly large. It fluctuated between 45 and 55 professionals and was charged with collecting data, following the activities of the agencies, managing interagency working groups, analyzing the results of NSSM's, and providing crucial covering memoranda with recommendations to Kissinger, and through him to the President, on all NSC studies. In addition, the staff wrote briefing memoranda on current issues, prepared Kissinger and the President for summit talks, drafted answers to presidential correspondence, etc. The NSC staff became Kissinger's, and through him the President's, right arm which monitored and frequently directed the work of the departments and agencies, ensuring central control on a host of issues.

Clearly, in analyzing how foreign policy was made in the Nixon Administration, special attention has to be given to the functioning of the NSC system. When it worked best, the Nixon-Kissinger NSC system tended to resemble a multiple-advocacy model. Agencies participated in the drafting of NSC studies, including the formulation of options, in working groups. They could voice their preferences on options in the SRG or the VP and the full NSC meetings. The President, after hearing the discussion, could then reach an informed decision. However, in practice, formal meetings of the full NSC occurred less and less frequently after the first year of the Administration, the President preferring to deliberate alone over decision memoranda prepared by Kissinger, and to consult with him personally. This frequently meant that agency views could only be presented in the NSSM process at the level of the SRG or the VP, with Kissinger and his staff summarizing them later for the President. The President withdrew from all but the final stages of decision making, which Kissinger and his staff came to dominate more and more.

Kissinger was less and less the neutral custodian required by George's multiple-advocacy model. Rather, he became a strong advocate for policy positions, adding his own recommendations to all option papers he forwarded to the President. These were reinforced in frequent personal talks. Sometimes, if he had already made up his mind on an issue, Kissinger would simply dominate VP or SRG meetings by the force of his personality, stifling critical discussion of alternatives and encouraging groupthink tendencies.[14] Frequently he came to use the

[14] An experienced government official has suggested the following typology of kinds of policy discussions that have occurred at the level of the SRG or VP:

1) Kissinger knows what he wants and argues for it at the outset. He tends to dominate the group. Others take him on only if they are forceful personalities

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NSSM and the committee process to tie up the bureaucracy on issues where his own mind was made up, or where he wanted to delay decision, by simply ordering more studies. At other times Kissinger issued decision guidelines after an SRG or VP, interpreting the consensus or the President's will in his own way. As a result of his personal interventions, a number of possible bypasses developed in the NSC framework as depicted schematically in the following diagram:

NSC Process with Bypasses



NSSM = National Security Study Memorandum
NSDM = National Security Decision Memorandum
VPWG = Verification Panel Working Group
IG = Interdepartmental Group, used to prepare Senior Review Group (SRG)
Alternative VP/SRG outputs indicated by 1, 2, or 3

In addition to his duties as head of the NSC staff and later as personal advisor to the President, Kissinger took on other roles which served to enlarge further his and the President's control over foreign and national security policy, reducing still more the role of the bureaucracy. Kissinger took personal charge of a number of policy initiatives that were handled for the President outside the NSC system among small secret groups of advisors, such as the opening to China, U.S.-Soviet

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and very sure of their arguments. There is sometimes a danger of groupthink tendencies if people are afraid to disagree.

2) A "group grope" when nobody is sure of his ground on a new or unexplored policy issue.

3) Kissinger is open at the start and other agency representatives go into a meeting with strong, fixed views. A hybrid solution emerges which Kissinger accepts as a consensus.

4) A flight from decision—nobody wants to resolve a question.

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relations, and the Vietnam peace negotiations. He became a presidential negotiator, traveling all over the world on special assignments, many of which would normally have been the business of the Secretary of State. His frequent absences from Washington overloaded the NSC machinery, as backlogs of NSSM's, NSC meetings, and other business accumulated at the White House. Kissinger also became a star briefer of the press. On the other hand, he refused to testify before congressional committees, citing executive privilege, although he was willing to meet with groups of Senators privately on occasion for off-the-record briefings. Another feature of the system was Kissinger's penchant for personal secrecy. Frequently, departments were not told the results of top-level meetings between the President and/or Kissinger and high officials of foreign governments. Agency bureaucrats were frequently uninformed of policies on bilateral and other matters, demoralizing them and rendering them ineffective.

In terms of decision-making patterns, the system tended to divide issues into the following types: (1) High policy issues handled outside the NSC system under Kissinger's personal direction with little or no opportunity for bureaucratic inputs (the pure royal-court model). (2) Issues within the NSC system, and therefore subject to bureaucratic inputs and bargaining, to which Kissinger assigned high personal priority (e.g., SALT) and on which he often personally intervened to circumvent the system (via back-channel negotiations and/or personal advice to the President). (3) Second-order issues within the NSC system on which Kissinger had no set views, and/or to which he assigned less priority, which were settled on the basis of agency recommendations or consensus, or which drifted because Kissinger often did not have time to address himself to them. (In the latter case, agencies would be moved to handle the issues by themselves through individual agency determination, interagency compromise, or continued bureaucratic infighting.) (4) Low-level issues not handled within the NSC system via NSSM's, and therefore fair game for bureaucratic determination/bargaining from the outset, or questions involving other parts of the bureaucracy (for instance, foreign economic policy, science and technology) where Kissinger and the NSC had only partial interest or responsibility.

Another important area more susceptible to bureaucratic politics was the implementation of policy after it was decided within the NSC framework, a task made difficult for Kissinger without "centers of strength" in other parts of the foreign-affairs bureaucracy.[15] The NSC

[15] Cf. Destler (fn. 10), 140-41, 148-53.

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system was designed primarily for decision making, not for implementation, a task formally assigned to the Under Secretaries Committee, staffed by State. In fact, this arrangement never worked very well. NSSM responsibilities plus operational duties for Kissinger and the President were simply too numerous for implementation to be monitored properly by the small NSC staff. The problem was compounded by the fact that policy guidelines (NSDM's) were often drafted hurriedly by the NSC staff without consultation with the departments, leading to different possible interpretations later on and opening the way for bureaucratic bargaining again, or for individual agency bureaucrats making policy on their own.

After Kissinger became Secretary of State in September 1973, adding still another role to his foreign policy duties, the emphasis in foreign policy decision making shifted even further away from the NSC committee structure to a small number of Kissinger's key advisors, mostly former NSC colleagues whom he took with him to the State Department.[16] The NSC staff continues to exist, but has been severely weakened. Kissinger continues to retain his hat as National Security Assistant to the President, which gives him an interagency handle, especially on defense policy, and permits him on occasion to circumvent his State Department subordinates. (Following Nixon's resignation, this arrangement helped Kissinger to consolidate a privileged relationship with President Ford.)

Because of his burgeoning problems with Watergate, it appeared that President Nixon delegated more authority to Kissinger and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger in his final year in office, giving up some of his personal foreign policy role.[17] These two key Secretaries were reported to be communicating regularly, sometimes holding their own "Tuesday lunches," having breakfast together at other times, or talking frequently by telephone. (However, they were also known to differ, for example on SALT II tactics at the Moscow summit of June, 1974.)[18] In dealing with the bureaucracy, Kissinger's closed and secret operating style persists. He prefers to work with his own trusted "in-group," now installed at the top level at State, to which only a few others have

[16] Important among these are Lawrence S. Eagleburger, his Executive Assistant; Helmut Sonnenfeldt, now Counselor of the Department with special responsibilities for Soviet and European policies; Winston Lord, who heads Policy Planning; and William Hyland, now Director of Intelligence and Research, who is a crack Soviet analyst.

[17] See Leslie H. Gelb, "Nixon Role in Foreign Policy Altered; Some Assert Kissinger Is Now In Charge," *New York Times*, December 24, 1973.

[18] See, for example, Leslie H. Gelb, "Schlesinger for Defense, Defense for Détente," *New York Times Magazine*, August 4, 1974.

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been allowed access, frequently keeping lower-level bureaucrats in the dark.

In sum, the important innovations introduced in the Nixon-Kissinger NSC system, designed to curb decision making through bureaucratic politics, contained seeds of a multiple-advocacy system and did produce some orderly and impartial decision making in a few areas, serving up options for presidential choice, as will become clearer from our discussion of cases. As it turned out, however, the NSC system was only part of the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy system; the other parts were Kissinger's many other, often conflicting roles, and the President's tendency to work within his own White House royal court. In many cases, the NSC system seemed to be used to divert or exclude the bureaucracy while Nixon and Kissinger did the most important business on their own. On some issues, the bureaucracy struggled to make an input, and did, but was not always informed as to how final decisions were taken. On others, it was totally bypassed. On still others, bureaucratic politics continued as usual when the White Houses did not seize control.

III. European Policy Cases

In the following discussion we will consider in summary fashion cases in recent American policy making on issues of U.S.-European relations[19] in three categories: (1) cases of closed policy making conforming to the royal-court model; (2) mixed cases in which a number of patterns are visible and to which a number of models must be applied to explain outcomes; and (3) cases where the outcomes can be explained almost entirely by an organizational process or bureaucratic-politics approach. Most of the cases are taken from the first four years of the Nixon Administration and focus on decisions, but some consider problems of policy implementation as well. We begin with three cases of White House "court" policies: U.S.-Soviet relations, the "Year of Europe," and Nixon's New Economic Policy of August 1971.

Category 1: The Royal-Court Model

U.S.-Soviet Relations

From the beginning of the Nixon Administration, the President and Henry Kissinger took personal charge of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, which they considered the linchpin of

[19] Our definition of Europe is political rather than geographic here, and we therefore include cases dealing with the Soviet Union.

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American foreign policy. Shortly after the inauguration in 1969, the two men agreed on a set of principles on how to deal with the Soviets. These principles were not processed through the NSC machinery.[20] At their core was the "linkage approach," i.e., that a relaxation of tensions should be sought with Moscow on all fronts at the same time. The goal was an overall understanding, not a selective détente. Apparently, it was felt that such an understanding could be arrived at by the United States making concessions on SALT and Vietnam, the Soviets on the Middle East, while other issues could be dealt with by mutual compromise.[21]

As it turned out, this initial strategy was modified when the Soviets balked at it. In the first two years Moscow tested U.S. intentions. The Soviets either did not or could not help us much on Vietnam. They persisted in their disagreement with Washington on the Middle East, resulting in the Jordan crisis of 1970 and the post-Suez cease-fire tensions over the installation of missiles in Egypt. They tested the Administration in the Cienfuegos incident in September 1970, when they tried to establish a potential submarine base in Cuba, until the Administration stood firmly against it.

Kissinger managed contacts with the Russians, meeting frequently in Washington with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. For staff work, he relied amost exclusively on two NSC staff experts on Soviet policy—Helmut Sonnenfeldt, his assistant for Soviet and European affairs, and William Hyland. Only occasionally was advice solicited from the wider bureaucracy. And the President himself kept close tabs on developments. He frequently saw Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Washington. Nixon wanted to proceed cautiously at first, to feel out the Soviets. He also wanted to obtain congressional approval for the Safeguard ABM system and to proceed with MIRV testing before getting locked into arms control negotiations. But his mind was set on improving relations with Moscow.

After a cautious beginning, it turned out that Soviet leader Brezhnev had come to the same conclusion by 1971. In January of that year, Nixon initiated a secret correspondence with Brezhnev that led to the accord of May 1971, setting a target schedule for SALT I. The secret Kissinger-Dobrynin channel was activated to facilitate SALT and to discuss the Berlin negotiations and a host of other issues. In his April speech

[20] Indeed, according to the list published by John P. Leacacos, there was no NSSM on overall U.S.-Soviet relations between 1969 and the fall of 1971, although there were NSSM's on specific problem areas, such as SALT and Berlin. See Leacacos (fn. 13).

[21] See the account in Henry Brandon, *The Retreat of American Power* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1973), chap. 16, on which I draw here.

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to the Soviet Party Congress, Brezhnev publicly signaled his new commitment to a policy of détente and to domestic economic development. The two superpowers had come to the mutual realization that advantages were to be had for both sides in improved relations.

During the Soviet-American summits of 1972, 1973, and 1974, the pattern of close White House control over Soviet policy continued.[22] Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt, and a few other staff aides prepared the 1972 summit in secret meetings with Brezhnev in Moscow in April. Brezhnev's visit to the United States in June 1973 was preceded by Kissinger's trip to Russia in May. The summit sessions themselves were closely managed by the White House. And the results—a SALT I agreement and a host of other cooperation accords—were pathbreaking achievements.

The developing U.S.-Soviet détente faced a severe test in the Middle East crisis of October 1973. Although only part of the story is known, the President, by this time under the cloud of Watergate and the firing of Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, authorized Kissinger, now Secretary of State, to make most of the decisions under his other hat as Presidential National Security Advisor (the royal-court model again). What was perceived at first as another eruption in the Arab-Israeli conflict quickly took on the character of a Soviet-American confrontation when it was learned that the Soviets had sent massive quantities of ammunition to Cairo and Damascus prior to the outbreak of the Yom Kippur war. Then their airlift of supplies to the Arabs increased. And then, on October 24, two messages from Brezhnev threatened unilateral Soviet intervention to stop Israel.

Taking personal charge of crisis management, Kissinger was constantly in touch by telephone with Ambassador Dobrynin, as well as with the Arab and Israeli Ambassadors. At Brezhnev's invitation, he went to Moscow on October 20 to arrange details of the first cease-fire agreement which, it was hoped, would open the way for talks between the belligerents. After a number of violations had occurred, he later worked with Dobrynin to arrange a second cease-fire agreement. On the crucial evening of October 24-25, following receipt of Brezhnev's message threatening unilateral intervention if the United States did not agree to a joint Soviet-American peace-keeping force, the President again empowered Kissinger by telephone to take charge of the American response. After reviewing available intelligence, Kissinger convened a late-evening rump NSC meeting at the White House and obtained agreement on a proposed cease-fire alert and diplomatic re-

[22] See the accounts in Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, *Kissinger* (Boston: Little, Brown 1974), esp. chap. 12.

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sponse to Brezhnev, which were then cleared with Nixon and implemented, causing the Soviets to back down. (Secretary of Defense Schlesinger later disputed Kissinger's version that there was "unanimous" agreement at the meeting on the probability of Soviet intervention.) Only then were America's allies in Europe "informed" of what was transpiring, which became a sore point later when European recriminations mounted concerning the lack of U.S. consultation in a crisis deeply affecting their interests.[23]

THE "YEAR OF EUROPE"

In the spring of 1973 the Nixon Administration launched a major effort to recast U.S.-European relations, which were perceived as having drifted for too long. After a peace had been negotiated in Vietnam and new relationships nurtured with Peking and Moscow, attention could now be directed to Europe. The invitation was there; the October 1972 Paris summit communiqué of the European Community had called for a "constructive dialogue" with the United States. Early in 1973 the President had sent Peter Peterson, his former Commerce Secretary, on a special mission to Europe and Japan to survey how to deal with mounting international economic problems. Peterson produced a report arguing for an overview of political and economic issues and their linkage, which is said to have influenced the form taken by Henry Kissinger's initiative in his "Atlantic Charter" speech in New York on April 23.

In this speech, Kissinger called for a comprehensive approach to political, economic, and military issues in Atlantic relations and a "fresh act of creation" to establish "a revitalized Atlantic partnership" which should also include Japan.[24] Faced with a trade and balance-of-payments deficit and increasing protectionist sentiment in Congress, the Administration was concerned about rising U.S.-European economic tensions. Another worry was growing isolationism and opposition to overseas commitments, expressed most forcefully in Senator Mansfield's resolution to cut American troop levels in Europe. Kissinger linked these two sets of issues, hoping to elevate them from the hands of technicians to the highest political levels of the relevant governments. If Europe wanted American troops to remain on the Continent, there would have to be concessions to the United States on

[23] The most detailed account of the Middle East crisis so far, and the one on which I rely most here, is contained in Kalb and Kalb, *ibid.*, chaps. 17 and 18. See also David Binder's articles in the *New York Times*, November 21 and 25, 1973.

[24] The text of the "Year of Europe" speech is reprinted in the *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 68, May 14, 1973.

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trade and other matters. Hence, the call for an Atlantic Charter that the President would sign on his trip to Europe, envisioned for the end of the year.

The speech was drafted by a small group of members of the NSC staff. There was no broader consultation within the government for fear of leaks. Secretary Rogers, who also delivered a speech in New York on the same day, had no advance notice of Kissinger's address. Kissinger and those who drafted the speech thought the Europeans would applaud the new opportunity to discuss principles and issues in Atlantic relations. No one on the NSC staff expected the discord that resulted. No one expected that different countries would have very different views on the notion of a new "Atlantic Charter." (The original Charter was, of course, a World War II document composed by the United States and England and directed against Germany.) No one anticipated that European allies would refuse to respond with one document for security and economic matters and would "nitpick at the fine print," as one American official put it. The trauma in U.S.-European relations that followed makes the "Year of Europe" initiative a good case study of American misperceptions and unanticipated allied reactions. It is also a good case of the royal-court model of decision making.

The closed and secret manner in which this initiative was formulated helps to explain some of the poor tactics associated with it. There having been no prior consultation with our allies (except perhaps one high-level approach to the British), European governments were caught by surprise. It would have been easy for the President to write letters to European leaders explaining the address, but this was not done. Moreover, our foreign embassies were totally uninformed and could not answer questions from European officials about what the speech meant.

The speech was more hortatory in tone than it might have been had the Department of State been involved in the drafting. Europe was depicted as a "regional power" in economics and diplomacy, whereas the United States was a "global power" with worldwide interests and responsibilities—not a formulation likely to go down well with nations which, until recently, controlled far-flung empires. And the label "Year of Europe" was presumptuous to say the least.

In retrospect, it appears that the "Year of Europe" was an effort by Kissinger and the President to reassert American influence in Europe so as to subordinate important aspects of developing intra-European cooperation (especially in economics and foreign policy consultations)

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to American and Atlantic interests. For Kissinger, a bureaucratic motivation may also have been present. With foreign economic policy diffused in several Washington bureaucratic structures, Kissinger may have been looking for a way to get a handle on all these issues and relate them to broader U.S. foreign policy objectives. However, if that is true, he gave up the battle early on. Outside of State and the NSC, no foreign economic staffs in the Washington bureaucracy were asked to participate in the follow-up efforts to try to elicit responses from the Europeans in the form of one or more Atlantic declarations. The fact that European governments were negative at the outset toward linkage of economic and security matters, combined with Kissinger's inability to lead the Washington foreign economic bureaucracy, also explains in part why no Atlantic economic declaration emerged, and why the "Year of Europe" produced no forward progress on the trade and monetary fronts. The bureaucratic-politics approach does help us to understand this outcome.

As it turned out, the *implementation* phase continued to be closely managed by Kissinger, first from the White House, then as Secretary of State after September 1973. Negotiations with the European Nine on draft declarations concerning economic and security affairs (the Europeans, led by the French, insisted that the two fields be handled separately) were undertaken by Helmut Sonnenfeldt, who became Counselor of the State Department; by Walter Stoessel, the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs; and later by Arthur Hartman, with only very few other State staffers involved. Foreign embassies were again kept largely in the dark, and were thus unable to assist through their contacts with foreign governments. This high-level, closed approach assured that the making of declarations would be no more than a cosmetic exercise, detached from the tough specific issues requiring negotiation by the wider bureaucracies in Washington and European capitals. The "Year of Europe" might have worked better had these bureaucracies been included, allowing transgovernmental policy coordination and coalition building to prepare and facilitate negotiations.[25]

[25] See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations," *World Politics*, XXVII (October 1974), esp. 42-50.

Several European and American drafts of the declarations of Atlantic principles were published in the *New York Times* with accounts of the negotiations: the EC Nine draft on relations between the Common Market and the U.S., to which Washington objected, *New York Times*, September 24, 1973; the EC Nine "European identity" declaration, December 15, 1973; two French drafts of the NATO declaration, the first quoted in the *New York Times*, November 9, the second reprinted in full on November 19, 1973.

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Negotiations were also hampered by European skepticism over developing special relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., underscored by the prevention-of-war agreement signed at the summit of June 1973; by the lack of American consultation with her European allies prior to the worldwide military alert of American forces during the Middle East war in October; and by different degrees of dependency and different approaches to meeting the energy crisis. Following Kissinger's complaints in his "Pilgrim's" speech (December 1973), that the European Community was presenting decisions to the United States as *faits accomplis*, there was also the issue of "organic consultation." However, the process decided on in the U.S. effort to implement the "Atlantic Charter" speech contributed to the difficulty. Caught at first by surprise, European governments were suspicious of American intent and did not know what the United States wanted. Kissinger apparently assumed that Western Europe could be negotiated with as an entity, when in fact foreign policy consultations were only just beginning among the Nine, who were not at all accustomed to speaking with one voice. Yet Kissinger's closed negotiating style continued despite its inappropriateness to multilateral negotiations. In reality, U.S. policy had to be carefully orchestrated in nine different European capitals. Furthermore, Kissinger did not understand the process of European political cooperation in the Davignon framework, showing his pique a number of times when other allies were informed of conversations between himself and one of the EC Foreign Ministers.

In short, the "Year of Europe" was a failure for reasons of process as much as substance. It created more discord than it alleviated. The royal-court model of foreign policy making proved inadequate to achieve a new basis for linking complex and controversial issues of U.S.-European relations because Western Europe had as yet no president and foreign minister with whom Nixon and Kissinger could deal on a basis of equality. And none of the involved governments, the United States included, had an adequate mechanism for coordinating security and economic negotiations; each issue area had always been bureaucratically compartmentalized. Hence, the meager result was only one lofty NATO declaration of principles, to be quickly forgotten after a year of wrangling and disappointment.[26] (Curiously enough, the one positive result of the entire exercise was a modest advance, on the European side, of the nascent effort at political cooperation and

[26] The final declaration of Atlantic security principles, which has since become known as the Atlantic Declaration, was agreed to at the NATO Ministerial meeting at Ottawa and printed in the *New York Times*, June 20, 1974.

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definition of identity that Kissinger had at the start seemed anxious to head off.)

THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY OF AUGUST 1971

The decision announced by President Nixon on August 15, 1971, to terminate convertibility of dollars into gold and impose a ten per cent import surcharge, rocked the international economic system of the industrialized world. The action was taken after a small group of advisors met with the President at Camp David on August 13–14. The group included Treasury Secretary John Connally and Under Secretary Paul Volcker; Arthur Burns, President of the Federal Reserve Board; George Shultz, Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB); Paul W. McCracken and Herbert Stein of the Council of Economic Advisors, and Peter Peterson, head of the recently established Council on International Economic Policy. Conspicuously absent were Henry Kissinger, Secretary Rogers, or any other representative of the State Department, as well as representatives of other foreign economic policy agencies such as the Commerce Department or the Office of the Special Trade Representative. Although few accounts are available of this meeting, it appears that John Connally, who at that point had spent six months at Treasury and established a very close relationship with the President, dominated the deliberations.[27] Increasingly unsettled exchange markets in the preceding months, the outflow of dollars, the prospect of the first American trade deficit in this century, and the failure of the policy of "gradualism" in improving the domestic economy had set the stage for some kind of strong action.

The announcement shocked our European and Japanese allies, who were not consulted in advance. But that was undoubtedly the effect intended by Connally. The political consequences for relations with our allies had not been taken into account. For three months, the August measures—partly meant by Connally as a tactic to gain unilateral trade concessions from our allies and force favorable realignment in exchange rates—were maintained, but the United States was vague about its precise objectives. By then the Europeans had hardened their position, and there was a distinct possibility of their taking retaliatory measures. Eventually the United States agreed to devalue the dollar and negotiate a general realignment of exchange rates. That result can be explained by bureaucratic politics and is described further on. But the

[27] I have drawn here on a good, but incomplete and not flawless account contained in Brandon (fn. 21), chap. 14, supplemented by several interviews with government officials.

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effect of the closed August decision was to inject suspicion and tension such as had not existed for years in Atlantic relations, and from which we have still not recovered. A political foreign policy input into the Camp David meeting might have softened the measures taken and reduced the damage. As at other times, the American Government lacked an effective mechanism to analyze and integrate the political and economic aspects of an international problem. The Council for International Economic Policy (CIEP) was too weak and was not even used.

In short, the August 1971 decision is another negative example of royal-court model decision making—this time by the President under the heavy influence of John Connally—with the effect of excluding important foreign policy implications from what was treated as a narrow economic issue.

CATEGORY 2: MIXED CASES

A number of cases exhibit mixed patterns of decision making. We will look here at SALT, the Berlin negotiations, U.S. troops in Europe, the question of East-West mutual balanced force reductions (MBFR), and U.S. trade policy, in an effort to explain how combinations of our models must be brought to bear in order to understand certain kinds of foreign policy making.

SALT I

With the aid of considerable background material now in the public domain through the publication of John Newhouse's book,[28] the case of SALT I policy making can be analyzed by employing four models: pluralistic bureaucratic bargaining, multiple advocacy as present in the NSC system when used impartially, democratic politics, and strategic White House (i.e., royal-court) interventions.

The origins of SALT go back to the Johnson Administration, which was ready to open talks with Moscow on strategic arms limitation before the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia required a postponement. At the time, planning U.S. policy on SALT proceeded within a framework of open, pluralistic interagency bargaining with little or no central management or control. President Johnson wanted a simple, clear proposal, agreed upon among the agencies, which he could present to the Russians to start the talks. The White House staff was

[28] John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1973). This unusual inside account could only have been written with the blessing of Dr. Kissinger and with access to many of the government officials most involved.

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not involved in shaping the position. Much of this was done through shrewd maneuvering by Morton H. Halperin and his colleagues in International Security Affairs (ISA) at the Pentagon, working with the military and other agency counterparts. The pattern seems to have been one of pure bureaucratic interagency bargaining.[29]

All this was changed by the Nixon Administration. After some initial experimentation, Kissinger and his aides set up an interagency Verification Panel (VP) at the Under-Secretary level, chaired by Kissinger, to gather data, analyze them dispassionately, and formulate realistic options, as well as to get disagreements out in the open. The preparatory work was done by the interagency Verification Panel Working Group, chaired by the NSC staff man in charge of program analysis—at first Laurence E. Lynn, later K. Wayne Smith, and then Philip Odeen. It was responsible for analyzing the many technical issues involved in comparing American and Soviet missile systems, examining the verification issues connected with various possible agreements, and formulating "building blocks" and negotiating options. In chairing the VP Working Group, the NSC staff of course played an important role in ensuring that options it favored were included in study papers and in attempting to educate the agencies toward acceptance of such options. The Working Group was also a forum that aired interagency disagreements, so that Kissinger's staff could identify them and inform him before meetings of the VP and occasionally of the full NSC, chaired by the President.

Thus the staff could submit recommendations of its own to Kissinger, and he in turn could submit them to the President. Many issues were decided by the Verification Panel. Some of the tough decisions were referred to the senior body, the full National Security Council. But the decisions were taken "by the President and Henry Kissinger, sometimes before a meeting, sometimes afterward."[30]

The Nixon-Kissinger SALT system sometimes functioned according to the multiple-advocacy model, with Kissinger and his staff as the custodians at the center making sure that all the agencies involved had a chance to be heard and to present their data and positions. This occurred in the preparatory phases when the Verification Panel supervised the interagency analysis that produced nine "building block" options for initial exploration with the Soviets, beginning in the autumn of 1969. Multiple advocacy also yielded four initial negotiating options

[29] *Ibid.*, chap. 3.
[30] *Ibid.*, 179.

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(A, B, C, and D) at the time of the second phase of SALT I in the spring of 1970.[31] There are probably other examples in the later analytical work that went into other negotiating proposals.

Frequently, though, results of the work of the VP would be modified by Dr. Kissinger and the President. One example was the decision, following an NSC meeting in early 1972, to add an on-site inspection clause to Option C, which called for a MIRV ban. The Soviets were most unlikely to accept such a clause, given their past refusals on this subject in all previous postwar arms control negotiations. The reasons are not entirely clear, but it seemed a convenient way to head off a MIRV ban despite strong interest by the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) in this possibility.[32] Even more dramatic was the surfacing, without any prior interagency staff work, of NSDM 69 in July of 1970, proposing Option E. Discarding the notion of a MIRV ban or phased missile reductions, Option E proposed a fixed limit of 1900 strategic missiles and bombers on both sides, including one-way freedom to mix (that is, allowing conversion of land-based forces into sea-based, but not the reverse), and one National Capital Area (NCA) ABM site or zero ABM's. "Whereas the other options had been methodically shaped and honed by the entire SALT apparatus, Option E was strictly a White House affair; Kissinger, consulting closely with the President and one or two members of his own staff, was the architect."[33]

Another example comes from a story by a former NSC staff member, also discussed by Newhouse. Kissinger, after his secret Moscow trip in the spring of 1972, instructed the staff member to put a particular option on Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM's) into an options paper and obtain interagency agreement on it within one week. The Soviets had indicated willingness to accept the numbers of 62 submarines and 950 tubes (compared to 41 submarines and 656 tubes for the U.S., but with MIRV'ed missiles). The staff member did his work, using the VP Working Group to educate the bureaucracy to prepare for the deal that Kissinger and the President had already decided on.[34]

Bureaucratic bargaining on SALT was by no means removed by the NSC system. Melvin Laird, when he was Secretary of Defense, usually made sure that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had reached agreement on a problem before presenting it at high-level interagency meetings or to the President. Thus, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard and JCS

[31] *Ibid.*, 170-78. [32] *Ibid.*, 179-81. [33] *Ibid.*, 186. [34] *Ibid.*, 245-46.

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Chairman Admiral Thomas Moorer frequently presented a united front at meetings of the Verification Panel, which greatly strengthened their position vis-à-vis other agencies. Sometimes the factors of influence extended beyond the executive branch to include a broader circle, especially the Congress and party politicians (the democratic-politics model). The influence of the military, for example, was always strong in formulating SALT positions because the President did not want to lose support in the conservative wing of the Republican Party in the Senate debate on the ratification of the anticipated SALT Treaty, or in the 1972 Presidential election. This could have happened if the JCS became too unhappy and let it be known that national security interests were being sacrificed.

Another bureaucratic element was the SALT delegation in Vienna or Helsinki, which included OSD, JCS, State, and ACDA representatives who often had different recommendations to report to their own agencies. A few members, such as Paul Nitze and General Allison, were men of stature with their own lines of communication in special areas (Nitze had good access to both Laird and Kissinger). One or two others frequently took their case directly to the NSC staff. Gerard Smith more often than not was caught between his two roles: as head of ACDA he frequently was an advocate for a particular position; as chief negotiator he was compelled to follow the President's instructions. Occasionally, the SALT delegation appealed to the White House against a presidential decision on which they had not been consulted in advance; and sometimes they won.[35]

The element of striking a bargain with Cabinet officers who felt strongly about their positions was also present in SALT, though it appears to have operated in favor of the military rather than State or ACDA at most times. One example relates again to the question of a deal with the Soviets on SLBM's, following Kissinger's talks with Brezhnev of April 1972. At the nub of the issue was the President's need for support from the JCS for an agreement giving the Soviets numerical superiority in ICBM's and SLBM's in return for a missile freeze. Admiral Moorer, the JCS Chairman, wanted something else on his side—a White House green light on speeding up the Trident submarine program. After discussion with the President it was decided that "The Navy would have Trident, assuming congressional approval,

[35] For example, NSDM 117, issued in July 1971 without much consultation with the bureaucracy, was opposed on several points by the delegation. A revised position emerged in NSDM 120. "The delegation was conceded some points, but overruled on others, including the (ICBM) freeze dates." *Ibid.*, 224.

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and the President would have the support of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for an SLBM deal that gave the Soviets nearly half again as many missile-carrying submarines as the United States."[36]

By far the most striking and decisive of SALT decision-making patterns illustrated the crucial significance of the royal-court model for that negotiation: the highly secret back-channel activity by Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, Kissinger's secret trip to Moscow, and the President's own contacts with Brezhnev and Kosygin. Kissinger's talks with Dobrynin began in January 1971, when the Soviets were told that the United States would insist on a link between offense and defense. They continued through the spring and, along with a number of messages exchanged between President Nixon and Kosygin personally, paved the way to the joint U.S.-Soviet announcement of May 20, 1971, which broke the deadlock in the talks.[37] These exchanges resulted in Soviet agreement to accept more than an NCA ABM site on the American side, and also the principle of equality in ABM's. Moscow also agreed to drop its insistence on including Forward Based Systems (FBS), at least for SALT I. The United States made a concession by dropping the principle of equality in numbers of offensive missiles. The deal was backed up by an exchange of identical secret letters between Nixon and Kosygin, in addition to the public announcement as worked out by Kissinger and Dobrynin. While the Kissinger-Dobrynin contacts were proceeding, they were kept so secret that Gerard Smith, chairman of the U.S. SALT delegation, was not informed, although Semenov, the chief Russian delegate, usually was briefed from the Soviet side. The result was frequently embarrassment for Smith.[38]

Spring of 1972 was the other period of intense back-channel activity, leading up to Kissinger's secret trip to Moscow in April and finally to the summit in May. A number of personal messages were exchanged between Nixon and Brezhnev during this period.[39] Under cover of a public announcement that he was attending a weekend meeting at Camp David, Kissinger met with Brezhnev for four days in Moscow, accompanied by several NSC staff members. It was at this time that

[36] *Ibid.*, 246. As Theodore Sorensen has written, "In choosing between conflicting advice, the President is also choosing between conflicting advisers, conferring recognition on some while rebuffing others. He will, consequently, take care to pay more attention to the advice of the man who must carry out the decision than the advice of a mere 'kibitzer.' He will be slow to overrule a Cabinet officer whose pride or prestige have been committed, not only to ease that officer's personal feelings but to maintain his utility and credibility." *Decision Making in the White House*, 79, cited in Destler (fn. 10), 134n.

[37] Newhouse (fn. 28), 203-19.

[38] *Ibid.*, 206.

[39] *Ibid.*, 243 ff.

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Brezhnev presented the specific proposal on numbers of SLBM's that broke the back of that issue, plus a more general statement on two ABM sites which, although requiring subsequent refinement, eventually led to the final formula on that question.

Noteworthy during the May summit itself were the personal roles played by Kissinger and his assistants, Sonnenfeldt and Hyland, in negotiating final details of the agreement in Moscow while the delegations were still in Helsinki. The remaining dispute concerned "the number of SLBM's the Soviets actually had, and the number of old missiles they would be obliged to retire in order to reach the agreed totals of 62 submarines and 950 missiles." Kissinger and his group were in frequent telephone contact with other members of the NSC staff in Washington which "had the job of preventing any erosion of support for the White House position within the government."[40] Only after final obstacles had been removed was the U.S. delegation called to Moscow for the signing ceremony.

From this brief account of SALT I we can conclude: (1) that strategic White House interventions, in secret contacts with Moscow, were crucially important to break deadlocks in the negotiations, making possible their final success; (2) that SALT I, at least in its early phase, was a success for the NSC system and the NSC staff, which played a perhaps indispensable role in gathering data and conducting analyses, forcing the agencies involved to produce impartial studies and options, suppressing bureaucratic politics—or at least postponing it for later phases of decision making; and (3) that despite the importance of the royal-court model in explaining some important outcomes in U.S. SALT policy, bureaucratic- and domestic-politics models must also be applied to understand the whole story.

THE BERLIN NEGOTIATIONS

On September 3, 1971, a Four-Power Agreement was signed which provided, for the first time, written guarantees of Western access rights to Berlin and assurances of practical improvements for its inhabitants, while maintaining West Berlin's ties to the Federal Republic. Important in its own right, the agreement, along with supplementary arrangements concluded between East and West Germany soon thereafter, represented a significant step in President Nixon's proclaimed era of negotiation and détente in Europe and Chancellor Brandt's *Ostpolitik,* for its ratification was linked to Bonn's acceptance of the Moscow Treaty and to American willingness to proceed with MBFR and

[40] *Ibid.*, 253.

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the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

In terms of the policy process, the Berlin accord is another case—this time of a multilateral negotiation—which included both bureaucratic and royal-court patterns of U.S. decision making.

Following an exchange of notes with the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1969, the negotiations began in March 1970 at the ambassadorial level. Serious drafts were exchanged between the three Western allies and the Soviet side in February and March 1971, after which the pace quickened until an accord was initialed in late August, to be signed a few days later. Bureaucratically, the talks were supported by a complex structure: a good deal of exploratory staff work, including drafting of position papers, took place in the so-called Bonn Group, which usually met at the level of heads of the political sections of the British, French, and American Embassies, together with the head of the German section of the West German Foreign Ministry. The Bonn Group's procedure was to discuss and form a consensus on position papers before submitting them to governments. On the American side, the representative was Jonathan Dean, an energetic and exceptionally skillful foreign service officer who had the complete confidence of the Ambassador. Occasionally, the Bonn Group met at the ambassadorial level to discuss particularly difficult problems.

In Washington, there were two NSSM's designed to consider U.S. objectives in the Berlin negotiations: NSSM 111, issued December 29, 1970; and NSSM 136, issued July 30, 1971. These studies were staffed by the European Inter-Departmental Group (chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, including an NSC staff representative), which reported to the Senior Review Group chaired by Dr. Kissinger. Moreover, State had frequently had its own Berlin Task Force, from which a number of personnel were informally drawn to formulate State's recommendations for the negotiations. In addition to the Assistant Secretary, Martin Hillenbrand—a man who had served as Minister in Bonn a few years before and had German expertise—James Sutterlin, the German desk officer, made important inputs at State. Since the subject at hand was a political-diplomatic negotiation in the first instance (and no one was suggesting removal of American troops in West Berlin), State had the strongest hand in interagency discussions.

Of special importance, however, to the success of the Berlin exercise, were the personal interest of the President, his close relations with the American Ambassador in Bonn, Kenneth Rush (his former law professor at Duke University), and the interventions of Dr. Kissinger. The

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details of this story are not public, but at several key points in the negotiations the President and/or Kissinger were in direct contact with Rush to give him instructions, frequently catching the State Department off guard. Rush later described Nixon's direct personal interest in the negotiations as follows:

> During the talks I was in touch with him frequently and received from him direct and frequent guidance. The President intervened personally with Soviet officials to overcome difficulties which arose during the course of the negotiations, particularly at one point when the Soviet negotiators appeared unwilling to discuss the central access issue until they first received satisfaction about the reduction of the Federal German presence in the Western sectors. In sum, his help was inestimable in bringing the negotiations to fruition.[41]

A further element in the back-channel network was Henry Kissinger's discussion of Berlin issues with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin at several points. Kissinger, of course, drew on the analysis of his own NSC staff, especially that of Helmut Sonnenfeldt and his associates, who were concerned that the bureaucracy not rush into a premature agreement.

U.S. policy in the Berlin negotiations was therefore a mixture of positions suggested by the bureaucracy, especially State and the American Embassy staff in Bonn, led by Jonathan Dean working in the Bonn Group, tempered and at times even contradicted by back-channel interventions with Ambassador Rush and the Soviets by Kissinger and the President. Rush obviously played an important role in the negotiations, but there were instances when even he, in spite of his close relationship with the President, did not know what was transpiring. As in the case of SALT I, it appears that a number of crucial White House démarches with the Soviet adversary were important in removing lower-level bureaucratic deadlocks and expediting the successful conclusion of the negotiations.

U.S. TROOPS IN EUROPE

The question of U.S. force levels in Europe was examined intensely within the Nixon Administration during 1970–71, spurred by both an internal governmental review of NATO strategy and several Senate Resolutions sponsored by Senator Mansfield and others to reduce our military presence on the Continent. The Administration study was centrally managed following the request for NSSM 84 in November

[41] From "The Berlin Agreement: An Assessment," Address by Kenneth Rush before the Berlin Chamber of Commerce and Industry, September 22, 1971, in *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 65, November 1, 1971, p. 493.

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1969. After several delays in the production of the study, the results were reviewed in the NSC system during the summer and fall of 1970, culminating in a Cabinet-level National Security Council meeting in November. Three options were discussed.[42] After the NSC deliberations, the President apparently decided in favor of maintaining an American force upward of 250,000 in Europe as necessary to give NATO the capability of fighting a large-scale conventional war, at least for a short period. In a message to the NATO Ministerial Meeting of December 1970, he announced that the United States would not reduce its forces in Europe before 1972 without reciprocal reduction by NATO's adversaries. (The time period was extended later.)

Meanwhile, Henry Kissinger was determined that both the United States and our European allies enhance their capability to conduct ground warfare in Europe by improving equipment, supplies, and deployments. Recommendations along these lines followed from NSSM 84, and from the U.S.-supported NATO review initiated in 1969 known as AD-70 (Atlantic Defense for the 1970's). Burden sharing was also one of the objectives of these efforts, one fruit of which was the European Defense Improvement Program (EDIP)—announced at the December 1970 NATO Ministerial Meeting—to which the European allies committed themselves over five years at a cost of $1 billion.

The issue of what to do about force levels in Europe had not caused intense dispute in the Washington bureaucracy. The State Department opposed any reductions, believing that such action would undermine NATO cohesion and harm the Western bargaining position in expected talks with the Warsaw Pact countries on mutual force reductions (MBFR). The Joint Chiefs, not wishing to undermine the military balance in Europe, took a similar line. Other elements in the Defense Department apparently urged some reductions because of cost pressures, an argument that probably influenced Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to recommend a 10 per cent reduction in American forces. But he was also concerned that Congress might legislate even larger reductions if the Executive did not bend at least somewhat in the direction of cuts, a line which Kissinger himself was probably prepared to accept. Treasury's concern with balance-of-payments aspects of the question does not seem to have been overriding.[43]

The mix of factors that influenced the President's decision cannot be

[42] In the following discussion, I draw in part on John Yochelson, "The American Military Presence in Europe: Current Debate in the United States," *Orbis*, XV (Fall 1971), 784-807.

[43] *Ibid.*, 794-95.

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known exactly. Presumably, it included uncertainty about West Germany's *Ostpolitik* and overall relations with the Soviet Union at a time of tension in the Middle East and rumored establishment of a Soviet missile base in Cuba. Nixon may have thought this was not the moment to give the Soviets unilateral concessions. Moreover, he was reluctant to diminish American political influence in Europe in any way. The Germans and other European allies were also applying pressure against American reductions. However, the conservative positions taken by the President and most of the bureaucracy can also be explained by a mind-set shared by the entire American NATO policy-making elite, including officials in the State and Defense Departments, the military, as well as Congressmen and Senators, the President himself, and influential members of the academic and business establishments outside the government (of which Kissinger was formerly a member). Involved for many years in the construction of NATO as a bulwark of the West in the cold war, this elite did not wish to take actions that would in any way weaken the alliance.

The weight of this bipartisan elite was to be felt a short time later when the White House appealed to it to help defeat a number of resolutions introduced suddenly in the Senate in May 1971 by Senator Mansfield and others, calling for unilateral American force cuts of up to 50 per cent by the end of the year. The President met personally with prominent individuals of both parties who were associated with the U.S. involvement in NATO (including John McCloy, Dean Acheson, George Ball, and Cyrus Vance). On May 15, a statement was released opposing the Mansfield Amendment, signed by nearly all living former Secretaries of State and Defense and their deputies, as well as by numerous other officials and former officials. Separate statements were obtained from Presidents Truman and Johnson.[44] A press campaign was organized, and the Administration lobbied actively with Senators from both parties. The Mansfield Amendment was defeated in the Senate by a vote of 36-61, and a number of compromise versions were also defeated on May 19. A subsequent effort by Senator Mansfield to revive the issue with another resolution in December 1971 was also unsuccessful.

An external factor aided the Administration's case against unilateral cuts in 1971. In a speech at Tiblisi on May 14, remarkable for its fortuitous timing from the Administration's perspective (a point that has not been satisfactorily explained), Soviet Party Chairman Brezhnev stated for the first time that Moscow was ready to begin negotiations

[44] See Hodgson (fn. 7), 29-32.

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between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries for mutual reduction of forces in Central Europe. The Administration immediately told Senators that it was foolish to cut troops unilaterally and weaken the Western hand in East-West talks. (This has remained the position of the Administration ever since.)

Decision making on troops in Europe thus reveals several patterns: the royal-court model again, since the final choice among several options was taken by the President himself; the democratic-politics model, because Executive-Congressional relations and Senate politics were very much at issue; and, most important of all, shared assumptions or mind-sets permeating a large policy-making elite within the government, and even extending outside it.

MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS (MBFR)

At its Reykjavik Ministerial meeting in June 1968, NATO signaled interest in exploring mutual force reductions with the Warsaw Pact countries. Although MBFR was generally accepted in NATO following the Harmel Report as an obvious area for advancing East-West détente, the Johnson Administration favored the idea primarily as a way to check Senator Mansfield and his supporters in the Senate. It was thought that Mansfield could be headed off by involving the United States and NATO in a complex East-West negotiation on reduction of forces. The West European allies agreed on MBFR as a desirable alternative to unilateral American reductions.

The issue was put "on ice" after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, but then reactivated in a succession of NATO communiqués after April 1969. Brezhnev endorsed the idea of negotiations in May 1971. Preparatory talks began in January 1973, and formal negotiations opened in Vienna the following October with nineteen countries participating. The talks have been stalled over the core questions of the kind and sequence of reductions.[45]

In terms of policy formulation, the making of U.S. policy on MBFR has gone through several phases:

1. From the Reykjavik signal of June 1968 to the spring of 1970,

[45] NATO, favoring U.S. and Soviet reductions first to a common ceiling in ground-force manpower, began the negotiations by calling for phased cuts of 10% in Western (largely U.S.) ground forces and 20% in Soviet-Warsaw Pact forces, to a ceiling of about 700,000 men. The Eastern bloc, desirous of preserving its present numerical advantage, has preferred instead equal numbers or percentage cuts in all types of forces, including air and nuclear forces, as well as immediate cuts in both stationed and indigenous forces. See the *New York Times*, September 16, 1973; and *NATO Review*, XXII (June 1974), 29-32, for a status report as of spring 1974. For the original NSC options, see the President's *Foreign Policy Report*, May 3, 1973, pp. 204-7.

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preliminary planning took place in a highly decentralized manner run by the agencies, especially State and Defense, and focused on inputs into NATO model-building exercises. Indeed, it can be argued that the deepening U.S. commitment to pursue MBFR was made primarily by the State Department in a succession of NATO communiqués without much White House review. The President and Dr. Kissinger, absorbed with winding down the Vietnam war, were not much interested in the question.

2. In April 1970, White House involvement began in a low-key manner with the issuance of NSSM 92, aimed at prodding the bureaucracy into sharper analysis of approaches to MBFR negotiations. In some respects, NSSM 92 was also a stalling action to keep the bureaucracy busy examining possible options without committing the U.S. any further at this time. The NSC staff became involved in interagency working groups in Washington, but the work was still very much exploratory. Kissinger still had not really focused on the problem. Meanwhile, the State Department continued to dominate inputs into NATO model building and the writing of NATO communiqués. The results of NSC staff work were not shared with the NATO allies.

3. After Brezhnev's Tiblisi speech, Kissinger began to focus on MBFR, potentially an active issue in U.S.-Soviet relations and by this time becoming useful again to ward off new pressures from the Senate for unilateral American troop cuts. The NSC staff began to manage the MBFR process more carefully through the Verification Panel and the VP Working Group. However, the bureaucracy played an important role in formulating MBFR negotiating options, and in taking the lead in NATO to achieve agreement on a common position to open negotiations in October 1973. Kissinger and the President continued to be negatively disposed toward MBFR as an arms-control measure, preferring to emphasize instead the primacy of undiminished NATO military security as the key criterion for MBFR. Clearly, at the top level of the White House, MBFR was seen as a "damage-limiting" exercise, as a tactical device vis-à-vis the Congress in the effort to maintain U.S. troop levels in Europe, and as a small instrument to be employed in widening U.S.-Soviet détente if the Soviets wanted it.

Bureaucratic politics has not been a dominant feature of MBFR. All the agencies are now agreed to pursue these negotiations in order to avoid unilateral force reductions. (Here the shared perceptions or cold-war mind-sets about the sanctity of NATO and our current force levels, discussed in the previous section, also come into play.) However, there have been a few exceptions. The JCS first resisted MBFR, but after 1970

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realized that negotiations were likely and that they needed to participate. The military has come to understand that under no conditions short of outright war will it obtain increased forces in Europe. MBFR was the only hope of postponing unilateral reductions. In 1970–71 the Pentagon opposed indigenous allied force reductions; State disagreed, citing allied views. The Pentagon won, and NATO's opening MBFR position focused on U.S.-Soviet reductions first. In the fall of 1971 Defense Secretary Laird, sensitive to congressional desires for early troop cuts, sent a stiff memo to the White House at the urging of Lawrence Eagleburger, then Deputy Assistant Secretary in ISA, pressing for early decisions on the American MBFR position and forward movement toward opening negotiations. Kissinger, preferring to delay, did not act on this recommendation. Throughout MBFR so far, the Department of State and the JCS, not normally bureaucratic allies, have been united in a concern to preserve NATO cohesion.

Important to understanding the bureaucratic process has been the collegial quality of the interagency Verification Panel Working Group, chaired first by Philip Odeen, later by Jan Lodal of the NSC staff. According to one participant, the White House NSC staff is *primus inter pares* in the MBFR Working Group, but it does not dictate. Instead, a consensus process of policy making has evolved.[46] The quality of the agency representatives is high. They meet frequently and know each other well. For a long period there was considerable stability in personnel—by now recognized experts in the esoteric technical subject at hand. Since the opening of negotiations in 1973, day-to-day tactical questions have been decided in a second forum, the MBFR backstopping group, chaired by ACDA, in which a similar consensual process of policy making seems to occur.

The most important White House intervention in MBFR policy was probably the choice of the U.S. position to be presented to the allies prior to formulating a common NATO position for the opening of negotiations. Presumably, Kissinger or the President decided this matter under strong pressure from the Pentagon. Other interventions have been procedural. At the Moscow summit of May 1972, the President pressed for and obtained a Soviet commitment to negotiations in principle. Dr. Kissinger clarified this Soviet commitment and strengthened

[46] A question which cannot be answered here is whether this kind of policy-making group encourages groupthink tendencies, stifling critical discussion of alternatives. Much depends on the personality of the chairman. My own guess is that this phenomenon occurs less here, but more frequently in meetings chaired by Kissinger in which he leads the discussion forcefully on a question on which he has already made up his mind.

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the linkage to CSCE on his trip to the Soviet Union in September 1972. During Brezhnev's visit to the United States in June 1973, a date was set for the formal opening of MBFR talks.

In sum, subject to overall White House coordination and guidelines and a few important decisions, much of MBFR policy has been made by the bureaucracy in a framework which frequently approached that of multiple advocacy. Given the multilateral nature of the negotiations and the need to consult and reach agreement on a common position with allies, the process has been open, leaving room for bargaining between agencies and with the negotiating team in Vienna. At a few crucial points, however, the influence of the Pentagon, which controls the "marbles" in this game—defense being its business—has been strongly asserted in the White House. However, there are many elements that make MBFR not a serious arms-control exercise, but "a charade," as one highly placed official called it, to stall congressionally forced U.S. troop cuts. This fact may go far in explaining the absence of sharp bureaucratic disagreement.[47]

THE TRADE REFORM ACT OF 1973 AND PREPARATION FOR MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

The Trade Reform Act submitted to the Congress in the spring of 1973, which was later passed as the Trade Act of 1974, is designed to provide the President and the executive branch with negotiating authority to enter into a new round of multilateral trade negotiations aimed especially at further reducing trade barriers among the industrialized countries. The European Community encompasses many of these countries and is a major target of the legislation. In understanding the process of formulating the bill and preparing the United States for trade negotiations, the bureaucratic- and democratic-politics models need to be applied.

Trade policy is one of the most complicated areas of foreign policy. It affects many domestic interest groups, whether they be labor unions, small businesses, or the large industrial corporations. There are countless vested interests with bread-and-butter concerns. These interests exert pressures on Congressmen who have to pass on trade legislation. And the parts of the executive branch involved have to work closely with the Congress, often bargaining and exchanging favors, to gain its support for legislation providing negotiating authority.

[47] MBFR negotiations will probably last for years, and the resulting reductions could be modest. For a critical view of U.S. MBFR policy, see John Yochelson, "MBFR: The Search for an American Approach," *Orbis*, XVII (Spring 1973), 155-75.

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The second reason for complexity is the profusion of bureaucratic structures in our government which have interests in trade policy. Involved recently have been the Office of the President's Special Trade Representative (STR), the Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP, created in 1971), the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), and the Departments concerned: Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, and State, to name the most important. Since most Presidents have neither the time nor the interest to focus on trade issues in detail, because of their technical and specialized nature, these questions have traditionally been worked out by the bureaucracy at lower levels through bureaucratic politics and consensus formation. In the last two years of the Nixon Administration this process became more centralized in the person of George Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury, who also wore the hat of Assistant to the President for all foreign and domestic economic policy matters and chaired the Economic Council. Shultz was the "economic Kissinger."

However, Shultz's style was different from Kissinger's. And Shultz had stronger views on domestic than on foreign economic policy. On the latter he was a "consensus" decision maker, taking few strong personal stands. But he became the funnel for all foreign economic policy decisions; the President's Special Trade Representative and the CIEP reported to and through him to the President. Shultz and Kissinger reportedly developed a *modus vivendi* and tried not to disagree with each other, both realizing that their power bases could only suffer by doing so. Yet the resulting fragmentation between the two men and their areas was not satisfactory from the standpoint of integrating political and economic inputs into foreign policy. The problem was intensified by Kissinger's secondary interest in trade and other economic issues.[48]

The process of formulating and enacting a new trade bill proceeded through several stages. First, the bill had to be drafted within the executive branch. The origins of that process go back to the fall of 1971, when new trade concessions were demanded by Secretary Connally and others as part of the Smithsonian agreement on the realignment of exchange rates. This was followed by U.S.-EC and U.S.-Japanese joint declarations in early 1972, committing the parties to work toward multilateral negotiations covering all aspects of trade. By the

[48] Cf. C. Fred Bergsten, "Mr. Kissinger: No Economic Superstar," *New York Times*, December 12, 1973. The NSC staff has been only marginally involved in foreign economic policy. It usually had one or two competent staffers working on the area, but Kissinger—usually busy with other matters—frequently did not give them sufficient support to allow them to operate effectively vis-à-vis the foreign economic bureaucracy.

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fall of 1972 a consensus had formed among many professionals in the U.S. foreign economic bureaucracy, led by Secretary Shultz, to formulate a new trade bill, including provision of presidential authority to negotiate tariffs down to zero and to deal with non-tariff barriers and provide some adjustment assistance.

Using Peter Flanigan, the CIEP Executive Director, as his deputy, Shultz set up two interagency groups under CIEP to prepare a bill—one group chaired by STR to consider factors of international negotiability (in which STR played a vigorous role), the second chaired by CIEP itself to consider legislative aspects, i.e., what the Congress would accept. Many other *ad hoc* groups met under this structure to consider the myriad of technical issues (such as problems of trade with Japan and the GATT 24 (6) questions, for instance). Meetings were held intensively in the early months of 1973. Participants describe the process on the whole as a smooth one of formulating a bureaucratic consensus. Most bureaucrats involved, aware of the dangers of rising protectionism in the United States and abroad, were committed to a major new step toward free trade. Shultz played a key role as a mediator, chairing the final meetings to get an agreed text before sending the bill to the President. On one particular issue, that of adjustment assistance, Shultz intervened personally. The question had provoked considerable bureaucratic debate, with the Departments of Labor and State, STR, and potentially the Congress favoring large assistance programs, while Shultz, OMB, and at least one other agency argued for smaller assistance with larger unemployment insurance. Shultz won (perhaps the royal-court model here!). Otherwise, the process followed the pattern of bureaucratic political bargaining and persuasion, perhaps even multiple advocacy, but without too many sharp disagreements, thereby permitting the formation of a consensus.

A second stage involved liaison work with the Congress to obtain passage of the bill. That was primarily the task assigned to the STR Deputy, William Pearce. Clearly, the model here is one of democratic politics, as the Administration sought to persuade key domestic interest groups, such as the AFL/CIO who were initially opposed to the legislation, and key congressional committees, especially House Ways and Means, to support the bill. The House Ways and Means Committee, as it turned out, approved a modified bill in October 1973, omitting provisions that would have allowed the President to impose quotas if he decided that imports had caused "market disruption." It also reduced presidential authority to impose trade restrictions to deal with payments imbalances. Moreover, it was more generous in the provisions

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on adjustment assistance to both workers and businesses adversely affected by imports. Considerable authority was granted the President to bargain down tariffs and non-tariff barriers.[49] The bill passed the House in December 1973, only to be blocked in the Senate because of the Jackson Amendment, refusing most-favored-nation treatment to the Soviet Union until the question of emigration of Soviet Jews was dealt with more liberally by the Soviet Government.

It took all of 1974 to resolve the Jewish emigration issue and obtain Senate approval and final congressional passage of the bill. Secretary Kissinger, reluctant to press the Soviets too hard for fear of jeopardizing détente, and perhaps unconvinced that the Trade Bill (not his project) was all that important, insisted first on dealing personally with Senator Jackson. For months they jockeyed for position, until in the fall European leaders increased pressure on Kissinger regarding the importance of multilateral trade negotiations to Atlantic relations. President Ford finally intervened to force Kissinger and Jackson to meet with him at the White House and work out a compromise on the rate of Jewish emigration and the type of Soviet commitment. (The Soviets later denied making any specific deal.) Only then did the Senate Finance Committee address the substance of the bill. At that point William Eberle, the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations who was later also appointed Executive Director of the CIEP, and his deputy, Ambassador Harald B. Malmgren, took over relations with the Congress and established an open and effective working relationship with the Senate Finance Committee during the final review process, backstopping it with a continuing interagency consultation process inside the executive branch. Frequently Eberle and/or Malmgren were present in the Senate committee room during debate on the final markup of the bill. The confidence established between Eberle, Malmgren, and key Senators, and the open STR-Senate consultation paid off in moving the bill to final Senate approval by the end of the year, contrasting with Kissinger's earlier closed-style confrontation tactics vis-à-vis Senator Jackson.

A third stage, the international preparation for negotiations, proceeded simultaneously with the second under the direction of Ambassador Malmgren. This stage involved work with the GATT Preparatory Committee for Trade Negotiations, beginning in January 1973, to develop methods and procedures for negotiations. Malmgren also traveled to a host of countries, industrial and less developed alike,

[49] *New York Times*, September 23 and October 4, 1974.

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to make contacts, begin a learning process, and build centers of support for negotiations, as well as to broaden their understanding of U.S. interests. This kind of international staff work mixes diplomatic consultation with international bureaucratic politics. The actual negotiations, to have begun at Tokyo in September 1973, were of course postponed because of congressional delay in passing the Trade Reform Act. They are now expected to proceed in 1975, perhaps continuing into 1978.[50]

CATEGORY 3: ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS/BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS

Bureaucratic politics, as we have seen, has played a role in a number of our mixed cases in Category 2; but in none of them has this model alone provided a satisfactory explanation. We will now consider two cases where the organizational-process/bureaucratic-politics model appears to be dominant in explaining outcomes: (1) international economic policy making in the autumn of 1971; and (2) the making of international monetary policy.

THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS OF AUTUMN 1971

Bureaucratic politics includes not just the interplay of government agencies, but also the interaction of top officials appointed by the President. The period between the announcement of Nixon's New Economic Policy on August 15, 1971, and the Smithsonian agreement in December 1971 is an interesting case of maneuvers between top officials to head off Secretary John Connally's pressure and delaying tactics vis-à-vis our allies, and persuade the President that overall foreign policy interests required a settlement on exchange rates and removal of the import surcharge. In this effort, there apparently was an informal alliance between Arthur Burns of the Federal Reserve Board, Henry Kissinger at the White House, and Nathaniel Samuels, the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, all of whom grew increasingly concerned that Connally's actions would provoke allied retaliation. Kissinger was worried that economic tensions would spill over to weaken U.S. security interests, creating disarray in the North Atlantic Alliance just before the impending China and Moscow summits which were scheduled for 1972. Peterson, the head of CIEP, also tried to

[50] For further analysis of the domestic and international political economy of U.S. trade policy, see C. Gordon Bare, "Trade Policy and Atlantic Partnership: Prospects for New Negotiations," *Orbis*, XVII (Winter 1974), 1280-1305; and William Diebold, Jr., "U.S. Trade Policy: The New Political Dimensions," *Foreign Affairs*, LII (April 1974), 472-96. The final version of the International Trade Act of 1974 is summarized in the *New York Times*, March 10, 1975.

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influence the President, but his effectiveness is less clear. He was no match for the dynamic Connally. The situation was delicate, however, and Kissinger especially did not join a formal bureaucratic coalition against Connally, who, if he thought he was being ganged up on, might have unleashed the full force of his ebullient personality to force the President to toe his line. Connally's key opponents worked on separate tracks to gain the President's ear. Secretary of State Rogers, curiously enough, stood aside from the struggle.

According to Brandon's account, Burns acted first by suggesting that Dr. J. Zijlstra, the president of the Bank for International Settlements as well as the head of the Central Bank of the Netherlands, act as an intermediary and make the rounds of the Group of Ten capitals in search of a compromise solution to exchange rate realignment.[51] The Zijlstra mission performed a service that was perceived as useful by all concerned except Connally, who refused to see Zijlstra, and wanted no one to interfere with his own negotiating tactics. Samuels supported Burns's efforts as best he could, though hindered by the neutral position taken by Rogers. Burns was also warning President Nixon of the dangers of an international recession if the monetary uncertainty was not settled. Kissinger, weak in international economics but by now fully sensitive to the political consequences of the crisis, first consulted a number of experts. Francis Bator of Harvard and Richard N. Cooper of Yale wrote him a joint memo, criticizing Connally's dilatory tactics and vagueness in defining U.S. demands, and urging removal of the surcharge and efforts to get agreement with the allies on exchange rates. Presumably, Kissinger then presented his case to the President. By November Nixon was apparently leaning more toward the Kissinger-Burns view.

But the clincher for Kissinger lay in a number of summit meetings already planned with Western leaders for consultations in advance of the Moscow and China trips, which allowed him to get a handle on the problem. Kissinger's key intervention was at the December 14 meeting with President Pompidou at the Azores. It was Kissinger who, over breakfast with Pompidou, settled the amount by which France was willing to revalue the franc in exchange for dollar devaluation. Connally, who had been forced to give up his waiting game, then went ahead brilliantly to negotiate the realignment of all industrial world currencies at the Smithsonian meeting. A few days later, on December 20, President Nixon lifted the import surcharge. (Accord-

[51] Cf. Brandon (fn. 21), chap. 14, on which I draw in the following discussion, as amended by a number of my own interviews with government officials.

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ing to one close observer, another tactic Kissinger may have used to support his line with the President was to appeal to the British, possibly through his counterpart, Sir Birke Trend in the Cabinet Office, to refuse a summit meeting with Nixon in December until the monetary issue was settled. The author has not been able to confirm this account which, if true, would represent an interesting maneuver in international bureaucratic politics.)

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY POLICY

Like trade policy, U.S. international monetary policy tends to be most concerned with the industrialized countries, making this also an important strand of American policy toward Europe. Unlike trade policy, monetary policy is much more arcane and not rooted in domestic politics. Decisions tend to be taken by a few specialists at sub-Presidential levels (the August 1971 decision was an exception) and the effects (for instance, of a change in the exchange rate or an international swap) are diffused nationally and equally, with little public involvement. At most, the only people consulted outside the government are a few Wall Street bankers or university economists.

The Treasury Department has traditionally dominated the making of international monetary policy. There is an informal Cabinet-level group in which the Treasury, the Federal Reserve (the second most important actor), the Council of Economic Advisors, and usually the State Department are the main participants. More important has been the sub-Cabinet level group which until recently was called the "Volcker Group" (after Paul A. Volcker, the former Under Secretary at Treasury for international financial affairs; previously it was called the "Roosa Group"), where most of the decisions were made. This group met informally in Volcker's office when necessary, sometimes two or three times a week, sometimes every few months, and included representatives of the other agencies named above. According to officials involved, the group was used as a sounding board by Volcker, who was very much the dominant figure. Only occasionally would issues be referred to the higher-level Cabinet group, in which case Arthur Burns of the Federal Reserve Board was usually the only other participant with expertise and strong enough views to compete with Treasury Secretary Shultz and Volcker in forcefulness and authority. Usually, technical monetary questions were discussed by experts in the interagency Volcker Group and then decided later by Volcker in the way he wanted. Normally, there was a wide area of agreement in the group on the actions taken.

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Exceptions to this rule in the recent period have been the international economic crisis of 1971, already discussed, when there was considerable disagreement among the agencies on what was negotiable. Another case is the period before Secretary Shultz's speech to the IMF in September 1972, which marked a turning point in U.S. policy. That speech announced America's willingness to consider greater exchange-rate flexibility, but shifted the focus of the international debate somewhat to the questions of when and under what circumstances governments should intervene in the money markets. The outline of the speech is said to have been set by Shultz himself, with staff work on it done by Volcker, together with a few other agency representatives. After the speech, there was a general consensus within the U.S. Government on how to proceed within the IMF Committee of Twenty on preparations for international monetary reform, although some decisions—such as the exact nature of the continuing international role of the dollar—were avoided or deferred.

The traditionally dominant role of the Treasury suggests an organizational-process model in explaining most U.S. international financial policy making. Occasionally, where there are interagency disagreements, a bureaucratic-politics model may explain outcomes. However, the technical nature of the issues and the small number of policy-makers involved also raise the possibility of a shared mind-set as an alternative model (or possibly groupthink, when considering the work of the Volcker Group). But these, like a number of other questions raised in this paper, are problems for future research.

IV. Conclusions

We began this paper with a look at six models of foreign policy making. As we have seen, bureaucratic politics is only one approach to explaining foreign policy. In only two of our cases did it turn out to provide the best explanation of policy outcomes. In other cases, characterized by the closed royal-court style of decision making, bureaucratic politics played no role at all in decisions, although in one it strongly affected the implementation of policy. In still other cases, it was necessary to apply several of our models in order to understand policies that involved mixed patterns of decision making. But can we say more about the fit of various models to certain kinds of policies on the basis of the cases discussed here?

Our cases of pure royal-court decision making (Category 1) fit fairly well under the heading "decisions marking major policy shifts" in which Presidential involvement/commitment is of overriding impor-

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tance.[52] Each of the three policies we examined—the improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations, the "Year of Europe," and the August 1971 N.E.P. —were presidential initiatives taken outside the NSC system to chart new policy directions. In each decision the personality and operating style of the President and his key court advisor (Kissinger in two of the cases, Connally in the other) were especially important in shaping the policy decision and its implementation. One action discussed under U.S.-Soviet relations—the U.S. global military alert of October 1973 during the Middle East crisis—was a crisis decision concerning possible intervention with military force. Curiously, as we have noted, the President stood aside and allowed Dr. Kissinger to determine the actual form taken by that decision and policy action. But it was also a royal-court decision within our definition. One would suspect that this model applies generally to military crisis decision making where national security is believed to be at stake.

One of our policies in Category 3, in which organizational process was the dominant pattern, turned on issues where one government agency or department was substantively responsible; that is, it was its business, and presidential interest/commitment was low.[53] This was true generally in the making of international monetary policy (excluding August 1971), a technical subject in which Treasury has the expertise and the dominant influence. Our other case in this category, involving bureaucratic politics and maneuvering to head off John Connally's nationalistic international economic policies in the fall of 1971, is different. It belongs to that group of foreign economic policy issues that become highly charged in terms of international politics and threaten to undermine alliance relations. Bureaucratic skirmishes between the political and economic bureaucracies of the government which are concerned with foreign policy often result as one or more actors seek to modify a previous position. The key point here is that no structures now exist in the U.S. Government to integrate these two strands of foreign policy effectively, leaving the way open for high-level bureaucratic maneuvering in case of sharp interagency disagreement on political-economic issues.

Turning to our mixed cases in Category 2, the importance of White House court interventions on key points of policy making in SALT I, Berlin, and to a lesser extent MBFR can be explained by the close relationship of these issues to the policy of overall U.S.-Soviet rapproche-

[52] This category and some others to be discussed below have been suggested by Robert J. Art (fn. 3), as preliminary issue-area tests of relevance of the bureaucratic paradigm.

[53] This is slightly different from the category of "institutionally-grounded issues" suggested by Art (fn. 3).

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ment, a high White House priority. An organizational-process model explains at least some aspects of policy on issues where one agency has primary substantive responsibility: State and the American Embassy in Bonn in the case of the Berlin negotiations, mainly a diplomatic task; the Pentagon on largely military questions of SALT, troops in Europe, or MBFR. The latter issues are more complicated, however, because of the interface with political aspects of arms control, NATO, and alliance relations—i.e., concerns of the State Department, and therefore good candidates for bureaucratic bargaining. In addition, State, or ACDA in the case of SALT I, was charged with carrying out actual negotiations. However, as we have seen, the most powerful explanation of the policy decision to maintain U.S. force levels in Europe and to pursue MBFR negotiations primarily as a tactical device toward the same end is the model of shared assumptions, or mind-sets, among all the key decision-makers, including the President. Mind-sets seem to be important on decisions to maintain former policies which have become accepted givens in much or all of the policy-making community, as opposed to decisions to chart new directions. In these two cases, we found cold war mind-sets controlling on NATO issues.

Democratic (congressional and domestic) politics is likely to be important, not surprisingly, on issues where Congress has a clear role that cannot be circumvented by the Executive: in our cases, the questions of troops in Europe (and by implication MBFR) and of U.S. trade policy. Congress has the power to cut appropriations for forces in Europe. And congressional cooperation is needed to pass trade legislation, such as the Trade Reform Act of 1973. Bureaucratic bargaining and the need to form a consensus on the trade bill before submitting it to Congress arose because not one but many government agencies have vested interests in trade policy. These agencies must be coordinated if a bill is to be agreed upon, which means bureaucratic bargaining. And the issues are technical and complex, usually precluding presidential involvement or decision except for overall guidelines—in our case the approval of the principle to proceed with a liberal trade policy.

The groupthink model was not adequately explored in this study. Nevertheless, we have noted its relevance when an esteemed court advisor with a strong personality becomes a policy advocate in a group or committee situation, especially when he enters the discussion knowing what he wants and argues for it from the outset. This model may explain certain aspects of the Nixon-Kissinger policy on SALT and Berlin when either of these two men took the lead in advocating a certain decision in meetings of the Cabinet-level NSC or one of its committees. It may also explain all or part of the August 1971 N.E.P.

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decisions that emerged from the Camp David meeting, which was apparently dominated by Treasury Secretary Connally, and possibly other international monetary policy decisions formulated in the "Volcker Group." A variant of groupthink can occur when a policy is discussed and agreed upon by a committee in which all or most participants share the same assumptions or mind-sets on a problem or a previously adopted policy direction.

The innovations introduced into the NSC system by the Nixon Administration did modify the influence of bureaucratic politics on decision making, but could not totally suppress it. On some issues (for instance, SALT and MBFR) the system functioned impartially and effectively, especially for problems requiring analysis of vast amounts of data; at times it approached multiple advocacy, as complicated agency inputs were gathered and sifted at the center in NSC studies, and agencies were given opportunity to express their views. Some, especially the military, bargained effectively to influence both the shape of options and final presidential choices. Sometimes, however, on high-priority issues such as SALT and Berlin, NSC machinery was circumvented by strategic White House interventions, including secret back-channel contacts and negotiations with the Soviets, conducted personally by Dr. Kissinger, or by the President himself. Other issues (for instance, the "Year of Europe" and overall strategy in U.S.-Soviet relations) were handled outside the NSC system by Kissinger and the President—excluding the bureaucracy almost entirely—with both favorable and unfavorable results. On economic questions where Kissinger and the NSC had partial responsibility, bureaucratic politics usually determined outcomes, with Kissinger and the NSC staff competing and maneuvering vis-à-vis other parts of the governmental foreign economic bureaucracy.

In this paper we have taken a cut at a large problem. Much further work needs to be done to elaborate some of the models discussed here, and to explore their interrelationships. Further development of our cases, and the addition of others, should yield additional conclusions about the usefulness of particular models to explain certain kinds of policy making. The approach outlined here could be applied to other U.S. administrations. It could also be utilized in comparative foreign policy research to test the relevance of these and other models to foreign governments. Such research would lead to a greater understanding of similarities and differences in the foreign policy making processes of other advanced industrial democracies, taking into account different constitutional systems, political cultures, and leadership styles.

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JUST WARS AND LIMITED WARS:
Restraints on the Use of the Soviet Armed Forces

By CHRISTOPHER D. JONES

DURING the cold war, the Soviets have been extremely cautious about sending their troops into the frequent limited wars of the era. No Soviet troops ever found themselves in military quagmires like Vietnam, Algeria, or Korea. Only twice—in Hungary and Czechoslovakia—have Soviet leaders exposed their troops to the trials of a limited war. In both cases the U.S.S.R. intervened after very great hesitation. In these two East European sorties, the Soviet forces did not encounter any resistance from the regular army of either country and did not hear even verbal threats from the West. The Hungarian intervention was over in a matter of days; the Czechoslovak action in a matter of hours.

Soviet military theory offers some insights as to why the Soviets have been so cautious about entering limited wars, and have steadfastly avoided being drawn into the kinds of limited conflicts that have shaken and sometimes toppled governments in the United States, France, and Great Britain. At first glance, Soviet military theory is not a particularly valuable guide to Soviet practice. It is full of prolix ideological formulas and citations of Lenin, who is given credit for formulating its basic premises. Lenin did write the passages frequently cited by Soviet military theorists, but he never presented his ideas on war in a systematic framework. Lenin's observations on military affairs were confined to his polemics against the European socialists who supported their governments during the first World War, and to the directives he issued during the Civil War in Russia. Many of Lenin's observations do support the conceptual framework of post-World War II Soviet military theory, but later political and military figures deserve the credit for synthesizing this doctrine and finding the quotations from Lenin that buttress their theoretical structure.

For all their ideological incantations, Soviet military writers do present the conclusions the Soviet Communist Party has drawn from its two monumental military triumphs—the defeat of the White and Allied forces during the Civil War, and the annihilation of the principal armies of Nazi Germany during World War II. The writers also hint at the conclusions the Party has drawn from its unsuccessful wars against Poland in 1920 and Finland in 1939. Soviet military doctrine

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may also reveal what political considerations kept the leaders of the U.S.S.R. from military interventions they may have contemplated against Yugoslavia in 1948, Poland in 1956, and Albania and Rumania during the 1960's.

If the published doctrine is not the operational policy of the military, it at least indicates the political restraints the Party attempts to impose on military theory and practice. Because this doctrine has been ceaselessly drummed into Soviet soldiers and civilians, it also requires Soviet leaders at least to consider the risks of publicly violating their own canon. Finally, on close inspection some of the political considerations emphasized in Soviet military thought which have been overlooked by Western theorists seem to have a considerable degree of intrinsic merit. The Western analysts who have commented on the Soviet discussion of the political restraints on the use of the Soviet military did so just before and just after Stalin's death, when the discussion consisted of a few rote formulas, most of which were coined by Josef Vissarionovich himself.[1] Later works on Soviet military doctrine have concentrated on the questions of nuclear strategy, Soviet policy in various areas of the world, and party-military relations.[2] Since 1960 the breadth and depth of Soviet writing on the political restraints on the use of military power has increased considerably, but Western observers have virtually ignored recent Soviet thinking on this topic.

The Soviet View of War and Politics

Soviet theoreticians wholeheartedly endorse Clausewitz's dictum that war is the pursuit of political policy by other means. As Colonels Fedorov and Morozov observe "Without a political aim even the fiercest struggle . . . will not be a war but simply a fight."[3] But the Soviets view war as a more profoundly political phenomenon than even Clausewitz did. For them, war is not just the pursuit of political objectives by violent means, but a life-and-death trial of a nation's political system as a whole. In his formulation of the Soviet Union's post-World War II military doctrine, Stalin placed the main emphasis on domestic political considerations. He proclaimed that the outcome of war was determined by five "permanently operating factors": the stability of the

[1] See Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press 1953), 230-32; H. S. Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union* (New York: Praeger 1959), chap. 2.

[2] See the numerous studies by Raymond Garthoff, Thomas W. Wolfe, John Erickson, and Roman Kolkowicz.

[3] V. I. Morozov and G. A. Fedorov in S. A. Tiushkevich, ed., *Marksizm-leninizm o voine i armii* [Marxism-Leninism on War and the Military] (Moscow: Voenizdat 1968), 14. All translations in this article are the author's.

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rear; the morale of the army; the quantity and quality of army divisions; the quality of military armament; and the skills of military commanders.

After Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in 1956, Soviet military writers abruptly abandoned these categories, but they preserved the essence of Stalin's view of war, a view they have presented in an increasingly complex and detailed analytical framework. Even the most recent Soviet writing shares with Stalin the conviction that the political situation on the home front and the morale of the army are as important to military victory as weaponry, economic strength, and diplomatic alignments. This view of war is considerably different from that presented by American strategic theorists of the 1960's and 1970's, who rarely, if ever, raise the questions of domestic politics or army morale.

All Soviet writers on war declare that war is a severe test of all the political, economic, and spiritual resources of a nation. They frequently cite Lenin's observation that modern warfare, because of the vast economic resources it requires, pulls the entire population into the conflict. It is this testing of the society as a whole that makes war so profoundly political. War is not merely a conflict between governments, but a question of whether governments can mobilize their populations to fight. As Colonel Medvedev declares in the 1968 edition of *Marxism-Leninism on War and the Military,* modern wars make every person an active participant and force every person to adopt "a conscious attitude toward a war."[4] Soviet writers often quote Lenin's observation that "In every war, victory in the last analysis is determined by the situation of the masses who spill their blood on the field of battle."[5]

Contrary to some Western theorists, the Soviets argue that technology does not reduce the importance of man in war but actually heightens the importance of the human factor, because advanced technology demands greater skills. They assert that such skills can be acquired only through superior political organization. In 1961, Colonel Belyi argued that the principal effect of the new missile technology was to increase the extent of human casualties enormously. Carrying on the battle in the aftermath of mass devastation was, in his view, as much a matter of morale as of technology.[6] Because of the importance of the human factor, Soviet strategists emphasize that the political attitude of

[4] *Ibid.*, 117.

[5] N. P. Prokop'ev, *O voine i armii* [On War and the Military] (Moscow: Voenizdat 1965), 232.

[6] B. A. Belyi in G. A. Fedorov, ed., *Marksizm-leninizm o voine i armii* (Moscow: Voenizdat 1961), 329.

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the masses toward a war is absolutely crucial to victory. They argue that in war a government places its maximum demands on its citizens: it asks them to sacrifice their material comforts and even their lives for the sake of the state's political objectives.

According to Soviet theorists, no government in its right mind makes such demands without exercising extreme caution: they maintain that when a government goes to war, it is in effect calling for a spontaneous popular referendum on the regime. Lyndon Johnson provoked such a referendum when he asked draft-age Americans to risk their lives for the sake of his political objectives in Vietnam. Many of them told the President, "Hell No! We Won't Go!" and eventually drove him out of office. Lenin argued that if a government sends its soldiers to war against their wishes, the government is in effect asking its soldiers to bring about the military defeat of their own country.[7] In his 1965 textbook, Prokop'ev echoed Lenin in declaring that "armies which do not believe in the legitimacy of their mission and are not supported by the people will suffer defeat."[8] N. V. Pukhovskii, a leading Soviet military theorist, stresses that the "political consciousness" of the masses is a critical element in military policy. According to Pukhovskii, political consciousness "is defined in one case by the readiness of the people to give up their lives for the political objectives of the war and in the other case by an unwillingness to fight. Political consciousness can demand from the soldier and the whole population the will to victory and it can demand a striving for the defeat of one's own government."[9]

The emphasis Soviet writers place on the importance of mass enthusiasm is not just a peculiarity of the U.S.S.R.'s soldiers; it is part of the political style of the CPSU. When Soviet leaders mobilize their citizens to achieve some urgent task, they rely not only on material incentives and reorganizations of the bureaucracy, as do Western regimes, but make great use of psychological incentives. The Party has found that "political consciousness" played an important role in many of the decisive moments of the Soviet regime: the Civil War, the First and Second Five-Year Plans, and the defeat of the Nazis. Khrushchev, who helped build the Moscow subway during the 1930's and who served as a political officer at the battle of Stalingrad, instinctively resorted to

[7] V. I. Lenin, "The Defeat of One's Own Government in the Imperialist War," in *Collected Works*, XXI (Moscow: Progress Publishers 1964), 315.

[8] Prokop'ev (fn. 5), 91.

[9] N. V. Pukhovskii, *O mire i voine [On Peace and War]* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Mysl' 1965), 38. This book was published under the auspices of the CPSU CC Higher Party School.

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the tactics of "agitation and propaganda" when he undertook any major task, such as the Virgin Lands program. Brezhnev, too, has served as a political officer. He fought on the front lines during World War II and was deputy chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet armed forces from 1953 to 1954.

For all his denunciations of the Chinese Communists for "voluntarism" (relying on psychological incentives in the absence of material and technical resources), Brezhnev has not abandoned the traditional Soviet emphasis on the "subjective factor." In his report to the 24th Party Congress he declared that the cultivation of a "Communist consciousness" among the masses was vital to the achievement of continued economic growth.[10] Throughout the 1960's and 1970's the Soviets have continued to talk about the ideologically motivated worker of the future, the "new Soviet man," whose appearance is imminently expected and, apparently, urgently needed. Recognition of the subjective factor is recognition not only of the positive role of psychological incentives, but of the fact that the CPSU has always had to deal with the problems of passive resistance, low productivity, shoddy workmanship, and "internal emigration" on the part of citizens at all levels of Soviet society. These problems have proven to be real obstacles to the realization of the Party's policies.

The Moral-Political Factor

The technical name the Soviets have for political consciousness in military affairs is "the moral-political factor." Soviet writers frequently quote Lenin to the effect that the Bolsheviks owed their victory in the Civil War to the fact that the morale of their soldiers was higher than that of their opponents, who enjoyed advantages in numbers and equipment. Soviet writers also maintain that the allegedly superior morale of Soviet soldiers during World War II was a crucial factor in defeating the Nazis. The observations of Allied personnel in the U.S.S.R. during the war confirm the existence of high morale and great personal heroism among Soviet soldiers, and also testify to the importance of these factors to the war effort. Observers usually concluded that the source of this morale was Russian nationalism.[11] Major General Il'in quotes Goering at his trial in Nuremberg as saying that the German General

[10] See pp. 82-91 of Brezhnev's report to the 24th CPSU Congress in *Materialy XXIV s"ezda KPSS* [Materials of the 24th Congress of the CPSU] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury 1971).

[11] Garthoff (fn. 1), 225-27; Alexander Werth, *Russia at War* (New York: Dutton 1964), passim.

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Staff did not err in its estimates of Soviet technological and economic capabilities, but was fatally wrong in its estimate of the morale of the Red Army.[12]

The emphasis placed by the Soviets on the morale of their soldiers may in part be a continuation of the traditional view of morale in the tsarist army. It may also be in part a justification for the existence of the party control system in the military, for mobilizing morale is the principal duty of the lower-level political officers. But it is also a recognition of the fact that morale has played a major role in the victories of the Red Army. Soviet writers maintain that morale has played a major role in the victories of other armies, such as the republican armies of the French Revolution. Belyi argues that the collapse of the French army in 1940 was due to the fact that the ruling classes of France could not mobilize "the spiritual energy of the nation."[13] Many Western historians would agree with him.

The Soviets define the moral-political factor in a straightforward manner. It is "readiness by the people to endure the extremely heavy trials of modern warfare and not to lose the will to fight and to defeat the enemy."[14] But specifying the components of the moral-political factor is a "very complicated matter."[15] Soviet writers refer to the "confidence" of the population in its civilian and military leadership, the "real unity" of the citizenry, and the "depth of patriotic feeling." The moral-political factor is also conditioned by "the character of the social and state order" and the "national and historical peculiarities" of a people.[16] Belyi distinguishes between two sets of components. The first includes popular political attitudes toward the social system and toward the specific policies being pursued by the state; the second includes technical military considerations: does the soldier believe that his army has skillful commanders, adequate supplies, and advanced weaponry?[17] V. D. Sokolovskii's *Soviet Military Strategy* emphasizes that the moral-political factor includes not only the political component, but the ability of the state to provide its soldiers with all the material and technological support necessary for victory.[18] Several Soviet writers add elements that

[12] S. K. Il'in, *Moral'ny faktor v sovremennoi voine* [The Moral Factor in Modern War] (Moscow: Voenizdat 1967), 6.

[13] Belyi (fn. 6), 295.

[14] Belyi in Tiushkevich (fn. 3), 275. Every Soviet text repeats this definition in one form or another.

[15] Prokop'ev (fn. 5), 230.

[16] *Ibid.*, 230-31.

[17] Belyi (fn. 6), 324-26.

[18] V. D. Sokolovskii, ed., *Soviet Military Strategy*, trans. by H. S. Dinerstein, L. Gouré, and T. W. Wolfe (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corp. 1963), 125.

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are usually regarded as the basis of morale in the West: socio-psychological and individual psychological characteristics which affect a soldier's view of himself as a military man.

Soviet writers on military affairs warn that it is impossible to specify beforehand just how great a role the moral-political factor will play in a war. They caution that the importance of this factor varies enormously from war to war and exists in a rather elusive dependence on the whole complex of elements which they have identified as components of the moral-political factor. Perhaps the reason they are so vague on this point is that they hesitate to say directly what all their definitions imply: the moral-political factor is the popular legitimacy of a government as it goes to war. In practice, as Colonel General Lomov explains, "The moral-political potential of a country . . . is expressed in the relation of a people to a war, in the degree of their unity around the ruling party and its government."[19]

Just and Unjust Wars

When a government is faced with the prospect of war, it is not in a position to bring about abrupt changes in the degree of its popular legitimacy. But it is in a position to choose war aims which its citizens can endorse or reject. Soviet experts on military theory emphasize that the choice of war aims is a conscious political act; that is, unlike historical traditions or popular confidence in the government, it is a factor over which the government exercises some immediate control. These experts furthermore emphasize that the choice of war aims has a decisive effect on the moral-political factor. As Marshal Voroshilov said on the occasion of Stalin's seventieth birthday, "The morale of the army, as Stalin teaches, depends in the first place and above all on the nature of the political aims of the war, that is, what the state is fighting for. . . ."[20]

The assertion that the political aims of a war determine the domestic political base for the war effort has survived de-Stalinization and has appeared in every Soviet discussion of war. In his examination of the moral-political factor in bourgeois societies, Belyi notes that although the class antagonisms of such societies have an effect on morale, bourgeois armies can have high morale if the soldiers and civilians of a

[19] N. A. Lomov, "O sovetskoi voennoi doktrine" [On Soviet Military Doctrine] in *Problemy revolutsii v voennom dele* [Problems of the Revolution in Military Affairs] (Moscow: Voenizdat 1965), 47.

[20] K. Voroshilov, "Genial'nyi polkovodets velikoi otechestvennoi voiny" [The Genius Commander of the Great Patriotic War], *Bol'shevik*, No. 24 (December 1949), 40.

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capitalist state believe that they are fighting for a just cause. Bourgeois morale, according to Belyi, will be low only if the masses do not endorse the war aims.[21]

In Soviet military theory, a positive moral-political attitude on the part of the masses depends on whether or not the war is "just." Soviet writers credit Lenin with establishing the just/unjust categorization of war, which they consider the most important political distinction to make in evaluating a war. They emphasize that this distinction is not made on the basis of the technical military aspects of the war. Prokop'ev states that it does not matter "who began the military action and on whose territory the war is being fought. The character of a war is defined by the question of why it is being fought. . . ."[22] Pukhovskii maintains that those Marxist-Leninists who have distinguished among world wars, local wars, and wars of national liberation have made false distinctions. The size or scale of a war does not determine its significance. The important question is that of the war's political objectives.[23] What the Soviets really mean by a "just war" is a war whose political objectives are supported by the Soviet population. In a recent article, Colonel Kondratkov in effect says that the "masses" decide if a war is just, independently of the party.[24] The significance of a just war lies in the fact that such a war, according to Colonel Tiushkevich, "promotes a widening of the political base which is necessary for victory."[25]

Soviet writers obscure the working definition of a just war as one that the population regards as just by using two other definitions. One of these says that a just war is one that complements the Marxist theory of history. The most recent edition of *Marxism-Leninism on War and the Military* tells us that just wars can easily be distinguished from unjust wars by virtue of the fact that the former are progressive and the latter reactionary.[26] The most frequently cited example of a just and progressive war is the campaign of the French revolutionary armies in 1793. The other definition of a just war is strategic. Prokop'ev holds that a war is just or unjust according to "whether it serves the interests of

[21] Belyi (fn. 6), 296.
[22] Prokop'ev (fn. 5), 64.
[23] Pukhovskii (fn. 9), 72.
[24] T. Kondratkov, "Problema klassifikatsii voin i ee otrazhenie v ideologicheskoi bor'be" (The Problem of the Classification of Wars and its Reflection in the Ideological Struggle), *Kommunist vooruzhennikh sil* [Communist of the Armed Forces] No. 11 (June 1974), 20; T. Kondratkov, "Sotsial'ny kharakter sovremennoi voiny" [The Social Character of Modern War], *Kommunist vooruzhennikh sil*, No. 12 (November 1972), 11.
[25] S. Tiushkevich, "Politicheskie tseli i kharakter voiny" [Political Objectives and the Character of a War], *Kommunist vooruzhennikh sil*, No. 7 (April 1969), 34.
[26] E. A. Khomenko in Tiushkevich (fn. 3), 76.

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the class struggle of the proletariat, or better yet, the interests of the international movement of the proletariat."[27] Or even better yet, the interests of the U.S.S.R. Pukhovskii explains the difference between those national liberation wars and civil wars which are just and those which are not: if such a war, in the opinion of the Soviet leadership, might involve the U.S.S.R. in a world war, then the war is unjust. If the Soviet leaders conclude that such a conflict does not risk dragging the U.S.S.R. into a larger conflict, then the war is just. In such a just struggle, the righteous side can count on fraternal assistance from the Soviet Union.[28]

The definition of a just war that applies to the use of Soviet troops is the definition that says a just war is one in which the government can count on the support of its soldiers and citizens. Prokop'ev observes, "The characteristic of a just war is that its objectives coincide with the basic interests of the people. The popular masses support such a war, actively participating in it."[29] According to the Sokolovskii text, in an unjust war the broad masses do not share the war aims of the government; as a consequence "the extent of their participation in the war is sharply reduced."[30] The greater the popular support for the war effort, the more "just" the war. Soviet military writers declare that a war in defense of the socialist fatherland, such as the struggle against the Nazi invaders, is "a special kind of war" which has an "unconditionally just character." Colonel Dziuba adds, "The most important feature of wars in defense of the socialist fatherland is that they are genuinely people's wars in all respects. Owing to the just aims and tasks of such a war, which fully correspond to the working people's interests, the masses take an active part in it, support and implement the policy of the Marxist-Leninist party and the government and rally even more closely around them."[31]

According to the Soviet texts, these three definitions of a just war yield four kinds of just wars: wars in defense of the socialist fatherland; national liberation wars against imperialist aggressors; proletarian insurrections directed against a bourgeoisie; and uprisings of any group of the exploited against their oppressors. Inter-imperialist wars are classified as unjust; boundary wars between newly independent states are described as neither just nor unjust, but simply another regrettable legacy of colonialism. The Soviets do not say that an army

[27] Prokop'ev (fn. 5), 45.
[28] Pukhovskii (fn. 9), 85-86.
[29] Prokop'ev (fn. 5), 35.
[30] Sokolovskii (fn. 18), 99. The same argument is made in the 1963 and 1968 Soviet editions.
[31] Ia. S. Dziuba in Tiushkevich (fn. 3), 139.

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fighting a just war will necessarily be victorious; they say only that it will put up a good fight. Soviet texts assign equal importance to other factors affecting war: the diplomatic alignments that develop before and during the course of a war, and relative advantages in economic productivity and technological sophistication. These topics receive as much attention from Soviet military theorists as does the moral-political factor.

But the Soviets maintain that all these considerations are so interrelated that they do not exist independently of each other. They argue that any one factor, such as the moral-political, is inseparably linked to a war in all its ramifications. What links all of the factors together is the political aim of the war. The war aim is not only the principal determinant of the moral-political factor, but also the principal determinant of the scope of a war and the methods of conducting it, the choice of enemies and allies, the timing and scale of the overall campaign, and even the battlefield tactics.[32] Pukhovskii asserts that the political objectives of a war take precedence over the specific demands of military strategy. As examples of the primacy of politics in determining strategy, he cites the politically inspired decision of Napoleon III to fight at Sedan, and the decisions of the French and German generals of 1871 to overlook their recent differences and collaborate in a joint offensive against the Paris Commune.[33]

"The Reverse Influence of War on Politics"

The war aims are also directly tied to the regime's domestic policies. Soviet authors insist that war cannot be understood apart from domestic policy because it is the same political party or ruling clique which makes both foreign and domestic policy. Lenin and his successors reject the assumption of Clausewitz (and of most American strategic theorists) that a country's war aims are those of a broad national consensus. On the contrary, Soviet writers assert, the war aims are picked by political parties which are representative only of their own particular constituencies. Pukhovskii writes that war breaks out "when the party desiring war is victorious in the struggle with its opponents—other political parties."[34] The Soviet texts frequently cite Lenin to the effect that foreign and domestic policy are inseparably linked, and that the masses

[32] Sokolovskii (fn. 18), 99-103; 1963 Soviet edition, 25-29; 1968 Soviet edition, 26-30. G. A. Fedorov in I. N. Levanov, ed., *Marksizm-leninizm o voine i armii* (Moscow: Voenizdat 1957), 42-47; Fedorov in Fedorov (fn. 6), 43-46.

[33] Pukhovskii (fn. 9), 158, 163-64.

[34] *Ibid.*, 21, 54.

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perceive this link much more clearly in wartime. It was on the link between foreign and domestic policy that Lenin based his appeal to the soldiers of the first World War to transform the imperialist war into an international civil war. Pukhovskii notes that the unity of foreign and domestic policy in the U.S.S.R. "is achieved consciously by the Party and the Soviet Government."[35]

Because of the link between foreign and domestic policy, war can exacerbate whatever antagonisms are present in domestic politics. Colonel Rybkin notes that the influence of war on domestic politics can vary greatly. He points out that while the Vietnam and Algerian wars destroyed a series of French governments and one French constitution, the British bourgeoisie managed to fight its colonial campaigns without provoking domestic political crises. America's war in Vietnam, he notes in 1970, was "a powerful factor of political action on American society." He concludes his analysis with the recommendation that a Communist party determine its attitude toward wars according to the probable influence of such wars "on the life of [its own] society."[36]

According to Soviet writers, the influence of war on the domestic political situation is greatly increased if the state's armies suffer defeats in individual battles. They frequently cite Lenin's prophecy of 1904: "The capitulation of Port Arthur," he wrote, "is a prologue to the capitulation of tsarism."[37] The connection between military defeats and domestic disorders that the Romanovs witnessed in 1856, 1904, and 1917 has not escaped their successors. One of the chapters in the early editions of *Marxism-Leninism on War and the Military* is entitled "The Reverse Influence of War on Politics." In a discussion of this topic, Fedorov observes that once states are drawn into the "whirlpool of war," they are frequently forced to alter both foreign and domestic policies.[38] Pukhovskii later adds the qualification that a government will restrict such changes so that they do not entail changes in the nature of the social system.[39] Of course, if a government loses a war, there may be drastic changes in the domestic policies of the defeated state. Major General Sushko observes that "defeat in war is

[35] *Ibid.*, 68.

[36] E. Rybkin, "Voiny sovremennoi epokhi i ikh vlianie na sotsialnye protsessy" (Wars of the Contemporary Epoch and Their Influence on Social Processes), *Kommunist vooruzhennikh sil*, No. 11 (June 1970), 16.

[37] V. I. Lenin, "Padenie Port-Artura" [The Fall of Port Arthur] in *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, IX [Complete Collected Works] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury 1967), 158. "A military defeat can . . . be the beginning of a deep political crisis" (p. 156).

[38] Fedorov in Fedorov (fn. 6), 52.

[39] Pukhovskii (fn. 9), 186.

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not only a military, economic, and political defeat, but also an ideological defeat."[40] Since the CPSU bases its legitimacy on its ideology, Sushko is saying, perhaps unintentionally, that military reverses suffered by Soviet armies threaten the legitimacy of the Soviet regime. Because the Soviet Union has no genuine constitutional procedure for responding to public pressure, any concession by the regime during a military crisis raises the possibility of popular pressure for yet more concessions in both foreign and domestic policy.

As Major General Il'in of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet armed forces has observed, "Classes and governments, which strive to unite the broad popular masses around their political slogans and their objectives, have their basic interests affected and their fates decided in wars."[41]

It is difficult to know what risks the Soviets run on the home front when they send their troops into battle; only the KGB and the top Party leaders have access to reliable information about domestic tensions in the U.S.S.R. The fact that Soviet leaders have almost always repressed public manifestations of dissent would seem to indicate that the rulers of the Soviet Union do not care to test the political reliability of the broad popular masses. The present leadership, in quoting Lenin so frequently, may share with him the conviction that the masses, if left to decide things on their own, will probably make the wrong decisions. The Soviet government has demonstrated a profound fear of the phenomenon that Solzhenitsyn calls "the truth": the truth is that the government is not telling the truth and has lost its legitimacy. This is why revelations of historical or political "truth" in other Communist societies, such as Hungary and Poland in 1956, shook these regimes to their foundations. The special danger of war is that in war Soviet citizens themselves will decide what is the truth: as Soviet military writers have declared, it is up to soldiers and civilians to decide whether a war is just and whether they will support the policies of their government.

War and the Question of Nationality

The Soviet military press is not a particularly good source for information about domestic political tensions in the U.S.S.R., but it does give a hint of one domestic problem that might affect the performance of Soviet armies: the nationality question. Sometimes the Soviet press seems to protest too much about the fraternal unity of the Soviet peoples

[40] N. Ia. Sushko in Tiushkevich (fn. 3), 48.
[41] Il'in (fn. 12), 9-10.

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and about the absence of "great-power chauvinism" on the part of unnamed large national groups in the U.S.S.R. and of "narrow-mindedness" on the part of the smaller nationalities. Along with these protestations are perpetual exhortations to the officer corps to show sensitivity to the ethnic differences among Soviet soldiers. There are even occasional muted discussions of the nationality problem. The brief but explicit discussions of the nationality question by the Soviet military press since the late 1960's coincide with similar discussions in the underground *samizdat* publications about the development of cultural and political nationalism among Ukrainians, Jews, Crimean Tatars, and Baltic peoples.[42]

In June of 1969, a writer in *Communist of the Armed Forces* noted that remnants of nationalism can appear even in countries which have begun socialist construction and can exercise a baneful influence on the progress of socialism. As examples of such influence, he cited the activity of emigré organizations of "Ukrainians, Balts and others" in organizing Captive Nations Week in the United States.[43] In a later article, another author noted that the multinational nature of the armed forces of some unnamed bourgeois states undermined the "moral strength" of these armies. In his opinion, this was due to the exploitative nature of such states and the dominance of one nationality over others. However, he noted that bourgeois multinational armies have demonstrated high morale and military reliability in one particular circumstance: the defense of their country against a foreign aggressor bent on enslaving all the national groups of the state under attack.[44] In the editorial of its issue devoted to the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the U.S.S.R., *Communist of the Armed Forces* presented the same argument about the conditions under which bourgeois multinational armies were reliable military forces. Noting that such armies were composed of soldiers of national groups that had been forcibly incorporated into the state, the editorial declared:

> These armies were impressive in numerical strength, but they quickly dissolved in a conflict with a serious opponent and this had the effect of destroying the [multinational] states themselves.

[42] For the *samizdat* literature on the nationality issue in the U.S.S.R., see Albert Boiter, *Five Years of Samizdat: A Bibliography* (Munich: Radio Liberty 1971); Nos. 13, 17, 18, 26, 27, *The Chronicle of Current Events* (London: Amnesty International), and No. 31 of the same journal in Russian, *Khronika tekyshchikh sobytii* (New York: Khronika Publishers).

[43] N. Cherniak, "Burzhuaznyi natsionalizm—otravlennoe oruzhie reaktsii" [Bourgeois Nationalism—The Poisonous Weapon of Reaction], *Kommunist vooruzhennikh sil*, No. 12 (June 1969), 18.

[44] V. Samoilenko, "Mnogonatsional'nost i moral'nyi faktor" [Multinationality and the Moral Factor], *Kommunist vooruzhennikh sil*, No. 3 (February 1970), 19.

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> The fragility of such armies was dependent on the unjust aims in whose name they made war and on class and nationality antagonisms.[45]

Communist of the Armed Forces assured its readers that Soviet armies fought only just wars. Presumably, the armies of the Ottoman, Hapsburg, and Romanov Empires did not.

The Risks of War

Soviet writers on military affairs emphasize that war is always an uncertain and risky affair. In going to war, the leaders of a country have staked their foreign policy, their domestic policy, and perhaps even the fate of the regime itself on the performance of their soldiers. Once the war has begun, the politicians no longer enjoy the degree of control over events that they do in peacetime. Soviet military texts frequently cite the maxim that once war has begun, "politics exchanges the pen for the sword." The texts also cite Engels' observation that once military operations have begun, they proceed according to their own dynamic. Furthermore, victory or defeat on the battlefield "decisively" affects the morale of the army and the people.[46] Soviet theorists also observe that setbacks during a war, particularly a long war, can affect the popular perception of whether or not the war is just. (The Johnson Administration witnessed this phenomenon during the war in Vietnam.)

The explanation, according to the Soviets, lies in the fact that in long, drawn-out conflicts the political objectives of the war are often changed, and the war accordingly mutates from just to unjust or vice versa. The explanation may also lie in the likelihood that, during a long war, soldiers and civilians have a greater opportunity to decide for themselves the truth of the government's justification for the war. As an example of the transformation of a just war into an unjust war, Prokop'ev cites the just campaigns of the French republican armies which developed into the unjust war of the Napoleonic Empire against Russia. An example which he could have cited but chose not to was the victorious and presumably just war the Bolsheviks fought against the Poles in the Ukraine in 1920, which became an unsuccessful and presumably unjust war when the Red Army tried to carry its counteroffensive into Poland in the hope of inciting a revolutionary insurrection by Polish workers. Instead of a warm welcome from its class brothers, the Red Army encountered staunch resistance from the in-

[45] "Armiia druzhby i bratstva narodov" [Army of the Friendship and Brotherhood of Peoples], *Kommunist vooruzhennikh sil*, No. 23 (December 1972), 3.
[46] Sokolovskii (fn. 18), 126-27.

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tensely patriotic Poles. As an example of an unjust war which became just, Prokop'ev might have cited the disastrous Winter War against Finland, which took on a more successful and presumably just character when the Soviet army counterattacked the Finns in 1944 as part of their final campaign against the Nazis.

The Soviets imply that one of the reasons for the large element of risk in war is that even capitalist armies are able to fight a just war if the war appears to them as a patriotic one against a hated foreign aggressor. After noting that military morale is of course highest in a society with no class antagonisms, Sokolovskii cautions that "high steadfastness of army morale can be attained even without such [class] unity." He explains that "such a situation arises when a belligerent country is united by a feeling of national solidarity and when the class contradictions are temporarily less pronounced than the ideas of national independence and sovereignty."[47]

Perhaps this conclusion reflects Soviet experience with the Poles in 1920 and the Finns in 1939–40. Soviet military writers assert that the desire for national sovereignty is what makes the national liberation wars of the Third World inevitably victorious in the long run. Prokop'ev warns his readers not to underestimate the steadfastness of an imperialist army engaged in an unjust war. As an example, he cites the Nazi forces that invaded the Soviet Union. He explains that imperialist armies can cultivate high morale by using such devices as propaganda and indoctrination, the discipline inculcated by military training, and repression of domestic political forces opposed to a war. He also explains the possibility of high morale in a bourgeois army by noting that a bourgeois state may not necessarily suffer from sharp class antagonisms. This is possible because a colonial empire may support a loyal "labor aristocracy," and the armament industries may employ a section of the working class that endorses militarism.[48]

The Soviet View of Limited War

The Soviets contemplate limited war from a perspective that is considerably different from that of American academic theorists. For Americans, limited war is a matter of battlefield symmetries and controlled applications of force that keep the war from escalating into a general nuclear conflict. Thomas Schelling compares the conduct of limited war to a dice game in which there are four possible outcomes:

[47] *Ibid.*, 126.
[48] Prokop'ev (fn. 5), 89-91.

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win, lose, draw, and disaster (general nuclear war).[49] The Soviets add two other possible outcomes: a collapse of army morale and a domestic political crisis.

For the Soviets, limited war like any other war is a test of the popular legitimacy of foreign and domestic policies and ultimately a test of the legitimacy of the regime itself. According to Sokolovskii, the purpose of the American theories of limited war is to persuade the public in the United States that war is a politically acceptable policy. The essence of the American theories, according to Sokolovskii, is the argument that "war is 'not so terrible' even when nuclear weapons are employed."[50] In the Soviet view, the relative performances of the contending armies in a limited war depend in the last analysis on the political objectives and political complexities of the war itself.

Implicit in Soviet writing is the recognition that it is extremely difficult to explain to one's soldiers and civilians that a war can be both just and limited at the same time. People do not willingly sacrifice their lives or the lives of their fellows for a cause which is of limited significance. As the most recent edition of Sokolovskii notes, "the demand for success in limited war does not correspond with the demand for the limiting of the extent of military actions. . . ."[51] It is implicit in Soviet military doctrine that the Soviets would not care to hazard the risks of a limited and protracted war which the enemy viewed as a just war in defense of national sovereignty. The military experts of the U.S.S.R. come close to stating that in going to war, Soviet leaders run the risk of a domestic political crisis if Soviet citizens come to view the war as an unjust, aggressive campaign.

Perhaps these are some of the reasons why the Soviets have virtually refused to discuss the limited-war theories which were once so fashionable in the United States. In their view, such abstract discussions can only contribute to the likelihood of such conflicts. When it is a question of going to war, the Soviet texts stress that Marxism-Leninism demands an exhaustive and meticulous *political* analysis of a given war in its specific historical context. In their brief comments on the theory and practice of limited war, Soviet military writers classify all Western participation in such conflicts as political aggression. Furthermore, they condemn all limited wars because they run the risk of escalating into nuclear world wars. They argue that local wars led to the first and second World Wars and that the system of cold-war alliances entails

[49] Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1966), 101-3.

[50] Sokolovskii (fn. 18); 1963 Soviet edition, 61.

[51] Sokolovskii (fn. 18); 1968 Soviet edition, 88.

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the threat that contemporary local wars will become world conflicts. The 1963 edition of the Sokolovskii text distinguishes among three types of limited wars that could become world wars: imperialist aggression against a proletarian uprising; imperialist aggression against individual Communist countries; and imperialist aggression against a national liberation movement.[52] The possibility of a proletarian revolution remains a rather distant prospect, barely mentioned even in the Soviet texts. According to the 1968 edition, the West has ruled out limited wars against European Communist states for fear of nuclear escalation. But the possibility that the U.S.S.R. might be dragged into a war involving an Asian Communist state or into the third type of limited war, a national liberation struggle, apparently remains real to the Soviets. So far they have kept their troops out of such conflicts and have limited themselves to supplying matériel to indigenous anti-Western forces.

This does not mean that the Soviets have ignored the West's experience with such conflicts. The Soviet military press shows familiarity with Western academic writing on limited war.[53] The Soviets' *Military-Historical Journal* has published one brief but detailed examination of the types of troops, weapons, and battlefield tactics employed by Western states in limited wars since 1946. This article paid particular attention to the military technicalities of the American campaign in Vietnam.[54] But the theme sounded again and again in the Soviet military press is that it is erroneous to examine such wars primarily from the standpoint of the number of troops and types of weapons employed. According to Colonel Kondratkov, the essential questions in such conflicts are the moral-political content of the war and the interaction of political issues and military means.[55] Soviet military writers recognize that military means cannot always be used effectively to achieve certain kinds of political objectives as, for instance, "winning the hearts and minds" of the Vietnamese people. Colonel Tiuskevich observes that in Viet-

[52] Sokolovskii (fn. 18); 1963 Soviet edition, 94.

[53] *Ibid.*, 82-98; 1968 Soviet edition, 82-88; T. Kondratkov, "Ogranichennaia voina—orudie imperialisticheskoi agressii" [Limited War—The Weapon of Imperialist Aggression] *Kommunist vooruzhennikh sil,* No. 8 (April 1969); V. Kulakov, "Poiskhozhdenie i sushnost' strategii 'gibkogo reagirovania'" [The Origins and Essence of the Strategy of "Flexible Response"], *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal,* No. 3 (1968); Leon Goure, "Notes on the Second Edition of Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii's *Military Strategy,* Memorandum RM 3972-PR (Santa Monica, Cal.: Rand 1964), 37-48; Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1964), chap. 10.

[54] V. Matsulenko, "Lokal'nye voiny imperializma, 1946–1968 gg." [The Local Wars of Imperialism, 1946–1968], *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal,* No. 9 (1968).

[55] Kondratkov (fn. 24), 20.

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nam the United States pursued " 'a political objective which exceeded the limits of its military capabilities' and, on the other hand, its military objectives exceeded the limits of the political capabilities of the USA and its armed forces."[56]

America's experience in Vietnam does confirm many of the Soviets' military theories. During the war, sections of the American public, including some military officers, chafed at the limits imposed by the politicians and called for either an all-out war or no war at all. At the same time, other sections of the American public came to believe that the Vietnamese Communists were fighting a just war in defense of their national sovereignty. American critics of the war proceeded to an indictment of U.S. foreign policy and then of U.S. domestic policy. This spontaneous referendum on the war led to a deep division between the protesters who linked the war with imperialism, racism, and social injustice, and the "establishment" which linked the war with the preservation of the domestic status quo. Because of the domestic political crisis, the American Government had to withdraw most of its military forces from Vietnam.

When it is a question of leading their nation to war, the Soviet leaders may in fact try to heed the advice of their military textbooks and fight only defensive wars that are "unconditionally just" in the eyes of their citizens. When they do send their troops into politically embarrassing battles, they do so only when they are reasonably confident, as in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, that they will encounter no resistance from the enemy's regular army and that the war will be over in a matter of days.

The Just War that Became an Unsuccessful Military Intervention

A Soviet Case Study of Lenin's Limited War with Poland

In 1930 the Military Section of the USSR State Publishing House published a remarkable work, P. V. Suslov's *Securing Political Support in the Soviet-Polish Campaign of 1920*.[57] In this book Suslov examined a war which began as a "just war in defense of the socialist fatherland" but ended as an unsuccessful military intervention by Soviet Russia. Suslov's study offers hard documentation for the somewhat vague

[56] Tiushkevich (fn. 25), 37. Tiushkevich does not indicate the source of the quotation.

[57] Suslov, *Politicheskoe obespechenie sovetsko-pol'skoi kampanii 1920 goda* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, Otdel voennoi literatury 1930).

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formulas of later Soviet military texts about the interaction of war and politics, the importance of the moral-political factor, and the role of nationalism in forming the moral-political factor.

In this work, written under the auspices of the Tolmachev (now Lenin) Military-Political Academy, Suslov does not hesitate to present analyses which are embarrassing to the Soviets. He criticizes the Ninth Party Congress (and, by implication, Lenin himself) for the decision to demobilize the Red Army in 1920. He puts most of the blame for the Soviets' political failure in Poland on the body Lenin appointed to be the provisional government in the areas of Poland that were occupied by the Red Army. Suslov also castigates the Red Army's political officers for their work inside Poland (and by implication, Josef Stalin, chief political commissar for the Soviet forces in southern Poland).

The Polish-Soviet war began in early March of 1920, when the Polish army under General Pilsudski invaded the Ukraine with the objective of setting up independent states in the Ukraine, Galicia, Belorussia, and Lithuania, and of restoring Poland's eastern borders of 1772. Polish troops captured Kiev in May, but in late July the Red Army pushed the Poles back into their own country. According to Suslov, the rapid Soviet counteroffensive was due partly to an upsurge of nationalism among the Russian population of the Soviet republics. He reports that workers, intellectuals, peasants, military deserters, and even prominent former officers of the tsarist army enthusiastically volunteered for the war against Russia's traditional enemy.

This was one of Soviet Russia's first experiences with the mass support its leaders could count on in what later military writers call a war in defense of the socialist fatherland. According to Suslov, the burst of Russian nationalism generated by the Polish invasion "was often transformed into pure manifestations of great-power chauvinism." The Bolsheviks, he writes, had to conduct an ideological struggle against this sentiment and educate Red Army soldiers about the true class content of the war: Polish landlords and capitalists, in collusion with the West, were trying to destroy the first socialist state in the world.[58] Suslov also explains the success of the Soviet counterattack as partly the result of popular opposition in Poland to the war and of desertion within the disaffected ranks of Pilsudski's forces.[59] Pilsudski's account of the war offers partial confirmation for Suslov's explanation of the collapse of the Polish offensive.[60]

[58] *Ibid.*, 21.
[59] *Ibid.*, 36.
[60] Jozef Pilsudski, *Year 1920* (New York: Pilsudski Institute of New York 1972), 83, 137, 138, 143, 148.

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As the Poles retreated, Lenin decided to continue the war into Poland itself. His objective was not to seize territory or to establish a military dictatorship over the Poles; he planned to fight a limited war for a specific political objective. Lenin believed that the presence of the Red Army in Poland would inspire a proletarian revolution which he hoped would spread from Warsaw to Berlin. Lenin expected that the Polish working class would greet the Red Army as its liberator. Western historians have noted that Lenin made the decision to invade Poland against the advice of a number of his colleagues, including Trotsky, Stalin, and Karl Radek, a Bolshevik born in Poland who was one of Soviet Russia's leading experts on European affairs.[61] The political commissars of the Red Army explained to their troops that they were on a revolutionary mission in Poland and told them to expect a fraternal welcome from their class brethren. To supervise the anticipated Polish revolution, Lenin created the Provisional Revolutionary Council of Poland, whose two principal members were prominent Bolsheviks of Polish descent—Julian Markhlewski, the chairman of the council, and Felix Dzerzhinsky, head of the Soviet secret police. The council operated behind the Soviet lines; the Polish Communist Party operated behind the Polish lines. Suslov criticizes the Provisional Revolutionary Council and the Polish Communist Party for two fundamental political errors: their position on Polish sovereignty and their domestic program.

Suslov notes that the Polish Communist Party, from its inception in 1919, had adopted Rosa Luxembourg's policy on the question of a Polish state: the Poles were to merge economically and politically with the larger Russian proletariat. The Polish Communist Party and the Provisional Revolutionary Council viewed the existence of small national states as incompatible with socialism.[62] The fact that the prospective leaders of a socialist Poland were also officials of the Soviet Government left little doubt as to the imminence of the union of the Polish and Russian proletariats. Suslov contends that the position of the Provisional Revolutionary Council and the Polish Communist Party on the question of Polish sovereignty was the main reason the Communists failed to win popular support in Poland for their attempted revolution.[63]

[61] See Louis Fischer, *The Life of Lenin* (New York: Harper and Row 1964), 392-93.

[62] Suslov (fn. 57), 17.

[63] Suslov cites a statement by Dzerzhinsky in 1925 to support his judgment: " 'Our mistake [in 1920] was the negation of the independence of Poland . . . ' " *Ibid.*, 18. Suslov quotes Dzerzhinsky to the effect that he and his comrades on the Council erred because they did not understand that between the eras of capitalism and socialism there would be a transition period during which vestiges of capitalism, including small national states, would continue to exist.

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Suslov believes that the other major error of the Provisional Revolutionary Council was its decision to oppose the distribution of landed estates to the Polish peasantry. The Council and the Polish Communist Party considered these large farms economically advanced forms of agriculture and wanted to transfer them to state ownership.[64] This program did not win the support of the Polish peasantry. (Suslov does not say so, but this was the same agrarian program that Lenin had advocated in Russia during the spring and summer months of 1917.) The political officers of the Red Army, who were charged with setting up local Polish revolutionary committees in the areas they occupied, compounded the mistakes of the Provisional Revolutionary Council and the Polish Communist Party. According to a Red Army study cited by Suslov, the political commissars were able to persuade only a handful of Poles to join the committees, and resorted to staffing them with Red Army men. The local revolutionary committees failed to win the support of the peasantry, failed to adopt a correct policy toward the Catholic clergy, and offended the Poles under their supervision by issuing directives in the Russian language.[65] But Suslov concludes that the failure of the local revolutionary committees to win popular support was in the last analysis due to the policies of the Provisional Revolutionary Council and the Polish Communist Party on the national and agrarian questions. To support his conclusion, he cites Dzerzhinsky's assessment of the failure of the Polish Communists:

> The peasantry and petit-bourgeois masses and a significant part of the workers (more accurately—a majority) did not come out for a proletarian revolution, for the Polish Communist Party, because they saw in our party an opponent of the slogan "land for the peasants" and an opponent of the slogan of the independence of Poland.
>
> But they did come out for the Polish Socialist Party, for liberation, etc., for the parties which promised the peasants land and which struggled in the name of the slogan of the independence of Poland. . . .[66]

The attempted export of revolution by the Red Army failed to win the support not only of the peasantry, the petit-bourgeois masses, and most of the workers, but even of many members of the Polish Communist Party. Before the war began, a group of Polish Communists issued a declaration in which they said that if the Red Army intervened to support a Polish revolution, the Soviets would succeed only in provoking a nationalist opposition to the uprising. This group warned

[64] *Ibid.*, 136.
[65] *Ibid.*, 141-44.
[66] *Ibid.*, 145. Suslov attributes this quotation to *Komintern*, No. 16-17 (1929), 32. Dzerzhinsky's view is shared by Adam Bromke, a Western historian: see *Poland's Politics: Idealism vs. Realism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1967), 54.

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that intervention by the Red Army would be " 'a trump card in the hands of the Polish bourgeoisie.' "[67] When the Red Army crossed the Polish border, the adherents of this group "dropped out of sight." Suslov chides them for "a lack of understanding . . . of the revolutionary role of the Red Army. . . ."[68]

Suslov observes that, as the Soviet forces approached Warsaw, they had to contend with a phenomenon that Lenin had not anticipated: Polish "chauvinism." The Poles, who had been deeply divided among themselves over social and economic issues, forgot their differences and rallied to fight the Red Army in the name of Poland's independence. The Polish Socialist Party under Ignacy Daszynski and the Polish Peasant Party under Wincenty Witos formed a coalition government and created a Council of National Defense, headed by General Pilsudski. Volunteer military units were formed throughout Poland "at a furious pace." The Warsaw area was quickly reinforced and the "revolutionary organizations" behind the Polish lines were subjected to "persecution and terror."[69] The new Polish Government "poisoned the socio-proletarian and peasant consciousness with nationalist demagogy in an amazingly proficient manner." Suslov continues, "The nationalist propaganda and social demagogy took its effect. Our units had to contend with a *qualitatively* different enemy. A nationalist fog in front of them hid the class-liberation banner of the Red Army."[70]

Suslov's opinion that the national upsurge in Poland had produced a qualitatively different enemy for the Red Army is shared by Captain Adam Przybylski, the author of a study of the Polish-Soviet war published under the auspices of the Bureau of Military History of the Polish Government. According to this account, the Soviet victories in the Ukraine and Belorussia and the initial advances of the Red Army into Poland at first produced a severe crisis of morale in the Polish army. The deep political divisions in the country compounded the crisis. Przybylski writes that, as the Red Army approached Warsaw, his countrymen came to the support of the newly created State Defense Council. He maintains that the 80,000 volunteers who rushed to the defense of the Polish capital were important not only for their numbers, but also for the fact that they provided "an element of moral force, an idealistic expression of the obligation to defend the threatened independence of the state, the free existence of the nation. . . ."[71]

[67] Suslov (fn. 57), 18.
[68] *Ibid.*
[69] *Ibid.*, 85.
[70] *Ibid.*, 88-89; Suslov's emphasis.
[71] Przybylski, *La Pologne en lutte pour ses frontières, 1918–1920* (Paris: Gebethner et Wolff 1929), 136, 137.

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The surge of Polish nationalism and hatred for the Russians had a bad effect on the morale of the Red Army men, who had been told to expect a rather different reception. Suslov observes that political work among the Soviet troops was not sufficiently "Leninist" to counteract the spread of "growing pessimism in regard to the revolutionary fervor of the Polish worker and especially of the Polish peasant. . . ."[72] This pessimism must have intensified during the retreat from Warsaw, for Suslov notes that many Red Army soldiers complained of savage guerrilla attacks by Polish peasants.[73] Pilsudski not only forced the Soviet army under Tukhachevsky to retreat from Warsaw, but drove a second Soviet army under Yegorov and Budenny out of the south of Poland. Lenin had to choose between mobilizing the exhausted Soviet state for yet another military campaign and abandoning his hopes for a Communist regime in Warsaw. He chose to sign a treaty with Pilsudski that gave the Poles generous territorial concessions.

In his conclusion Suslov notes that there was still debate in the U.S.S.R. over whether the failure of the Polish campaign was due primarily to political or to military errors. He cites Marshal Tukhachevsky's assertion that the Soviets did not make any political miscalculations but committed some serious military mistakes.[74] Suslov does not elaborate on Tukhachevsky's argument—that Generals Yegorov and Budenny were responsible for the Soviet defeat because they did not send reinforcements to Warsaw, as Tukhachevsky had requested.[75] Suslov does note that Antonov-Ovseenko, head of the political administration of the Soviet armed forces during the early 1920's, did not share Tukhachevsky's view. He quotes Antonov-Ovseenko as saying, "We overestimated the disintegration of the Polish Army and we also overestimated the revolutionary preparedness of the Polish proletariat and we did not reckon with the possibility of a nationalist upsurge of the broad Polish masses, particularly the peasantry."[76]

At the 1921 party congress, Lenin declared that he would leave to fu-

[72] Suslov (fn. 57), 89.
[73] *Ibid.*, 141-42.
[74] *Ibid.*, 155.
[75] Tukhachevsky's account of the war, "The March Beyond the Vistula," is reprinted in Pilsudski's *Year 1920* (fn. 60). Tukhachevsky does not refer to Yegorov and Budenny by name but does mention their armies (pp. 259-62). His analysis of the war is open to some doubt. He claims that the Poles did welcome the Red Army enthusiastically, and that if the Provisional Revolutionary Council had been installed in Warsaw, all of Western Europe would have erupted in revolution (pp. 242-44). Louis Fischer questions the validity of Tukhachevsky's assessment of Polish and European politics on pp. 395 and 397 of *The Life of Lenin* (fn. 61).
[76] Suslov (fn. 57), 155-56.

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ture historians the question of whether political or military errors were responsible for the defeat of the Red Army in Poland.[77] Suslov himself chose not to take up Lenin's invitation. He does not express an opinion on whether the political mistakes committed by the Soviets cost them victory. He confines himself to pointing out the political errors of the Red Army and analyzing their origins.

There is some evidence that Lenin privately believed that the Soviet defeat was due to political errors. Clara Zetkin, a German Communist, quotes Lenin in 1920 as saying that nationalism had inspired the successful Polish resistance to the Red Army. Lenin also said that he would not ask his soldiers and civilians to wage another difficult and bitter war in Poland unless he could offer a moral-political argument that would be persuasive with the armies on both sides of the battlefield. According to Zetkin, Lenin declared:

> . . . in the Red Army the Poles saw enemies, not brothers and liberators. They [the Poles] felt, thought and acted not in a social, revolutionary way, but as nationalists, as imperialists.
>
> The revolution in Poland on which we counted did not take place. The workers and peasants, deceived by the adherents of Pilsudski and Daszynski, defended their class enemy, let our brave Red Army soldiers starve, ambushed them and beat them to death. . . .
>
> I myself believe that our position did not force us to make peace at any price. We could have held out over the winter. But I thought it wiser, from a political standpoint, to come to terms with the enemy; and the temporary sacrifice of a hard peace appeared to me preferable to a continuation of the war. . . .
>
> In the present situation Soviet Russia can win only if it shows by its attitude that it carries on war only to defend itself, to protect the revolution; that it is the only great country of peace in the world; that it has no intention whatever to seize land, suppress nations, or enter upon an imperialist adventure.
>
> But above all, ought we, unless absolutely and literally compelled, to have exposed the Russian people to the terror and suffering of another winter of war? Our heroic Red soldiers at the fronts, our workers and peasants, who have suffered so much!
>
> Another winter of war, after the years of the imperialist war and of the civil war, when millions would starve, would freeze, and die, desperately silent. Food and clothes are already scarce.
>
> The workers are complaining, the peasants murmuring that we are only taking away from them and giving them nothing. . . . No; the thought of the agonies of another winter of war was unbearable. We had to make peace.[78]

[77] *Ibid.*, 156.
[78] Zetkin, *Reminiscences of Lenin* (New York: International Publishers 1934), 18-20.

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Suslov does not take up the question of whether or not Soviet Russia had the military capacity to overwhelm the Poles in a second engagement. What Suslov offers is a demonstration of the propositions of Soviet military theory that war is the pursuit of specific political objectives; that the political objectives of a war determine the moral-political factor on both sides of the battlefield; that this factor has a great impact on the success of military operations; that nationalism is one of the most important components of the moral-political factor; and that Soviet leaders will not pursue a war that appears to be "unjust" if they are worried about the stability of the home front.

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INCLUSION AND MOBILIZATION IN EUROPEAN LENINIST REGIMES

By KENNETH JOWITT*

Developmental Tasks, Strategic Political Uncertainties, and Regime Structures

IN the history of Leninist regimes[1] one can identify at least three elite-designated core tasks and stages of development. The first is transformation of the old society; the second is consolidation of the revolutionary regime; the third and current task is inclusion: attempts by the party elite to expand the internal boundaries of the regime's political, productive, and decision-making systems, to integrate itself with the non-official (i.e., non-*apparatchik*) sectors of society rather than insulate itself from them.

Typically, designation of a core task has two major, related consequences. It specifies a particular locus of political uncertainty and generates a particular regime structure, one that simultaneously reflects the task at hand and the corresponding locus of uncertainty. To expand and illustrate these points: the transformation task refers to a Leninist party's attempt to decisively eliminate the political and military capacity of opposition elites. The defining characteristic of the social and political environment during this period is turbulence. The existence of a highly turbulent environment has very specific political implications for regime organization, power distribution, and consequently, regime-society relations. In such circumstances, Leninist parties are faced with a set of conflicting imperatives within the party and in the party's relations to society. Within the party the imperatives of obedience to central directives and the need for discretion "in the field" compete with one another, while in party-society relations the imperatives of gaining sociopolitical support and controlling that support partially conflict with

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[1] The term "Leninist regimes" will be used throughout in a generic sense. Distinctions of a developmental nature will be referred to in terms of specific syndromes of tasks, uncertainties, and structures (i.e., transformation, consolidation, and inclusion regimes). Thus, in reference to the period of Stalin's rule in the Soviet Union, the term Leninist regime does *not* reflect a lack of appreciation of the differences between 1935 and 1925, or between Stalin and Lenin as individual leaders. The term Leninist refers to the existence of an organization-ideology which, although changing in significant respects over time, remains identifiable as a particular type of charismatic institution.

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one another. In short, acting on the task of transformation engenders social and organizational turbulence which in turn makes it difficult for the regime simply to command support from social groups and obedience at all levels of the party. The need to bargain with "heroic" local cadres and to persuade social strata who are essential in the battle against the class enemy produces a particular type of party organization and regime-society relationship.

With the achievement of a political and military breakthrough, the self-perceived task of a Leninist regime changes from transformation to consolidation. The party's efforts shift to creating the nucleus of a new political system and community in a setting that is designed to prevent existing, "unreconstructed" social and cultural forces from exercising any uncontrolled and undesired influence over the development and definition of the institutions, values, and practices favored by the party. With the adoption of the consolidation task the locus of political uncertainty shifts. Instead of searching for "risk-taking cadres" and demonstrating a capacity to attract political support, the party elite (or a section thereof) attempts to maximize its *insulation* from society, to secure the undivided commitment of its cadres by reducing the reference groups for those cadres to one—the party as represented by its leadership. The task of consolidation and the corresponding uncertainty surrounding the issue of cadre insulation bias the distribution of power and the definition of the regime in favor of those individuals and institutions most likely to depersonalize the party's contacts with the society and to maximize obedience within the party.

Just as success with the task of transformation redefines the regime's internal and external environments by creating a less turbulent situation, thereby depriving local cadres and social groups of control over a major locus of uncertainty and power,[2] so success with consolidation —creation of an articulate socialist intelligentsia, elaboration of an industrial base, and the development of military power—has made it increasingly difficult to sustain the rationale for and format of a consolidation regime.

With the achievement of consolidation, these regimes complemented the political-military destruction of traditional elites with the social and economic destruction of traditional institutions; they achieved a deci-

[2] There is no longer a need for the regime to depend on "heroic" local cadres to secure the political support of local social constituencies against the "class enemy"; neither is there any longer the disruption that prevented the extension of central party control.

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sive breakthrough.[3] The locus of political uncertainty has shifted once again, reflecting a change in the *sociopolitical* environment and a corresponding attempt by certain components of the party leadership to redefine the regime's core task in light of this change and the party's concern with self-maintenance. The locus of political uncertainty has shifted from protecting the precarious values of a newly established revolutionary regime with charismatic qualities to insuring that the social products of its developmental efforts identify themselves in terms that are consistent with the party's ideological self-image and organizational definition. Uncertainty involves the possibility that the increasing social heterogeneity of socialist society, in the form of an increasing range of articulate social audiences,[4] might express itself as an articulated plurality of political-ideological definitions.[5] Inclusion is an attempt to prevent that plurality by revising the regime's format and its relationship to society from insulation to integration. The argument to be presented here attempts to explicate this situation, the defining situation for the majority of Leninist regimes. It is hoped that the perspective expressed in the preceding pages will enable students of these regimes to get beyond those analyses that (a) posit a unilinear de-radicalization or de-utopianization of Leninist regimes,[6] (b) effectively reduce social change in its broadest sense to the proposition that socioeconomic change determines political change,[7] or (c) juxtapose, in a Manichean variant, a series of social changes that are described as progressive and political responses which, if not "adaptive" in the sense of

[3] Revolutionary regimes differ from reformist regimes in their attempts to attack tradition comprehensively at two levels. Reformist regimes are more likely to limit their efforts at social change to changes in elite structure. Revolutionary regimes attack traditional institutions as well as traditional elites. Collectivization in contrast to land reform is a striking instance.

[4] I would like to suggest the notion of "articulate audiences" in place of both "masses" and "publics" to describe a diverse set of social groups in contemporary Leninist regimes. Unlike masses, these groups are politically knowledgeable and oriented. Consequently they are capable of offering the regime support of a more differentiated and sophisticated character. Unlike publics—i.e., citizens who voluntarily organize themselves around major political issues—these "audiences" are restricted in their political behavior to those roles and actions prescribed by the regime itself.

[5] For one Leninist regime's attempts to move in this direction see Jowitt, "Political Innovation in Romania," *Survey*, Vol. 93 (Autumn 1974), 132-52.

[6] See Robert C. Tucker, "The Deradicalization of Marxist Movements," in *The Marxian Revolutionary Idea* (New York: Norton 1969), 172-215; and Richard Lowenthal, "Development vs. Utopia in Communist Policy," in Chalmers Johnson, ed., *Change in Communist Systems* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1970), 33-117.

[7] See Samuel P. Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society* (New York: Basic Books 1970), 3-48.

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becoming more liberal, are seen as resulting in "arrested" development.[8]

Inclusion

The task of inclusion refers to a ruling Leninist party's perception that the major condition for its continued development as an institutionalized charismatic organization is to integrate itself with, rather than insulate itself from, its host society. More specifically, it involves a Leninist party's attempt to devise a new role and set of institutions that allow for a more effective mediation between the status of party *apparatchik* and formal party membership or nonparty status. *It refers above all to an attempt to expand membership in the regime in a way that allows politically co-opted social elites or activists to maintain their social-occupational identity,*[9] *and the party apparatus to maintain its institutionalized charismatic status.* The process of expanding membership has typically included expanding the boundaries of the regime's productive and decision-making systems along with the internal boundaries of the political system itself. The most dramatic instance of the latter phenomenon has been the admission of a wide range of social elites to consultative status in sociopolitical activities.[10] Stable expansion of a political system's membership base indicates a political elite's recognition of the need to respond to previously *ex*cluded, distrusted sectors of the population. Such expansion often entails the development of leadership capacities within the regime which utilize relational skills of persuasion and manipulation in contrast to command capacities largely based on coercion; the latter typify regimes maximizing their insulation from (rather than integration with) their host society.

In the case of Leninist regimes, expansion of the decision-making

[8] See Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration?" in Brzezinski, ed., *Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press 1969), 1-35; for a restatement of this thesis, see Zvi Gitelman, "Beyond Leninism, Political Development in Eastern Europe," *Newsletter on Comparative Studies of Communism*, v (May 1972), 18-44.

[9] During the consolidation period, Leninist regimes typically attempt to invidiously distinguish regime supporters from nonsupporters and to socially isolate the former. In short, at the social level as well as in the relations between society and polity, insulation is the major characteristic at this stage of development. Social "elites" are forced to forsake their social-occupational identities in order to share in political status and responsibilities. Inclusion regimes are characterized by attempts to integrate social and political roles. On the "insulative" tendencies of consolidation regimes, see Reinhard Bendix, *Work and Authority in Industry* (New York: John Wiley & Sons 1956), 400-434.

[10] On this central point, see Peter C. Ludz, *The Changing Party Elite in East Germany* (Cambridge: MIT Press 1972), 40-42, 126, 185; Alfred G. Meyer, *The Soviet Political System* (New York: Random House 1965).

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system has taken the form of placing relatively greater emphasis on the weight of empirical premises (in contrast to ideological assumptions). Such an emphasis creates a more critical, less dogmatic orientation toward problem definition and problem resolution, in part through a greater appreciation of discussion, consultation, and experimentation. Finally, expansion of the productive system in these societies has resulted in placing greater emphasis on merit and procedural criteria. This emphasis indicates a heightened appreciation of formal rationalization as an efficiency- and resource-expanding process. Jointly, these boundary revisions of the political, productive, and decision-making systems reflect a perceived need to gauge and control the complexities of society more accurately, and a basic if not thoroughgoing confidence that past developmental efforts (social, political, and economic) have succeeded in creating a set of strategic groups that can serve as the social basis of a Leninist political community.

However, the adoption of inclusion as a defining or core task presents problems as well as opportunities for a Leninist regime. The opportunities consist primarily of an enhanced ability to control the potential political implications of an emerging set of articulate social audiences. The problems stem from the regime's intention to enhance its legitimacy without sacrificing the charismatic exclusiveness of its official (*apparatchik*) component. Insofar as inclusion becomes a defining task orientation, it adds complexity to the social system. Complexity increases not simply through the arithmetical introduction of more elements (i.e., expert consultants), but also through the introduction of elements more resistant to elite fiat and arbitrariness (characteristics of routinized charismatic organizations as well as charismatic leaders). For example, *to the extent* that the party's leadership is committed to a more rational decision-making process, it is constrained by the operation of premises that are empirically grounded. Also, if the party leadership is committed to eliciting rather than commanding the support of different social audiences, it is again constrained—this time by the aspirations and concerns of those elements in the population whose support it desires. In addition, if the party leadership tries to increase productivity by introducing and strengthening formal rules, it is somewhat constrained by their operation.

Throughout the fifties and early sixties consolidation was the predominant task orientation for the majority of Leninist regimes. However, beginning in the late fifties and early sixties, there is more than adequate evidence that attempts were made within several parties to

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either modify or redefine the priority of consolidation in favor of inclusion. *Modification* occurred in North Korea and Bulgaria in 1965–1966. *Redefinition* of task and regime structure occurred in the Soviet Union in the period 1959–1961, in Romania between 1965 and 1968, in Yugoslavia and Hungary in 1966, and in Czechoslovakia in 1967–1968. There is a crucial difference between the modification and the redefinition of a regime's character. One must distinguish between the introduction of inclusive policies and the creation of a regime structure based on the task of inclusion. When the dominant faction of a party makes the authoritative ideological statement that the issue of "capitalist restoration" has been decisively resolved, and when social reality (both domestically and internationally) is no longer conceived, or related to, in dichotomic terms, it is appropriate to conclude that a change in regime character has occurred. The paradigmatic case is Khrushchev's Soviet regime. The ideological formulations of "state" and "party of the whole people" were announced at party congresses and signified a new structural relationship between regime and society—one of reconciliation versus antagonism, integration versus insulation. Recognition of the Third World and the *obshchestvenniki*,[11] as well as of the intrinsic value of science, signified dramatic and character-defining breaks with the ideological-philosophical-organizational definitions *and* practices of the consolidation period.

However, regardless of whether the outcome was modification or redefinition of regime format, for over a decade the major feature of most Leninist regimes has been the conflict between and accommodation of individuals, policies, ideological formulations, and institutional definitions representing either an inclusion or a consolidation bias. This *conflict-accommodation pattern* is similar in many ways to the more general conflict-accommodation pattern one discovers between tradition and modernity. Consolidation regimes are obviously not identical with feudal, patrimonial, or tribal sociopolitical orders; however, in some respects they are comparable. It may even be suggested that the congruence between several of the defining premises of a consolidation regime and the defining premises of a traditional peasant society has been one stabilizing factor in many societies that have had con-

[11] *Obshchestvenniki* are party members who, while active as consultants and even as officeholders in the party organization, are not full-time party apparatus workers. I have attempted to analyze their significance in terms of national development in my paper, "State and National Development in Contemporary Eastern Europe" (unpub.).

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solidation regimes.[12] In examining the conflict-accommodation pattern of consolidation and inclusion policies, institutions, and norms, we are studying a variant of the more general tradition-modernity encounter.

Regime Structures

In ideal-typical terms, regime structure may be viewed as a set of political-organizational adaptations that emerge in response to specific developmental tasks and strategic political uncertainties (both external and internal). Any particular regime structure will reflect the pattern of conflict and accommodation (within a given ruling coalition) among factions with different task priorities.

Regime structure can be analyzed in terms of the organizational, ideological, and policy correlates of a given core task such as consolidation and inclusion. Specification of these correlates should enhance our grasp of the major political uncertainties, conflicting goals, and patterns of conflict and accommodation that characterize contemporary Leninist regimes.

Profile of an Inclusion Regime

To the extent that a Leninist regime shifts its core task from consolidation to inclusion, a series of adaptive changes tend to occur. To begin with, the party develops its corporate character and leading role in opposition to those institutions whose distinctive competence is violence—the security and/or military forces. This institutional shift in influence toward the party as a corporate organization is accompanied by a shift toward oligarchy, away from a neopatrimonial type of leadership. Within the party, the political manager becomes the defining political actor in place of the political bureaucrat. There is a marked change in the social base of the regime as well, with the more professional, skilled, and articulate strata increasing their status vis-à-vis the "new class" of peasant-worker recruited officials. Power is expanded within the regime to allow for a more institutionalized mode of consultation with a variety of social groups. It must be stressed that consultation also occurred during the consolidation period, and consolidation regimes, like inclusion regimes, depend(ed) on social support for their existence (despite a tendency in the literature to assert "so-

[12] See Jowitt, "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-Leninist Systems," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 68 (September 1974), 1171-91.

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ciety's" nonexistence prior to Stalin's death). However, the mode of consultation in the inclusion regime is distinguished by the regime's willingness and capacity to allow members of particular socio-occupational strata to *complement rather than exchange* their social and occupational identities with political-organizational responsibilities. For understandable reasons, regimes oriented *not* to inclusion but rather to consolidation typically define the relationship between socio-occupational status and political-organizational status in mutually exclusive terms. Society and regime are related in a strict hierarchy. A change in status in such a situation does not consist primarily of a change in role, but of a change in identity—a change from nonofficial to official or *apparatchik* status. A structure of this order is predictable in a regime that equates effective political penetration with maximum organizational insulation from social claims. Such a regime will emphasize assimilation to a narrowly defined and exclusive political-ideological status—the quintessential expression of which is the member of the *apparat*.

The radical innovation of inclusion regimes is that, while co-optation remains the sole means of exercising political influence, it is no longer primarily based on the categoric separation and opposition of socio-occupational identity and political-organizational responsibilities in the party.

Consistent with this change, when inclusion becomes the core task, manipulation rather than domination becomes the defining relationship between regime and society. Policy making is expressed more in terms of initiative based on critical scrutiny of problems and less in terms of an indiscriminate emulation of external references and/or dogmatic adherence to past policies. The *legislative and representative* organs of the state are ideologically and institutionally upgraded. This point warrants some elaboration. The proverbial wisdom is that during the consolidation stage (i.e., during Stalin's rule) the state was overwhelmingly powerful. In fact, the security forces were overwhelmingly powerful and in most cases effectively subordinated all other state functions and institutions. During the consolidation period, the state, as a set of institutions and symbols representing the political unity of the whole society, is afforded at best an ambivalent and more often a distinctly inferior status to those state institutions (such as the Ministry of Interior) whose distinctive competence is vigilance rather than representation.

Inclusion regimes typically upgrade their ideological evaluation of the nation-state. This process is marked by ambivalence and selectivity

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and differs significantly from the way consolidation regimes deal with the nation-state.[13] Finally, Leninist inclusion regimes define their international position in terms of a more extensive set of *complementary* membership groupings. At both the national and international level, inclusion regimes typically adopt a more differentiated and less exclusive view of their political identity.

All of these revisions in regime definition involve a shift away from command, arbitrary, and dogmatic modes of action and organization, and a move toward leadership, procedural, and empirically oriented modes.

A. The movement to redevelop the integrity of the party as *the* leading political institution may be viewed as an attempt to assert the primacy of an organization whose distinctive competence is sociopolitical rather than coercive, an organization with manipulative and persuasive capacities as well as coercive ones, an organization with a certain claim to social representativeness as well as political and ideological exclusiveness.

B. The restructuring of the party's leadership from a neopatrimonial to a more oligarchic pattern has typically included a stress on performance, merit criteria, a more rational division of labor at various levels in the party, stricter adherence to scheduled meetings, the regular publication of their results, and in some instances the elaboration of statutes which at least formally guarantee the right of individual dissent within the party.[14] The critical or empirical component of inclusion is evident in the emphasis on collective leadership which ideally allows for more open inquiry, more diverse sources of information, and more discussion within the leadership echelon. The stress on merit criteria is a development with both procedural and empirical dimensions, given the emphasis on impersonal standards of recruitment and promotion as well as on achievement and observed performance. A measure such as the promulgation of party statutes formally guaranteeing the right of individual dissent within the party simultaneously embodies procedural, empirical, and leadership dimensions, given its (at least formal) specification of legal-rational rights, its support of more open discussion, and its indirect contribution to interaction based more on considerations of reciprocity and less on fear.

C. The appearance of a new type of cadre, the political manager, is

[13] In this connection, see the points made on pp. 79-80 and 87-88.

[14] On the extent of rights of dissent in the Romanian party, see *Statutul Partidului Communist Roman* (Bucharest 1959), 40.

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of particular importance. Let us clarify what this cadre's defining features are. We are *not* suggesting that *economic* cadres become dominant in Leninist regimes stressing the inclusion task. We should also not confuse the political manager with the technocrat. This confusion is perhaps one of the greatest errors in the literature; namely, the identification of the technocrat as the alternative to the *apparatchik*.

The managerial political cadre is distinguished by *two* competences: first, his relatively high level of technical expertise and/or experience and second, and perhaps more importantly, *his manipulative skills in sociopolitical settings*. Unlike the technocrat and the *apparatchik*, the manager is a political actor sensitive to the social-personal dimensions of a situation and possessed of a capacity and willingness to manipulate the social and personal dimensions of a situation to achieve his goals. It is this competence, a leadership competence, that distinguishes the political manager from both the command-oriented *apparatchik* and the rule-oriented technocrat. For reasons that will become evident when we discuss the policy-making process in an inclusion regime, political managers tend to complement their leadership orientation with a reliance on empirical and procedural orientations.

D. The increasing recognition given to the professional-skilled stratum in societies ruled by Leninist regimes is a telling indication of the shift from a consolidation to an inclusion orientation. The party's ideological upgrading of the "intelligentsia," the differentiation of wages, and the recruitment patterns of the various parties suggest that for varying periods of time and to different degrees Leninist regimes during the sixties began to orient themselves to the social products of their own mobilization-industrialization efforts. The New Class with its dogmatic, arbitrary, and command orientation is no longer the sole sociopolitical stratum that can represent itself as the legitimating base of Leninist regimes. In contrast to the New Class, the new articulate, professional-skilled stratum is distinguished by its higher level of training and expertise, its preference for revised authority relations, and its various recognition aspirations. Its preferences *seem* to lean in the direction of a more rule-ordered system (not necessarily democratic), both as a condition for effective performance and as a guarantee of its status as the indigenous product of the regime's efforts at social-political transformation.

E. The expansion of power is reflected in a Leninist party's willingness to approach the question of power in a more complex fashion, to differentiate types of power, and to allow different elements in a society to exercise different forms of power. Specifically, the expansion

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of power refers to the party's willingness to permit a significant degree of functional autonomy or expert autonomy in the performance of specific tasks. This tendency, one that has been noted by a number of analysts, is marked by leadership rather than command orientations inasmuch as it involves the party's recognition, acceptance, and manipulation of skilled strata in the pursuit of regime goals. Its empirical component manifests itself as a greater appreciation of the need for debate and multiple types of information. Finally, the expansion of power contributes to the place of procedural norms in the social system insofar as the expansion of power reflects the party's acceptance of distinct and differentiated areas of competence as well as the scheduled and coordinated discussion of specific topics.

F. Perhaps the most significant difference between consolidation and inclusion regimes involves the character of authority relations. The shift from a regime-society relationship based on domination to one emphasizing manipulation is a shift from a sociopolitical order based almost exclusively on command and violence to one in which leadership skills of manipulation *and* persuasion are more significant than in the past. Manipulation, however, is not simply a more economical and clever mode of domination. It allows for a certain measure of recognition and influence to aspiring social strata that have felt relatively deprived of status, influence, and economic well-being. To date, the discussion of manipulation in Leninist regimes has worked with the established sociological paired concept of real and felt influence.[15] We should elaborate this distinction to suggest that there are at least two forms of real influence and two types of felt influence. Real influence may be exerted over routine and over defining issues, the latter being those that have a direct impact on the overall character of a social-political system.[16] Felt influence or manipulated participation may also be of two types, one that is characteristic of (but not limited to) consolidation regimes, the other of inclusion regimes. Consolidation regimes engage almost exclusively in *symbolic manipulation*; the most striking instance is the manipulation of nationalist symbols. Symbolic manipulation indicates the party's perceived need to address imbalances between the regime and society in a context of continuing

[15] See, for example, the interesting article by Thomas Baylis, "East Germany: In Quest of Legitimacy," *Problems of Communism*, XXI (March-April 1972), 46-56.

[16] Influence over routine issues must not be confused with influence over insignificant issues. Routine issues may well be significant; they differ from defining issues in the order of significance. The resolution of defining issues has a direct impact on the basic character of the major institutions, values, and/or behaviors that provide a social system with its distinct identity.

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political distrust and avoidance of commitments to that society. *Organizational manipulation*, that is, the revitalization of national-front organizations, the upgrading of trade unions, and the emergence of peasant unions, is quite a different kind of manipulation. Organizational manipulation not only indicates the regime's recognition of an imbalance, but also allows social elements (i.e., professionals) real involvement in routine decisions.

G. In the policy sphere, regimes oriented to inclusion tend to stress policy initiation more than emulation as the basic premise of policy making. The critical and empirical components of initiation in contrast to emulation as a policy stance are too clear to warrant extended comment here. Consolidation regimes are "traditional" in that major policies tend to become ritualized rather than continually scrutinized —whether the commitment is to machine tractor stations, a reified dichotomic world view, or a dogmatic conception of the party's "leading role."

Policy initiation in turn places a premium on leadership rather than command skills, and on procedural norms rather than political arbitrariness. Policy initiation assumes a degree of discretion by decision-making units. Discretion is an integral component of a decision-making style based on the critical-empirical examination of a problem. However, command orientations emphasize standardization of environments rather than their differentiation. Command orientations also typically emphasize the authority of superior ranks rather than the importance of a particular policy situation or environment. A leadership (rather than command) structure is thus a key element in insuring the effective operation of a policy-making process marked by policy initiation.

If one views the nation as a decision- or policy-making unit, it is not accidental that independent Communist regimes vociferously demand that international relations within the *bloc* be based on mutual, reciprocal adjustment among leaders, not on obedience to the commands of one set of leaders—the Soviet. The rationale behind this argument is at least partially that each leader is most familiar with his own policy environment and must have discretion in order to base policy on an adequate (empirical) relationship to that environment. Command structures focus attention on superiors; leadership structures focus attention on problems as well.

Policy initiation also depends on the upgrading of scheduled operations, of formal procedures over political arbitrariness. Formal procedures (i.e., contracts) are designed to insure the effective coordination

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of distinct policy-making units and to minimize any interference with the regular and differentiated analysis of problems and solutions in particular policy-making environments.

H. All Leninist regimes attending to the task of inclusion through necessity and/or choice tend to upgrade those state institutions and symbols that emphasize the representative and unifying quality of the state. The reverse of this is that such regimes typically downgrade those institutions (i.e., the Ministry of Interior) and slogans (i.e., "vigilance") which during the consolidation period dominate and subvert all other state institutions and functions.

The state *as a set of representative institutions and symbols* is downgraded during the consolidation period precisely because the major concern of the party during such a period is to deny the "whole people" representation and legitimation. The nation is precisely what has to be "reconstructed" and denied influence in the process of creating new socialist elites, institutions, and culture during the period of consolidation. The state at this time is upgraded only in one sense: its monopoly of organized violence is secured and enhanced. When Leninist regimes upgrade the state as a set of institutions and symbols emphasizing representative and reconciliatory functions, it is a sign that in their view the process of consolidation (as defined here) has been decisively effected, with the class enemy not only defeated but replaced by a new, more trustworthy set of social strata deserving ideological and organizational recognition. The upgrading of the state in this manner involves both the symbolic and organizational recognition of "society," and is predicated on a greater incidence of leadership rather than command orientations, and of political integration rather than bureaucratic insulation. In turn, the added stress on more regular meetings of parliament, increased periods of debate, and greater specialization of committees is based on procedural and empirical premises.

I. Finally, to the extent that Leninist regimes orient themselves to the task of inclusion, they are more likely to demonstrate a positive ideological evaluation of the nation-state. This often involves a more sophisticated and critical attitude toward the country's pre-Leninist history and a more flexible political attitude toward sectors of its national constituency, rather than a "for us or against us" posture. Inclusion-oriented regimes are also likely to define themselves internationally in terms of *multiple rather than exclusive* membership groupings. The tendency of certain Leninist regimes to define their political identity on the basis of their complementary relationships with different membership groupings (i.e., the Third World, Western Europe, the Warsaw

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Pact, the United States, or the "World Socialist System") reflects a major disposition within such regimes to define themselves by consciously and critically appraising the relationship between their goals, resources, and environments. This disposition may legitimately be interpreted as having an empirical rather than dogmatic character. A critical-empirical posture of this order, one based on complementary memberships, may aptly be called universalistic in contrast to the neotraditional and particularistic definition of political identity adhered to by consolidation regimes. The latter define membership in exclusive terms; i.e., to be a member of the socialist bloc means *not* to consider oneself as a Third-World or "small" nation. It must also be noted that a Leninist regime's expansion of the criteria and premises for deciding on its posture in the international arena has implications in other realms. The adoption of complementary and diverse memberships favors the development of leadership (rather than command) skills within the party elite—skills that enable the regime to recognize and manage multiple international constituencies. Finally, the perceived need to relate to, but differentiate memberships in different settings (i.e., all-European, Warsaw Pact) favors the appreciation of procedural norms such as sovereignty as a device for stabilizing a more complex environment.

One can find a fair amount of illustrative material to support the argument that during the sixties the majority of Leninist regimes began to shift their priorities in the directions suggested here.

Beginning with the removal of Beria, continuing with the condemnation of the neopatrimonial "cult of the personality" and Khrushchev's upgrading of the party as a corporate institution in the late fifties, and up to the attacks within the Czechoslovak party in 1967 on Novotny's mode of leadership, the reassertion of the party's corporate integrity has been a visible and politically significant development. The greater emphasis on oligarchic leadership (or, in Leninist terms, collective leadership) was closely related to this reassertion of the party's corporate integrity. Oligarchic leadership has been based on a greater specification of intra-elite responsibilities (one instance was the differentiation of the Executive Committee and Presidium in Romania in the period 1965–1974), the rationalization of structure (such as occurred during the mid-sixties in East Germany and Hungary), the stress on scheduled meetings (a characteristic of both the Gierek and Ceauşescu regimes), and an upgrading of the party's regional and local units in regimes as diverse as the Soviet and Yugoslav.

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The appearance of political managerial cadres can be documented in a number of regimes. Baylis and Ludz have noted this development in the D.D.R., and Johnson has pointed out the managerial component in the Polish party and its conflict with the *apparatchiki*.[17] However, along with Ludz and Baylis, Johnson is disposed to label these cadres as technocrats, thereby possibly obscuring their distinctive political skills and their greater sensitivity to social situations and capacity to manipulate them. The higher level of education among Central Committee members has been noted by a number of analysts.[18] Data on their operating style are harder to come by. We would suggest, however, that during the sixties a style of leadership exemplified by Ceauşescu, Kadar, and most recently Gierek, appeared in Eastern Europe—one that sharply contrasted with that of leaders like Gomulka, Novotny, Gheorghiu-Dej, Chervenkov, and Stalin. In certain respects the "model" for the political managerial cadre is former American Secretary of Defense McNamara. In an article devoted to McNamara, David Halberstam points to a number of attributes that are also characteristic of the new Leninist political managers.[19] They are rationalists, men who are well-trained, authoritarian but still appreciative of the need to receive expert information and to structure situations so as to elicit that information and support. They are "win-oriented," not neutral pragmatists or technocrats. They tend to be sober individuals with a penchant toward the puritanical. They contrast with the rather hedonistic *apparatchik* new-class cadre in the way the modern bourgeoisie analyzed by Weber differed from the traditional capitalist.[20] It is a change from the Berias to the Katushevs, the Stoicas to the Winters.

As for the rise in prominence of the professional and skilled strata, a large number of examples can be provided to illustrate this phenomenon. The Czechoslovak Action Program of the late 1960's, with its

[17] Baylis (fn. 15), and Peter C. Ludz, "Continuity and Change Since Ulbricht," *Problems of Communism*, XXI (March-April 1972), 56-57. Ludz has provided an excellent and succinct analysis of development in the D.D.R. in *The German Democratic Republic from the Sixties to the Seventies* (Occasional Papers in International Affairs, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, November 1970); see also Ross Johnson, "Poland: End of an Era," *Problems of Communism*, XIX (January-February 1970), 28-40.

[18] See, for example, Robert H. Donaldson, "The 1971 Soviet Central Committee: An Assessment of the New Elite," *World Politics*, XXIV (April 1972), 382-409.

[19] David Halberstam, "The Programming of Robert McNamara," *Harper's Magazine*, Vol. 242 (February 1971), 7-21. The term "model" should not suggest that "managerial" cadres in Leninist regimes consciously have McNamara in mind.

[20] For Weber's comparison, see *The Protestant Ethic* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons 1958), 69-78.

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stress on the intelligentsia, science,[21] and the need for merit-performance norms, provides a clear instance of one regime's ideological recognition of this stratum. The central places accorded to economic managers and skilled individuals in the economic reform the East Germans promulgated in 1963, and in the New Economic Management of the Hungarians in 1968, are additional instances.[22] The recruitment patterns of the Yugoslav, Polish, Hungarian, and Czech parties in the sixties provide another illustration of the ascendance of this stratum.[23] In Romania the slogan, *omul potrivit la locul potrivit* (the right man for the right job), reflects an increased emphasis on technical qualification and a heightened appreciation of the professional strata created by twenty-five years of mobilization and industrialization.

Perhaps the most instructive example, however, can be found in the Soviet Union, where, during the sixties, there was a struggle over the type of propaganda personnel the regime should employ. It seems that around 1965 "concrete proposals were advanced in the press to replace the traditional agitators with more sophisticated 'politinformators'—that is, information specialists capable of influencing knowledgeable mass audiences."[24] Note the characteristics of the "politinformators." They were drawn not from the ranks of workers and peasants but from the ranks of officials, economic managers, scientists, engineers, agronomists; in short, the professional stratum. They specialized in differentiated forms of propaganda. Their skills seemed to be aimed at new types of audiences—audiences that were more articulate, educated, urban, and skilled. Their competence appears to be based on manipulating select audiences with specialized information rather than haranguing mass audiences with symbolic slogans. According to Unger, they had emerged as a countrywide institution by 1967, and they may now number over two million.[25]

As with so many other aspects of the change from consolidation

[21] Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, "The Action Program of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia," in Robin Alison Remington, ed., *Winter in Prague* (Cambridge: MIT Press 1969), 88-137.

[22] For the East German reform, see Baylis (fn. 15), and "Economic Reform as Ideology: East Germany's New Economic System," *Comparative Politics*, III (January 1971), 211-31. See also the fine article by Bennet Kovrig, "Decompression in Hungary: Phase Two," in Peter A. Toma, ed., *The Changing Face of Communism in Eastern Europe* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press 1970), 196-202, for an analysis of the upgrading of economic-managerial personnel that attended the Hungarian reforms.

[23] On recruitment patterns during the sixties, see Frank Parkin, "Class Stratification in Socialist Societies," *British Journal of Sociology*, XX (December 1969), 355-75.

[24] Aryeh L. Unger, "Politinformator or Agitator: A Decision Blocked," *Problems of Communism*, XIX (September-October 1970), 31.

[25] *Ibid.*

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to inclusion, the expansion of power was initiated by Khrushchev with his practice of providing organizational formats for the participation of experts in policy discussions. The attention given to trade unions in Hungary,[26] the increased scope of public debates in the Soviet Union,[27] the creation and revitalization of expert organizations exemplified by the conferences of managers and engineers in Romania,[28] the relative differentiation of social-scientific from strictly ideological studies evident in the growth of sociological institutes throughout most of Eastern Europe—all are instances of a tendency that emerged during the sixties. It was a movement toward less rigid control and more differentiated appreciation of the social system.

We have already pointed out that the question of manipulation is very complex. It could be argued that all modern societies, regardless of political and ideological orientation, are primarily (though not exclusively) based on manipulative rather than command skills. The nation-state, itself the structural expression of modernity in the political realm, is partially based on the capacity to manipulate the allegiance and identification of millions of people. In this respect, the Leninist regimes' manipulation of society in the postconsolidation period can be seen as a variant of modern manipulation, not as a unique phenomenon. The relative shift from regime domination to regime manipulation of society in Leninist regimes depends on at least two developments: first, the appearance of urban, educated, and *articulate* strata that can make a legitimate claim to recognition as integral and trustworthy components of society; second, at least partial acceptance of this claim by managerial party cadres within the respective regimes. As a mode of control, manipulation indicates the emergence of a more "articulate society" in place of a "silent society," and of a political decision by the regime to organize rather than repress the heterogeneity that characterizes its environment, in order to act effectively on its multiple goals.

Examples of organizational (rather than symbolic) manipulation include periodic visits by the First Secretaries of the parties to various areas and constituencies. In this respect, Khrushchev, Gierek, Ceauşescu, and Kadar are quite different from Stalin, Gomulka, Gheorghiu-

[26] See Kovrig (fn. 22); also Barnabas Racz, "Political Changes in Hungary after the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia," *Slavic Review*, XXIX (December 1970), 633-51; and in particular William F. Robinson, *The Pattern of Reform in Hungary* (New York: Praeger 1973), 238-45 and 326-42.

[27] See the very perceptive piece by Jerry Hough, "The Soviet System: Petrification or Pluralism?" in *Problems of Communism*, XXI (March-April 1972), 25-46.

[28] For a report of the meeting of economic managers, see *Scinteia*, February 18, 1972.

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Dej, and Rakosi. A second instance can be found in the proliferation of what are termed representative and collective decision-making units, whether they are agricultural unions, workers' committees, upgraded youth organizations, or nationality organizations. It is not necessary to conclude that the recent attention and emphasis placed on these organizations by Leninist regimes signifies that they are now politically significant in their own right. However, this attention and emphasis do tell us something important about the perceptions of the elites in these regimes—about what new strategies they consider necessary and appropriate. In turn, these strategies indirectly provide us with an insight into the types of social (not just economic) uncertainties these elites see themselves to be facing. The attempt to control society "from within," as opposed to commanding it from an insulated position, is a major change that has character-defining implications for these regimes.

The development of sociology as a legitimate academic pursuit is also indicative of the shift from domination to manipulation. It is not surprising that the manipulation of statistics became a substitute for sociology during the period of consolidation; it was a period during which the regime distrusted the existing society and avoided empirical studies that might challenge its dogmatic beliefs about social reality. With the appearance and recognition of what in certain basic respects are new societies, the reappearance of sociology is not accidental. The system-quantity focus of statistics stands in contrast to the community-quality focus of sociology, a greater concern with the dynamics of social situations. The rise of sociology is a strong indication of the shift in regime tasks, and of significant changes in society and in regime-society relations.[29]

We have suggested that policy initiation is an integral aspect of the shift from consolidation to inclusion. The Romanian emphasis on the right to define internal and external policy independently,[30] the statement in the Czechoslovak Action Program that the "Czechoslovak people will formulate its own attitude towards the fundamental problems of world policy," the criticism that in the past the party had "not taken advantage of all opportunities for active work; it did not take

[29] The rapid and visible rise of sociological studies in Leninist political systems is easily documented. For an interesting analysis of this rise, see Alvin Gouldner, *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* (New York: Basic Books 1970), 447-78.

[30] For the Romanian position, see "Statement on the Stand of the Rumanian Workers Party Concerning the Problems of the International Communist and Working Class Movement (April 1964)" in Wm. Griffith, *Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964–1965* (Cambridge: MIT Press 1967), 269-97.

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the initiative . . . ," the distinguishable initiatives of the Bulgarians in the areas of agriculture and of foreign policy in the Balkans during 1965–1966,[31] the Hungarian approach to economic organization, and the Yugoslav approach to the questions of nationality, economic organization, and distribution of political power between 1965 and 1970—all are instances of Leninist regimes engaging in policy initiation rather than emulation, and of a differentiation process within the "World Socialist System."

The upgrading of *certain* state institutions has occurred in a number of countries. The strengthening of the State Council in Romania and Ceauşescu's assumption of the role of President of the State Council, the suggestion at the Tenth Congress of the Bulgarian party that a State Council replace the Presidium of the National Assembly and have important executive and legislative functions,[32] the upgrading of the personnel attached to state functions in Romania, and the somewhat greater role played by legislative organs in most East European nations and the Soviet Union involved: (a) a regime shift from a "Calvinist"-oppositional posture toward society to a "Lutheran"-reconciliation posture;[33] (b) a move toward the institutionalization of distinct functions and values; and (c) the tentative construction of a "substitute" public arena distinguishable from both the official and private sectors of the social system.[34]

Concerning the adoption of a more positive attitude toward the nation-state, one must be careful to observe that during the consolidation period Leninist regimes do not simply forget the nation-state. There are the examples of Stalin's manipulation of Great Russian national feeling and the more recent instances of Gheorghiu-Dej's affair with the "Dacians," Moczar's posture in Poland, the Bulgarian and Albanian emphasis on national history, and Kim Il-sung's attention to nationalism. It is not the manipulation of nationalism that distinguishes (Len-

[31] See Remington (fn. 21), 133-34. On Bulgaria, see J. F. Brown, *Bulgaria Under Communist Rule* (New York: Praeger 1970), 173-301; Michael Costello, "Bulgaria," in Adam Bromke and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, eds., *The Communist States in Disarray 1965–1971* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1972), 135-58; Marin V. Pundeff, "Bulgaria under Zhivkov," in Toma (fn. 22), 89-121.

[32] Costello (fn. 31), 155.

[33] For the comparison of Calvinist and Lutheran attitudes toward man on which this image is based, see chap. 4 of Weber (fn. 20), esp. 137-38.

[34] The character and role of publics in national development is a neglected topic in the field of comparative studies, particularly in the study of Leninist systems. The notion of publics and public domain has been bypassed, as has the more general and related focus of national development in the study of Leninist systems, in favor of attention to interest groups and the possibility of multiparty democratic systems. Such attention has in part reflected and in part contributed to the tendency to implicitly confuse national development in Leninist systems with movement toward liberal political orders.

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inist) inclusion regimes from consolidation regimes; it is the type of nationalism. Consolidation regimes typically manipulate national feelings and symbols in an attempt to generate cohesiveness and support for the regime in the absence of any concrete regime commitments to the society. The result is often the mobilization of traditional ethnic nationalism within the society and the somewhat unintentional adoption of chauvinist postures by the regimes. A prime example is the Gheorghiu-Dej regime in Romania.[35] Inclusion regimes tend to adopt a romantic nationalist rather than an integral or chauvinistic posture. The basis for this is the partial but significant reconciliation of "regime" and "society," and the assertion of party sovereignty vis-à-vis the bloc. Thus, while the move toward party sovereignty may not be initially predicated on nationalist premises (as Professor Golan correctly argues in the case of Czechoslovakia),[36] the assertion of party sovereignty, and more generally the commitment to more empirical premises, lead to a re-evaluation and redefinition of the party's various membership groups. Inclusion regimes give some evidence of a balanced and integrated appreciation of the nation-state as a unit marked by continuities and decisive changes. There is support for this argument in the position of the Romanians between 1967 and 1970, and in the Action Program's comments on the nation.[37] One may expect similar tendencies under Gierek.

Finally, the argument that inclusion regimes tend to define their international position in terms of multiple rather than exclusive memberships is clearly demonstrated in the case of nonaligned Yugoslavia in contrast to Bulgaria, Romania in contrast to Albania, and Czechoslovakia under Dubcek in contrast to the same country during Novotny's rule.

It is our argument that at various points during the sixties the majority of Leninist regimes responded to changes—intended as well as unintended—in the composition of society and regime in a manner distinct from the institutional, ideological, and policy syndrome that characterized them during the fifties. We are *not* suggesting that social and political developments within the "World Socialist System" inevitably

[35] For an analysis of a development of this order, see Jowitt, *Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1971), 221-24, 280-82.

[36] Galia Golan, "The Road to Reform," *Problems of Communism*, xx (May-June 1971), 11-22.

[37] See Miron Constantinescu, "Valorificarea critica a mostenirii culturale," in *Luceafarul*, May 6, 1972, and Remington (fn. 21), 131-32.

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led to the complete defeat of each consolidation regime, to the proportional elaboration of empirical, procedural, and leadership premises in the ideological, institutional, and policy domains of all Leninist regimes, to the appearance of fourteen regimes of a uniform political-social character, *or* to the elimination of all major elements of the preceding regimes. Rather, we see the interaction of consolidation and inclusion forces within Leninist regimes and the societies they rule as a conflict-accommodation process leading to the distinctiveness of each regime and society, much as the interaction of modernity and tradition has historically produced distinctive political, social, cultural, and economic amalgams. We do not define significant change as complete change. To argue that Leninist regimes significantly changed their character during the sixties it is not necessary to posit the removal of all Stalinists any more than it is necessary to posit the complete removal of traditional elements in Japan after 1945 in order to call Japan modern. However, in almost all such regimes issues were raised within the party and problems were presented within society that challenged the existing consolidation format and demanded consideration and adoption of more inclusion-oriented postures and responses. It is important to point out that policy did not always match verbal intent (as in Bulgaria), that development along inclusion lines was not proportional in all domains (as in Romania), that certain regimes emphasized certain developments rather than others (as in Hungary), and that the commitment lasted longer in some countries than in others (Hungary in contrast to Bulgaria). However, such observations do not invalidate the argument that the sixties witnessed major and relatively widespread changes in the ethos, structure, and policy of many Leninist regimes, in the direction of inclusion. This period was distinguished by the partial but significant replacement of consolidation with inclusion features, plus the development of conflict-accommodation patterns between the two.

Inclusion and Mobilization

The most striking development in Leninist regimes in the last seven years or so has been the apparent reversal of the inclusion emphasis that emerged with varying degrees of strength in the sixties. The pattern is not neat—no neater than the initial shift from consolidation to inclusion—but it is discernible and significant, if thus far inadequately interpreted. Developments in East Germany and Bulgaria in 1967–1968, the Husak phenomenon in Czechoslovakia, and the

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reorientation of the Romanian regime between June 1971 and July 1972 were reactions against the ethos, organization, and policies connected with the adoption of inclusion-oriented policies or inclusion as a core task.[38] How can this apparent reversal be explained, and what is its content?

To begin with, the initial move by Leninist regimes to expand the internal boundaries of their political, productive, and decision-making systems was predicated on the combination of success and failure they had experienced during the consolidation period. However, movement toward or adoption of inclusion as a new core task and political posture revealed additional problems of unsuspected magnitude and raised challenges to the Leninist conception of a socialist political community.

The shift by various regimes to the inclusion task and its correlates strikingly revealed the uneven nature of development that had occurred in the period of "socialist construction." This unevenness was by no means limited to the economic field, but was evident in the social and cultural fields as well. For all the talk in the West of a "postmobilization" period, the continuing impact of industrialization on many of these societies was, if anything, increasing in several senses during the sixties. First of all, their social heterogeneity was growing, as working classes with an identity of their own began to crystallize.[39] Second, there was a growth in the whole range of problems associated with geographical and occupational mobility. A third problem involves the crystallization in *social-psychological* if not social-political terms of the professional and skilled strata, and their desire to become the primary support base of the regime—a development which presaged the replacement of the bifurcation of regime and society based on the "new class" with one based on the professional-skilled class.[40] A fourth

[38] On East Germany, see Baylis (fns. 15 and 22); on Bulgaria, Costello (fn. 31).

[39] As Neil Smelser has pointed out in "Mechanisms of Change and Adjustment to Change," in Bert F. Hoselitz and Wilbert E. Moore, eds., *Industrialization and Society* (Paris: UNESCO, Mouton 1968), 32-57, the process of differentiation places a premium on effective integrative processes. Social disturbances are often the result of discontinuities between differentiation and integration. One may view the reassertion of a mobilization posture in many Leninist regimes as the party's attempt at an integrative response.

[40] On this point, see the discussion in Frank Parkin, *Class Inequality and Political Order* (London: MacGibbon & Kee 1971), 137-86; on the conflict between workers and managers in Hungary and on the increasing status of managers under the N.E.M., see Kovrig (fn. 22), and Racz (fn. 26). The place of China in all of this is complex. I would suggest that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was both an attack on the "new class" (i.e., against a Stalinist consolidation structure) and an attack on a *Soviet-type* inclusion structure with its emphasis on "political" integration with a new professional class and exclusion of the mass of the population. China offers the student of Leninist regimes conceptions and definitions of both consolidation and inclusion that differ from those of the Soviets.

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problem, the cynicism of the youth, became more apparent as a result of sociological studies and remains a highly salient issue and a persistent regime concern.[41] The ideological standing of the working class as well as its social and economic status also emerged as character-defining issues.[42]

However, the most dramatic questions have been raised about the organizational and ideological definition of the party itself. The rejection of the consolidation model has not spontaneously provided models of organization and development immediately acceptable to Leninist elites.[43] Directly connected to the perceived challenge to the party's institutionalized charismatic organization is the concern within these parties that social development not be equated with the emergence of a new political frame of reference that would jeopardize the party's status as *the* political membership unit in the whole social system. At the international level a related concern is that greater attention to the party's domestic constituency must not jeopardize the existence of some form of international Leninist regime community.

The general response to these problems and challenges has been a reassertion of the mobilizational or charismatic character of Leninist regimes. This reassertion may be seen in part as an attempted elaboration of the expressive dimensions of human behavior evident in the stress on moral incentives, ethical standards, and ideological consciousness.[44] Evidence of such a stress and orientation is by no means evidence of its success. However, such efforts do indicate the continued institutional strength of charismatic orientations within these regimes. But it would

[41] Kovrig has characterized the contemporary social ethos in Hungary as "collective and intergenerational alienation . . . obsessive materialism and a partial breakdown of traditional morality . . ." (fn. 22), 208. He notes that young people in Hungary "are reluctant to be transformed into obedient factors of production" (p. 21). There is evidence that young people in Bulgaria, Poland (under Gomulka), Romania, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union are estranged in many respects from the structure and ethos of party rule.

[42] This has been quite evident in Czechoslovakia in the discussions that have been going on since 1967, and in Romania since 1970. One can also find it, not unexpectedly, in consolidation-oriented regimes such as North Korea with its ideological notion of "working-classizing" society, and in Albania.

[43] In this light the concern expressed by several Leninist regimes to develop studies of leadership, to create a "science of leadership" in order to analyze the dimensions of the leadership task in industrial societies can be seen as an adaptive (how successful is a question of a different order) response to the uncertainty over what is currently meant by the "leading role of the party."

[44] For example, see the Romanian party's statement on November 4, 1971 (*Scinteia*); the emphasis on ideological preparation in Hungary manifested in county-level "educational directorates" (Racz, fn. 26, p. 638); the thrust of the Chinese Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution; the emphasis in North Korea on the ideological revolution; the emphasis on *consciencia* in Cuba, and recent developments in Yugoslavia.

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be a mistake to conclude at this point that we have adequately defined the reaction of Leninist regimes to the inclusion task and process. What we have established is that this reaction has a mobilization thrust. It would be incorrect to assume that the nature and import of this thrust is identical to the mobilization efforts which characterized these regimes in the late forties and early fifties. Yet, lacking a diversified perspective, many analysts appear to have fallen into this trap.

The chief explanation is that Western analysts of development in these regimes have typically adopted something of a Manichean perspective on the relationship between "regime" and "society." Although the power disparity between the two realms (often discussed as though they were real things) is recognized, there is little (if any) evidence of a multifaceted conception of the term "development" and the process to which it refers. In place of the assertion that during the consolidation period society had no political impact, we have the new assertion that the party is a stumbling block in the way of future "progress." In certain respects the party is just that. However, that observation does not exhaust or clarify the question of development and developmental patterns in Leninist regimes. Aside from the invitation such formulations offer for the confusion of political preference and analysis, they fail to extend our understanding of what is happening in these regimes.[45] To do so, a more "protestant" and analytical appreciation is called for. Such an approach would view the issues of regime development and social development as reciprocal processes and attempt to define the specifics of each set of dynamics and their relationships. Undifferentiated notions of de-radicalization, de-utopianization, or "postmobilization" obstruct the efforts of the most qualified scholars. For example, in an impressive "devil's advocate" article written several years ago, Azrael correctly and succinctly points to the reappearance of mobilization efforts in several regimes.[46] The problem with his argument is that it relies on an *undifferentiated pairing* of the concepts mobilization/postmobilization which he is in one respect opposing. Although he correctly criticizes those who posit the linear de-radicalization of Leninist regimes, his conceptual formulation limits him to the assertion that continued political mobilization is still apparent. However, the major point concerning the most recent instances of mobilization is that they are not simply or even primarily the same type of mobilization that was manifest in the transformation or consolidation periods. It is crucial to note that the current mobilization

[45] Gitelman (fn. 8), is a case in point.
[46] Jeremy Azrael, "Varieties of De-Stalinization," in Johnson (fn. 6), 135-53.

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efforts are partially constrained and shaped by the prior efforts and continued commitments to expanding the internal boundaries of the regimes' political, productive, and decision-making systems through greater reliance on empirical, procedural, and leadership premises—in short, by the commitment to the inclusion task.

The current emphasis on mobilization within individual Leninist systems has varied. But even those regimes which made the most limited changes in the direction of inclusion, reacted most strongly against it, and could be expected to limit their understanding of mobilization to that suggested by the Stalinist consolidation model—i.e., the Bulgarian and North Korean regimes—have not rejected all the changes that were initiated during the last ten years.[47] If this is true for regimes with the greatest commitment to the task of consolidation, it is even more true of regimes such as the East German, Hungarian, and Soviet. As an example, we refer once more to the issue of the "politinformator" in the Soviet Union: within a year or two there was a "mobilization" reaction against the "politinformator" in favor of the traditional "agitator"; it did not, however, result in the removal of the "politinformator" but did restore the agitator to a high status position.[48] The point is that we are witnessing the appearance of *amalgam-regimes* based on selective, tentative, and to varying degrees fragile combinations of inclusion and mobilization.

The developmental and leadership orientations of these regimes reflect a suspicion of strategies that reduce leadership to the tasks of aggregation and coordination and neglect mobilization. Given their continued charismatic bias, one that is organizationally supported, they seek to create party activists and not simply citizens. They are in varying degrees committed to the maintenance of an international regime community as well as to their individual nations; *to the deliberate preemption of any potential political arena or role not coterminous with the party organization and party membership*; and to a philosophical stand stressing becoming over being, and potential over current performance. The question to be raised about these regimes is, in what sense do they continue to be radical, mobilizational, or utopian; not, are they or aren't they radical, utopian, or mobilizational. The issue can be stated at the most general level in this way: are inclusion and mobilization stances antithetical, or can they be seen as conflicting imperatives?

[47] Though important, the changes in these regimes, particularly the North Korean, were quite limited. On Bulgaria, see Brown (fn. 31); on North Korea, see Joseph Sang-hoon Chung, "North Korea's Seven Year Plan (1961–1968): Economic Performance and Reforms," *Asian Survey*, XII (June 1972).

[48] See Unger (fn. 24).

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Units may be defined as antithetical when the integrity of one is dependent on the subordination of the other.[49] A system made up of antithetical units is not viable until one of them is effectively subordinated to the other, or until they are effectively compartmentalized. Units (i.e., decision-making premises, social forces, or ideological tenets) may be viewed as conflicting imperatives when the integrity of one unit is dependent on the oppositional integrity of the other. An excellent example of the latter is provided by Weber in his discussion of the formal and substantive bases of legal-rational justice;[50] another example would be a functioning two-party system.

The answer requires a developmental perspective. To the extent that groups challenging the fundamental structure of the regime were denied access to resources that might have allowed them to translate their social dissent into political opposition, and to the extent that the regime has created a diverse set of strategic social support groups, such a regime can engage in mobilization without terror and can simultaneously allow for the partial expansion of its internal boundaries in the manner we have spoken of. *To say, however, that mobilization and inclusion stances can at certain points in a developmental process stand in a partially complementary relationship to one another is NOT to deny the continual conflict between the two stances and underlying premises.*[51] For although mobilization may in some respects be seen as a specific form of the inclusion process—ideally, mobilization expands the number of people, the amount of their time, the extent of their awareness, and their involvement with political tasks—mobilization is based on an approach to tasks that differs radically from that associated with inclusion. The inclusion process is one marked by the *methodical* con-

[49] Thus, at the point of their initial encounter, tradition and modernity are antithetical. They can and do form amalgams but their viability depends on one or the other establishing a *de jure* or *de facto* superordinate position. As Halpern has argued, "the two things that cannot be combined at all are the best in traditional society and the best in modern society. Indeed before anything significantly traditional can be combined with anything significantly modern, a revolution must first have torn apart the closed system of tradition so that it may not merely add or substitute the new, but become capable of assimilating it." See Manfred Halpern, "The Revolution of Modernization in National and International Society," in Robert J. Jackson and Michael B. Stein, eds., *Issues in Comparative Politics* (New York: St. Martins Press 1971), 52; also Jowitt (fn. 35), Part 1, esp. n. 5, pp. 63-64.

[50] See Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books 1962), 383-416.

[51] Here, as in many other basic respects, my conception of development in Leninist regimes differs from that proposed by Huntington who sees the current stage of development (which he terms "adaption") as one where the conflict between specialists and political generalists is "one between complements" (fn. 7, p. 33). I see the tension between the legal-rational thrusts of inclusion and the sustained charismatic preferences of the apparatus and leadership as much more consequential.

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sideration and management of tasks. Political mobilization is marked by controlled or elite-directed *disruption*. Disruption of established routines—social, personal, institutional, and psychological—is the defining element of mobilization. Let us be clear: no value judgment is being made to the effect that inclusion is always and necessarily a "better" regime posture, or that mobilization occupies such a position. It may be that the viability of all regimes (as Jefferson and Mao have suggested) is dependent on some mix of the two.

To return to our immediate concern, the mobilization stance adopted by postconsolidation Leninist regimes has several characteristics which in significant fashion *do* conflict with those associated with the inclusion task and process. The definitional tendency of Leninist regimes—their attempts to control and specify the substantive dimensions of social developments, not merely the framework within which such developments occur—does pose a challenge to the integrity and effectiveness of formal, procedural norms; the mobilization emphasis on potential and rate poses a challenge to any thorough critical and empirical evaluation of issues and policies; and the charismatic stress on unity poses a challenge to the still fragile collegial orientations and relational competences of these elites. Not only do these stances—mobilization and inclusion—conflict with one another; there is no guarantee that Leninist regimes will effectively combine them. However, that their success is problematic and partial cannot automatically be taken as evidence that they "fall short"of modernity. They do indeed fall short of the liberal variant of modernity.[52] Still, one must consider the possibility that all variants of modernity, including the liberal one, are based on conflicting imperatives and are amalgams with distinctive characters. All modern societies appear to be based on conflicting imperatives of achievement and equality of performance and potential. In contemporary China, Liu and Mao represent these imperatives; in a different context, Madison and Paine represented them in the early history of American development and modernization.[53] In fact, these

[52] See Mark Field, "Soviet Society and Communist Party Controls: A Case of 'Constricted' Development," in Donald W. Treadgold, ed., *Soviet and Chinese Communism: Similarities and Differences* (Seattle: University of Washington Press 1967), for an analysis that confuses liberal modernity with modernity. In spite of that, Field's analysis of regime-society relationships and developments is very acute. For a more complex appreciation of the character of Soviet development, see J. P. Nettl and Roland Robertson, "Industrialization, Development, or Modernization," *British Journal of Sociology*, XVII (September 1966), 274-91.

[53] For an excellent and insightful analysis of the conflicting emphases in the American tradition and the character of its resolution, see Norman Jacobson, "Political Science and Political Education," *American Political Science Review*, LVII (September 1963), 561-69; for the Mao-Liu conflict, see the revised edition of Franz Schurmann's

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two examples demonstrate the importance of recognizing and relating the universal attributes of modernization as well as the specific and distinctive historical expressions that provide them with sociopolitical substance. Viewed from this perspective, different modern or modernizing societies can be perceived both in terms of their similarities *and* distinctiveness, thereby minimizing the danger of raising one historical variant to the position of the model itself. It then becomes possible to investigate in what respects certain societies are more modern than others, to compare the variety of problems that characterize different types of modern societies, and to differentiate modern societies in terms of the imperatives they stress and those they tend to neglect. In this light the whole issue of convergence becomes more interesting, complex, and demanding. The focus can shift from a zero-sum perspective which defines development simply in terms of "them" becoming more like "us" or vice versa, to a perspective that appreciates and examines the "unprecedented" *but bounded* variety of modern amalgams that may emerge and persist. We must be prepared for unprecedented types of modern systems—such as might have emerged from Dubcek's Czechoslovakia.

Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press 1968), 501-93, as well as Benjamin Schwartz's "The Reign of Virtue: Some Broad Perspectives on Leader and Party in the Cultural Revolution," in John Wilson Lewis, ed., *Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge [England] University Press 1970), 149-70.

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THE INFLUENCE OF SMALL STATES UPON THE SUPERPOWERS:

United States-South Korean Relations as a Case Study, 1950–53

By CHANG JIN PARK*

GENERAL Mark Clark aptly described the difficulties confronting United States-South Korean relations during the Korean War when he said, "I found myself engaged in a two-front diplomatic battle . . . with the Communists at Panmunjom and with President Syngman Rhee in Seoul" and "the biggest trouble came from Rhee."[1] As the Supreme Commander of the United Nations Forces in Korea from May 1952 to the summer of 1953, Clark often found himself unable to translate the great military power under his command into political influence over the leader of the Republic of Korea. More than once he had to resort to the least attractive means, political threats, in order to persuade Rhee to accept the policies of the United States.

General Clark's statement reveals in part the changing pattern of the relationship between the superpowers and small nation-states in the bipolar world of the 1950's. The world was roughly divided into two ideologically opposing camps. Small countries within each camp had considerable latitude for maneuvering in pursuit of their own interests so long as they adhered to the ideology of the dominant bloc. The fundamental reason for the radical change of relationships between the superpowers and small countries lay in the nature of the bitter rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union for the hegemony of the world. As the cold war intensified in the 1950's, the bloc leaders considered the unity of each bloc very important. Therefore each tried to maintain and preserve the existing structure of the international system. Although the changes in Cuba, for example, did not radically tip the power configuration of the system, the United States and the Soviet Union regarded the preservation of the status quo important in symbolic and psychological terms, and therefore tried to protect their

* I wish to express my deep appreciation to Professor Donald C. Hellmann of the University of Washington Political Science Department for his perceptive suggestions and criticism on an earlier version of this paper.

[1] Mark W. Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu* (New York: Harper 1954), 256.

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respective spheres of influence even at the risk of war. Since their primary concern was the preservation of unity, the bloc leaders tended to overlook less serious deviations by smaller and weaker alliance partners, and were responsive to and cooperative with the demands of these nations. The smaller countries within each bloc thus had latitude to maneuver on behalf of their own interests. They tended, according to Robert Keohane, "to concentrate on a narrow range of vital interests and ignore almost everything else"; they could "take large-scale patterns of international politics for granted, since nothing [they did could] possibly affect them very much."[2] The result of this phenomenon was the emergence of polycentrism within each camp. So long as the smaller allies did not try to defect to the opposing bloc or to alter the fundamental nature of the existing polity—for example, to move from a socialist polity to a democratic one—the bloc leaders acquiesced to the emerging concept of polycentrism.

This circumstance was especially prevalent in relationships between the United States and her smaller and weaker alliance partners. Even when they differed from the United States on specific issues, these countries could get away with independent postures. For example, when President Rhee, in a desperate attempt to subvert the truce talks in Korea, ordered the release of 27,000 anti-Communist North Korean prisoners of war on June 18, 1953, there were doubts in the minds of some Amercans as to the true identity of the enemy in Korea.[3] However, the United States was not prepared to sacrifice President Rhee simply because of his delaying tactics. In a news conference on July 1, 1953, President Eisenhower reminded a questioner that the real enemy in Korea was still North Korea and the People's Republic of China, and not the Republic of Korea. The President said that the United States was "witnessing an acute example of the difficulties that arise when allies, dedicated to the same principles and the same basic ideas, draw apart on the means of attaining their objectives."[4]

Taking full advantage of the peculiarity of the bipolar world, the

[2] Robert O. Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies," *Foreign Policy*, No. 2 (Spring 1971), 162-63.

[3] Rhee's action was hailed in South Korea as an act of great statesmanship. The release of anti-Communist prisoners was the only option available for the Seoul government in its effort to break up the truce talks, and to unify Korea by defeating the enemy militarily. Rhee's daring action was primarily intended to break up the truce talks rather than to undermine the foundation of the U.S.-South Korean alliance. From the American perspective, however, it seemed to sabotage the efforts for peace, and the American Government openly expressed misgivings with regard to Rhee's intentions.

[4] Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change, 1953–56* (New York: Doubleday 1963), 187.

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Republic of Korea on numerous occasions disagreed with the policies of the United States. South Korea, under the leadership of President Rhee, influenced the conduct of the United States in five ways: (1) by calling for assistance, (2) by calling for mutual cooperation against the common enemy, (3) by making calculated policy proposals, (4) by refusing to cooperate, and (5) by raising moral issues.

I. The Call for Assistance

When the Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950, the immediate decision of the Republic of Korea was to formally ask the American Government for military aid. President Rhee sent the following telegraphic message to President Truman:

> Beginning in early morning 25 June, North Korean Communist Army began armed aggression against South. Your Excellency and Congress of U.S. already aware of fact that our people, anticipating incident such as today's, established strong national defense force in order to secure bulwark of democracy in the East and to render service to world peace. We again thank you for your indispensable aid in liberating us and in establishing our Republic. As we face this national crisis . . . , *we appeal for your increasing support and ask that you at the same time extend effective and timely aid in order to prevent this act of destruction of world peace.*[5]

This formal request for military aid relieved the United States of the burden of a potentially awkward political situation at home and of embarrassment abroad. Even without a formal request for immediate military assistance, the mercurial nature of American domestic politics would most likely have forced the Truman Administration to intervene in the Korean War in order to stop the spreading influence of communism in Asia. When Chiang Kai-shek was driven out of the mainland in the latter part of 1949, the Truman Administration was under bitter attack by a large sector of the Republican Party for having "lost" China to the Communists. In the emotionally charged atmosphere that surrounded this issue, the Democrats were hard put to explain away even some of the palpably inaccurate accusations, and the issue quickly took on major political proportions. While the China question was still reverberating around the country as a hot political issue, the Truman Administration surely did not wish to be accused by the Republicans of losing South Korea to the Communists. However, since there was no bilateral defense treaty between South Korea and

[5] Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope*, II (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1956), 336; emphasis added. Cf. U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Policy in the Korean Crisis* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1950), 17.

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the United States, the decision of the Truman Administration to become embroiled in Korea without a request from the Republic of Korea would have caused immense embarrassment both at home and abroad. When South Korea asked for military aid, the decision of the American Government to extend military assistance was legitimate both from the perspective of the American tradition and from the standpoint of international law,[6] because the Truman Administration was responding to a call for assistance. The United Nations had little or no control over American actions: the commander in chief of the United Nations Forces, General MacArthur, received all political and military directions direct from the United States Government. By formally requesting military aid, President Rhee not only saved the United States from potential embarrassment, but was able to demonstrate to the United States, and to the world, that the two countries pursued the same goal —to contain communism in Korea and in Asia.

The same technique—that is, a public call for aid—was later employed by President Rhee in prodding the United States to arm additional Korean combat divisions. South Korea was unable to finance the creation of several more combat divisions and to bring into being what was viewed as a military necessity. She therefore formally petitioned the American Government to provide the necessary aid. At first, the Truman Administration refused to authorize creation of any additional divisions on economic grounds. General Clark, however, believed that economic conditions did not constitute the primary reason for Washington's lack of enthusiasm about creating more divisions: "A more legitimate obstacle to the creation of additional ROK divisions was the equipment shortage in the United States. With our country providing arms to nations all over the world . . . , our equipment had to be allocated carefully."[7] Although the Truman Administration believed that South Korea would not be able to remove young Koreans from productive work, President Rhee insisted that his country, according to General Clark, "could support a large army under the conditions of the war. He made that [point] clear when he objected to proposals to move Chiang Kai-shek's troops into the Korean fighting. Rhee objected on two counts. First, he said, he did not want

[6] See Michael Akehurst, *A Modern Introduction to International Law* (2d ed.; Allen and Unwin 1971), 269-72, 340-42; F. S. Northedge and M. D. Donelan, *International Disputes: The Political Aspects* (New York: St. Martin's Press 1971), 182; The United Nations Charter, Article 35 (2); J. L. Brierly, *The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace*, ed. by Sir Humphrey Waldock (6th ed.; New York: Oxford University Press 1963), 382-84.

[7] Clark (fn. 1), 76.

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Korea turned into a battlefield of the Chinese Civil War. Secondly, he said, if the United States had enough equipment for two Chinese divisions to fight in Korea, why not give him the equipment so he could organize two more ROK divisions?"[8]

General Clark directed a manpower study in Korea which determined how many combat divisions the country could support under conditions of war. The results showed that the Koreans were quite capable of supporting up to "twenty divisions in the field and still maintain their industrial and agricultural production at high enough levels to insure against inflation."[9] With President Rhee constantly requesting more Korean fighting forces, General Clark formally submitted, in June 1952, recommendations to increase the amount of Korean fighting units. Without Rhee's tenacious requests for more Korean combat divisions, General Clark might have delayed his careful and timely study on the manpower situation in Korea; without the recommendation by General Clark, it is doubtful if the Truman Administration would have allowed South Korea to increase the number of its combat divisions.[10] And without this recommendation by General Clark, it is highly doubtful whether the Republican Party would have seized Rhee's request as a campaign issue in 1952.[11]

As the foregoing analysis of the two cases shows, "the call for assistance" by South Korea helped to exert influence upon the United States in two ways—one positive, the other negative. On the positive side, South Korea's urgent call for immediate military aid when war broke out gave sanction to the Truman Administration's determination to help. There was no serious dissent within the American Gov-

[8] *Ibid.* When the Korean War broke out, Chiang Kai-shek asked the United States to permit him to send two of Nationalist China's divisions to Korea. After due consideration, however, the Truman Administration opposed the use of Nationalist troops in Korea because of their proven inadequacy in the field.

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] Until General Clark's formal recommendation, the Truman Administration considered the increase in additional Korean divisions a waste of money, effort, and time because of the proven inadequacy of South Korean troops in the field. Throughout the Korean War, the Korean troops were undertrained, underequipped, poorly led, and uninspired. This was in large measure due to the lack of time necessary to train, motivate, and lead them; the Republic of Korea had been born on August 15, 1948, and war came on June 25, 1950. Consequently, South Korean soldiers often failed to perform as well as American soldiers in the battlefield. It is quite probable that Eisenhower, too, knew of the inadequacies of Korean troops. Yet he supported Clark's recommendation. President Eisenhower may have seen some advantage in the recommendation: the war in Korea was very unpopular in the United States and some were favorably disposed to Koreanizing the Korean conflict; any measure to turn the major responsibility of the fighting over to the Koreans was a politically very popular one.

[11] Ronald J. Caridi, *The Korean War and American Politics: The Republican Party as a Case Study* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1968), 230f.

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ernment regarding its decision to honor the Korean call for assistance. However, the South Korean call for the creation of more combat divisions produced negative political effects. Although the Truman Administration was reluctant to increase the size of the Korean fighting forces, the Republican Party under the leadership of General Eisenhower was willing to honor Korea's request. When the Republican Party made it a campaign issue, the Truman Administration was forced to accept General Clark's recommendation.

II. The Call for Cooperation

On July 15, 1950, President Rhee wrote the following letter to General MacArthur:

> In view of the joint military effort of the United Nations on behalf of the Republic of Korea, in which all military forces, land, sea and air, of all the United Nations fighting in or near Korea have been placed under your operational command, and in which you have been designated Supreme Commander of the United Nations forces, *I am happy to assign to you command authority over all land, sea and air forces of the Republic of Korea during the period of the continuation of the present state of hostilities*; such command to be exercised either by you personally or by such military commander or commanders to whom you may delegate the exercise of this authority within Korea or in adjacent seas.[12]

This seemingly simple letter benefited South Korea in many ways. Rhee's decision to place all of the Korean armed forces under the direct command of an American general demonstrated that South Korea was more than willing to accept the leadership of the United States. By placing his fighting forces under MacArthur, Rhee actually improved the position of South Korea to influence American policy through the general. The decision, in effect, simply ratified the inevitable. Whether Rhee wanted it or not, the military situation in the field would have necessitated placing Korean armed forces under MacArthur's direct command. By moving before his hand was forced, Rhee managed to establish close rapport with MacArthur, which subsequently was to pay dividends in view of the unique position the general came to hold.

It is true that the range of Rhee's options was limited. To have kept Korean forces out of MacArthur's command not only would have created ill will in the United States, but would have imposed serious

[12] Clark (fn. 1), 169; emphasis added. Cf. Courtney Whitney, *MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1956), 338.

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strategic and tactical problems in the field because of the divided command structure. It is possible (although Rhee never publicly admitted it), that his decision to place the Korean armed forces under General MacArthur was in large part a calculated maneuver to maximize his bargaining power. The troops were not placed under the general immediately after the outbreak of the war, but three weeks later, after Rhee had time to weigh the alternatives involved. On the other hand, one could doubt that the three-week delay in his action was caused by the patience of sweet reason. President Rhee may have been too preoccupied with the advancing invading army to consider the assignment of the South Korean army to MacArthur. But Rhee was known to have the capacity to balance out the alternatives involved in crisis situations before taking any concrete actions.

The decision served to avoid friction with the strong-willed and independent MacArthur at a moment when his cooperation was absolutely essential. It also demonstrated in an unambiguous way that the Republic of Korea and the United States were striving to attain the common objective of repelling Communist aggression and stopping the spread of Communist influence in Asia. The decision was a politically sound one for South Korea and promoted and reaffirmed good relations between the two alliance partners.

III. The Calculated Policy Proposal for Bargaining Advantage

Nation-states, be they great or small, often use calculated policy proposals as instruments for international bargaining. Communist North Korea employed this technique very successfully during the truce talks in order to gain bargaining leverage. General Clark maintained that Rhee learned this technique from the practices of the Communists.[13] Therefore, before we analyze Rhee's frequent employment of calculated policy proposals, it would be useful to briefly examine the bargaining methods used by the Communists in Korea.

From the very beginning of the armistice talks in July 1951, the Chinese and North Korean Communists were unequivocally opposed to the idea of an Armistice Supervision Agency. When the United Nations Command insisted on such an agency, the Communists finally agreed, but they also proposed that a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission be established. The function of this Commission, composed of nations completely uninvolved in the Korean conflict, was to supervise the execution of the armistice agreement. It was mutually agreed that

[13] Clark (fn. 1), 263.

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each side would nominate three neutral countries acceptable to the other. The United Nations Command nominated Sweden, Switzerland, and Norway; the Chinese and North Korean Communists chose the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.[14]

It was of course common knowledge that the Soviet Union was involved in the war.[15] As Admiral Turner Joy stated, "The guns, the aircraft, the tanks, the marine mines, the ammunition, the fuel, the trucks, and the military advice that had been used by Communist forces in the Korean War came from the Soviet Union."[16] North Korea and Communist China realized that the American Government would never accept the Soviet Union as a *bona fide* neutral nation and that they would have to withdraw that country's nomination. Their nomination of the Soviet Union had been made primarily for bargaining purposes, and was successfully used to extract important concessions from the United Nations Command, which was, in effect, under the direct control of the United States. Admiral Joy argued that the American Government should oppose "Soviet membership in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission on the frank and solid argument that the Soviet Union was not a neutral in the Korean conflict. Instead, the United Nations Command delegation was directed to object to Soviet membership on the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission on the grounds that the Soviet Union had a common border with North Korea. While this was an unassailable fact of geography, it had little relevance to the issue at hand."[17]

Immediately after they had nominated the Soviet Union to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in the spring of 1952, the Chinese and North Korean Communists came back to the United Nations Command with the proposal that the United Nations Command recognize the right of North Korea to construct and to repair airfields in North Korea. They were well aware that this proposal violated the agreement between the belligerents not to increase their military power during the period of truce talks. Instead of rejecting the proposal, the American Government responded in a conciliatory and receptive manner. Although fully aware of the Communists' tactics,

[14] Turner C. Joy, *How Communists Negotiate* (New York: Macmillan 1955), 90f.

[15] North Korea was a fully controlled satellite state of the Soviet Union from 1945 to roughly 1950. See Joungwon Alexander Kim, "Soviet Policy in North Korea," *World Politics*, XXII (January 1970), 239-42; Wiwon Chung, "The North Korean People's Army and the Party," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., *North Korea Today* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger 1963), 105-16; Byung Chul Koh, *The Foreign Policy of North Korea* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger 1969), 42f.

[16] Joy (fn. 14), 91.

[17] *Ibid.*, 91f.

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the United States chose to approve the demand that the airfields in North Korea be allowed to be rebuilt on condition that the nomination of the Soviet Union to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission be withdrawn.

On the South Korean side, President Rhee was equally effective in employing calculated policy proposals for bargaining purposes. Following Stalin's death in March 1953, the Chinese and North Korean Communists showed a greater willingness to negotiate truce agreements. Rhee, however, renewed his violent opposition to a negotiated ending of the Korean War even though he was aware that his objections would not succeed since the United States was determined to end the war by means of negotiation. However, he hoped that some concessions might possibly be granted by Washington if he asked an unrealistic price for South Korea's acceptance of the truce agreement. With this in mind, Rhee informed the American Government that he would be happy to support the armistice agreement provided the United States would establish a buffer zone along the Korean-Chinese-Russian borders. This proposal was made through the office of General Clark, who wrote, ". . . Rhee sent me a letter. He apparently had had second thoughts about the idea of simultaneous withdrawal of Chinese and UN forces after an armistice. He would never agree to this . . . unless he was given several ironclad U.S. guarantees. The most remarkable of these was that a buffer strip on the *north* side of the Korean border be established, supervised and maintained by the U.N. Command until permanent peace was established in the Far East. . . . Rhee, in effect, proposed that the United Nations occupy the territory of Russia and China, neither of which was in the Korean War officially, as though we had defeated the Soviet and Chinese armies."[18]

Rhee knew that his proposal was an unrealistic one, but it was a worthwhile gamble since, short of complete sabotage of the truce talks, it was a way in which the Republic of Korea would be able to extract major concessions from Washington regarding what Seoul saw as the basic requisites for its security. One of Rhee's aims was to accelerate the formation of a bilateral defense treaty between the Republic of Korea

[18] Clark (fn. 1), 263. This technique of bargaining is widely used in international negotiations, and is evident, for example, in the disarmament talks, Middle East negotiations, and Vietnam peace talks. But what I am saying here is that the Communists and Rhee skillfully took advantage of the exploitable situations. This does not mean that United States officials were unaware of the Communist bargaining technique. On the contrary, they were well aware of the fact that both the Communists and President Rhee exploited situations wherever possible. The point is that the United States Government was looking beyond the immediate to its global commitments and priorities.

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and the United States. Without a formal American commitment to preserve the security of South Korea, the political position of Rhee, as well as the security of South Korea, would have been in serious jeopardy. Rhee's gamble paid off handsomely. The American Government not only agreed to conclude a bilateral treaty between the two countries, but also to pour billions of dollars into South Korea to rehabilitate the devastated country, thereby securing an arrangement that left his position as president intact and bound a superpower to the defense needs of a small nation.

This should not be seen as an unprecedented act attributable to Rhee's diplomatic skills; the United States concluded defense treaties with Japan and Taiwan under similar circumstances. However, Rhee did have a material effect in the matter. With or without his demands, the United States would have been receptive to the idea of a bilateral defense pact with South Korea. But the defense treaty was formalized considerably before the American Government was actually prepared to sign, primarily because of the desire of the United States to calm the fears of President Rhee.

IV. Refusal to Cooperate

One of the inexorable developments of the cold war was the change in relationships between superpowers and small states. Before the advent of the cold war, when persuasion failed, the great powers almost always translated their military might into political influence by threatening the weaker nation-states. In the loose bipolar international system of the late 1940's and 1950's, however, the superpowers often found themselves unable to check the behavior of smaller and weaker countries. Moreover, some of the small states were not subject to punitive sanctions for acting independently (especially when they were led by adroit and skillful leaders), and in some cases acted defiantly toward the two superpowers.[19] The relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union, which has persisted since the late 1950's in the face of the development of multipolarity, serves as a good illustration.[20] Despite massive aid from Moscow, Cuba has openly expressed her disagreement with the Soviet Union (most notably in the missile crisis of 1962), and

[19] J. D. B. Miller, *The Politics of the Third World* (London: Oxford University Press 1967), 64.

[20] Although Cuba came under the influence of the Soviet Union at the time the structure of the postwar international system was slowly but inexorably being transformed from a loose bipolar to a multipolar system, the association of the Soviet Union with Cuba is illustrative of a new phenomenon in relationships between superpowers and small nation-states.

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initiated actions in Latin America in direct defiance of Soviet policy. The Soviet Union still has the capacity to influence the conduct of Cuba, but Castro has been able to establish wide latitude for maneuver in foreign policy. Rhee and Castro stand as examples of a phenomenon which was found not only in the relationship between the superpowers and nonaligned countries of the Third World, but also in the relationship between the bloc leaders and their weaker and smaller alliance partners.

One of the fundamental reasons for the increased independence of small states in the 1950's was the monopoly of the nuclear weapons systems by the two superpowers. The division of the international system into two ideologically opposing camps forced a host of small nations to seek their security and survival under the protective umbrella of either the United States or the Soviet Union. As the bloc leaders, the United States and the Soviet Union had the requisite capabilities to protect and preserve the political and territorial integrity of their client allies. However, the immensely destructive nuclear weapons systems made them reluctant to be forced into situations in which nuclear "games of chicken" were the only means of conflict resolution. Since an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation between the superpowers always contained the danger of a general nuclear war, they tried to resolve international crises without resorting to the doomsday weapons systems. This reality enhanced the importance of diplomacy and alliance partners. Moreover, this new phenomenon in world politics made it possible for smaller and weaker allies within each bloc to maneuver on behalf of their own interests. Thus, although the military capabilities of the two bloc leaders were more than adequate to destroy the entire civilization of the world, both the United States and the Soviet Union sought the support of smaller allies almost as assiduously as the latter sought the former. The superpowers courted the weaker and smaller allies largely for political and psychological reasons. The United States, for example, needed the weaker allies in order to outmaneuver the Soviet Union in the United Nations as well as in other situations of international conflict. The smaller allies were able to exploit the situation and pursue independent postures so long as their independence did not undermine the overall bloc solidarity vis-à-vis the opposing camp. Under these circumstances, the bloc leaders were quite tolerant of and even lenient toward deviating weaker and smaller allies.

Rhee effectively influenced American policy in Korea through the tactic of defiant noncooperation. More than once, Rhee was able to force the American Government either to modify contemplated poli-

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cies drastically—for example, the repatriation of prisoners of war—or to delay them. President Rhee's skillful employment of noncooperative tactics placed Washington in an embarrassing position on numerous occasions. Rhee never seemed to hesitate to express dissenting opinions whenever the policies of the United States appeared to be detrimental to the interests of the Republic of Korea.

As early as July 1950, the Truman Administration was concerned about the uncompromising attitude of Rhee on the question of the crossing of the 38th parallel.[21] The basic position of Rhee was simple: since the North Korean Communists had started the Korean War, the legality of the 38th parallel as a political boundary between South and North Korea was now questionable. Just as the North Korean and Chinese Communists intended to drive the United Nations forces out of South Korea and to unify the whole of Korea under Communist rule, so must the United States try to destroy the Communist forces throughout Korea in order to unify the divided country.

Initially, the Truman Administration did not know how to respond to the South Korean President, for the United States was in a vulnerable military position. If Rhee's views were rejected and the *ante bellum* division re-established, serious troubles might follow. If the forces of South Korea were to continue north in order to attempt to destroy the Communist forces and unify the country without American support, they would be defeated very quickly. In the ensuing rout, the North Korean and Chinese forces would undoubtedly push south of the 38th parallel. In that event, the United States would most likely have to rescue her ally and *ipso facto* be forced into a position that would require a major military campaign to unify the whole of the country.

Alternatively, if Rhee pulled his armed forces out of the United Nations Command because of a failure to push beyond the 38th parallel, the security of the American fighting forces and that of the United Nations in Korea would be jeopardized. The United States was short of combat divisions in Korea; even if she had been able to man the entire 155-mile battlefront, military operations would have been lacking in legitimacy without cooperation from the South Korean Government.

The Truman Administration was acutely aware of these potential pitfalls, and as the United Nations' armies broke through enemy defenses after Inchon, two opposing groups within the American Govern-

[21] Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: Norton 1969), 451.

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ment debated the question of the crossing of the 38th parallel. One group, led by Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, argued that the United Nations' armies should be allowed to cross the parallel and unify the whole of Korea because "peace and stability in Korea" could not be achieved so long as the country was divided into two regions. The other group, led by Paul Nitze, State Department Policy Planning Staff Director, argued for the restoration of the *status quo ante bellum*.[22] The Truman Administration decided to adopt the first recommendation; by doing so, it changed its political and military objectives. Politically, it moved from the restoration of the *status quo ante bellum* to the unification of the whole of Korea. Militarily, the objective changed from inflicting as many casualties upon the enemy as possible to pushing the enemy back across the 38th parallel and destroying the North Korean regime in order to unify Korea.

There is no documentation indicating the extent of President Rhee's influence in the matter of the crossing of the 38th parallel, but it clearly was a factor. Secretary Acheson stated, in *Present at the Creation*, that the United States was very concerned about Rhee's insistence upon not recognizing the legitimacy of the 38th parallel. Like his subsequent refusal to cooperate with the American Government on the question of the armistice agreement, Rhee's noncooperative attitude on the crossing of the 38th parallel was a source of exasperation and concern for the United States.

President Rhee was unequivocally opposed to the concept of a negotiated settlement of the war. His overriding concern and interest was the unification of the divided country. When the United States decided to cross the 38th parallel in the fall of 1950, Rhee saw an opportunity —for the first time since 1945—to fulfill his desire. This expectation was shattered by the intervention of Communist China in November 1950. A negotiated settlement of the war necessarily meant continued division of the country. As much as possible Rhee tried to turn aside any such plan despite the fact that the United Nations desired the truce and the Chinese and North Korean Communists wanted it. His conditional acceptance of a negotiated settlement should be seen in that light: a reluctant concession to international realities adopted mainly for the purpose of bargaining with the United States.

Although rebuffed by the American Government, the South Korean leader never let up in his violent opposition to the concept of an armistice while the Truman Administration was in power. When Eisen-

[22] *Ibid.*

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hower indicated that he, too, would work to end the Korean conflict by negotiation, Rhee continued to oppose this approach in the strongest terms. On April 19, 1953, Rhee wrote a half-appealing, half-defiant letter to President Eisenhower. He appealed to the President to abandon the idea of an armistice agreement with the Chinese and North Korean Communists, and defiantly informed him that if the United States was going to proceed with the concept of an armistice, the Republic of Korea would be compelled to drive the Chinese Communists out of Korea alone. Rhee put it in the bluntest possible terms: if the United States desired to remain in Korea, it had to support the Korean efforts to march toward the Yalu River in order to unify the country. If not, the United States should withdraw from Korea at once.[23] These harsh statements and declarations were, of course, empty threats and bluffs, for Rhee was well aware that the Korean armed forces were no match for the great numbers of the well-disciplined and well-trained Chinese soldiers. Eisenhower, too, was aware of the unpreparedness of the South Korean troops, but his immediate concern was neither the success nor the failure of Rhee's unilateral action against the enemy. His primary worry was that unilateral actions by South Korea might force the United States into an even larger conflict with the Chinese and North Korean Communists. Thus, Eisenhower's immediate interest lay in dissuading Rhee from any unilateral military operations, and he sought it through a highly conciliatory response:

> First, the action taken by the United Nations in Korea was to assist your valiant country in repelling the armed attack directed against it initially by the North Korean regime and subsequently by the Chinese Communists. This has been successfully accomplished.
>
> Second, the task of repelling the armed attack having been accomplished, it would not be defensible to refuse to stop the fighting on an honorable basis as a prerequisite to working out the remaining issues by peaceful means.
>
> Third, the United States and the United Nations have consistently supported the unification of Korea under conditions which would assure its freedom and independence. Neither the United States nor the United Nations has ever committed itself to resort to war to achieve this objective. To do so would be a complete negation of the basic tenets of this country and the United Nations.
>
> Fourth, any agreement to stop the fighting on an honorable basis presupposes a willingness on the part of both sides to discuss the remaining issues and to make every reasonable effort to reach agreement thereon. As I said in my address of April 16, an honorable armistice "means the immediate cessation of hostilities and the prompt initiation

[23] Eisenhower (fn. 4), 181f.

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of political discussions leading to the holding of free elections in a united Korea."[24]

On May 30, 1953, Rhee reiterated his opposition to a negotiated settlement of the war. In a letter to Eisenhower, Rhee suggested he would support American efforts to reach an armistice agreement with the Chinese and North Korean Communists, conditional on the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and a mutual defense treaty between the United States and South Korea. This latter proviso was to balance the China-North Korea and Sino-Soviet pacts, while the withdrawal of the United Nations Forces was to be preceded by greatly increased strength in the South Korean forces through stepped-up American aid. If these conditions were not met, the South Koreans would not recognize the truce agreement and continue to fight the Communist forces.[25] Rhee was aware that the United States would never allow the Korean armed forces to continue the fighting once the truce agreement had been reached; his threat to continue the hostilities if his conditions were not fully met was designed to keep the United States off balance by making his own behavior uncertain. In the context of the time, it was a tactic that could not help but have some impact on American policy.

Partly to prevent him from carrying out his threats, and partly to soothe Rhee's hurt feelings and pride, Eisenhower wrote a letter to the South Korean President on June 17, in which he accepted all of his proposals except the demand for withdrawal of Chinese Communist troops from Korea and the option of unilateral military actions by South Korean armed forces after the conclusion of an armistice agreement. In the letter, Eisenhower assured Rhee that (a) "the United States would not renounce its efforts by all peaceful means to effect unification of Korea"; (b) that he "was prepared promptly, at the conclusion of an acceptable armistice, to negotiate with him [Rhee] a mutual defense treaty along the lines of the treaties heretofore made between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines, the United States and the Commonwealth of Australia, the United States and the Dominion of New Zealand"; and (c) that "the United States Government, subject to requisite congressional appropriations, would continue economic aid to the Republic of Korea to permit restoration of its devastated land."[26]

On the same day, Rhee cabled Eisenhower, reiterating his convic-

[24] *Ibid.*, 182.
[25] *Ibid.*, 183.
[26] *Ibid.*

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tion that any truce agreement with the Chinese and North Korean Communists was detrimental to the interests of both the United States and South Korea. More importantly, however, he firmly assured the President that South Korea would not initiate unilateral military operations against the Communists without first consulting the American Government.[27] One day later, to the astonishment of the entire world and in direct defiance of his understanding with the United States, Rhee released 25,000 anti-Communist North Korean prisoners of war, who were quickly dispersed among sympathetic South Korean families. In the days following, Rhee released 2,000 more North Korean prisoners of war. It was a daring step designed to bring down the truce negotiations.

The release of the prisoners put the United States in a delicate predicament, jeopardizing Eisenhower's effort to come to an agreement with the Chinese and North Korean Communists. At the time, the armed forces of South Korea held roughly two-thirds of the United Nations lines in Korea, presenting an ideal opportunity for Rhee to follow through with his threat of unilateral military action. Had such an offensive been launched, it would certainly have failed without massive logistic and direct support from the United States. The seriousness of the situation went to the very foundation of the alliance between the United States and South Korea.

> These twenty-five thousand [actually 27,000] prisoners of themselves did not constitute the real issue. Since the prisoners were largely non-Communists, they were probably little threat to the supply lines or to the security of the rear area. However, what Syngman Rhee had done was to sabotage the very basis of the arguments that we had been presenting to the Chinese and North Koreans for all these many months. In agreeing that prisoners should not be repatriated against their will, the Communists had made a major concession. The processing of the prisoners was observed by representatives of both sides. This condition was negated in a stroke by Rhee's release of the North Koreans. The Communists asked at this juncture . . . whether the United States was able to live up to any agreement to which the South Koreans might be a party.[28]

In the eyes of Peking and Pyongyang, any armistice agreement with the United States would be meaningless so long as the Republic of Korea was not willing to support it. Creating this sense of doubt was precisely one of Rhee's purposes in releasing the North Korean prisoners. He was attempting to discredit the United States in the eyes of

[27] *Ibid.*, 184.
[28] *Ibid.*, 185.

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the enemy and, by doing so, to stop any attempt to reach agreement with the Communists at Panmunjom. The move was a calculated one: since the Chinese and North Korean Communists regarded South Korea as a puppet of the United States, the release of the prisoners might have led them to wonder if the move was not contrived by the United States herself. Rhee almost succeeded, for there was a moment when it appeared as if full-scale military hostilities would resume, but in the end Rhee acquiesced to the American stand, and the United States and the Communists moved back to truce talks.

V. Moral Suasion

Employed in the context of domestic politics, moral suasion usually implies persuasive efforts by the superior toward the inferior. The superior authority, or person, may try to persuade lower-ranking persons or groups by an appeal to shared values and common, long-term goals. The President of the United States may reason with an interest group in an effort to persuade it to accept his policies or viewpoints, using the enormous prestige and respect for his office as a key tactical factor. In international politics, however, moral suasion can be exercised by both the powerful and the weak nation. The relationship between the United Kingdom and India from 1945 to 1947 illustrates this point. Although England had started to embark on a policy of decolonization after the end of World War II, her foreign-policy makers were greatly influenced by the arguments of Indian leaders appealing to universal political ideals; for example, decolonization and self-determination were correctly recognized by the British leaders as developing trends in the postwar world. Without this powerful moral appeal by the Indian political leaders, the British Empire might have lasted several years longer. Another example of moral suasion in international politics was the successful effort by the United States in persuading Chiang Kai-shek not to attack the Chinese mainland after the outbreak of the Korean War. Chiang was more than willing to commit his troops to Korea and then to invade the mainland in order to overthrow the Chinese Communist regime, but the Truman Administration successfully dissuaded him from such a course.

During the height of the cold war in the 1950's and 1960's, nation-states were no longer solely satisfied to defend their own territories and to maintain national independence. In the bipolar world, nation-states tried to add to their influence by attempting to impose their beliefs upon others. These beliefs were often universal, with a heavy moral em-

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phasis. Hans Morgenthau has called this new force "nationalistic universalism." According to Morgenthau,

> The nationalism of today, which is really a nationalistic universalism, has only one thing in common with the nationalism of the nineteenth century—the nation as the ultimate point of reference for political loyalties and actions. But here the similarity ends. For the nationalism of the nineteenth century the nation is the ultimate goal of political action, the endpoint of the political development beyond which there are other nationalisms with similar and equally justifiable goals. For the nationalistic universalism of the mid-twentieth century the nation is but the starting point of a universal mission whose ultimate goal reaches to the confines of the political world. While nationalism wants one nation in one state and nothing else, the nationalistic universalism of our age claims for one nation and one state the right to impose its own valuations and standard of action upon all the other nations.[29]

Nationalistic universalism, according to Morgenthau, has its own set of values and methods of influencing the behavior of other nation-states. Nationalistic universalism fundamentally rejects the techniques of influence employed by nations prior to 1945:

> Nations no longer oppose each other, as they did from the Treaty of Westphalia to the Napoleonic Wars, and then again from the end of the latter to the First World War, within a framework of shared beliefs and common values, which imposes effective limitations upon the ends and means of their struggle for power. They oppose each other now as the standard-bearers of ethical systems, each of them of national origin, and each of them claiming and aspiring to provide a supranational framework of moral standards which all the other nations ought to accept and within which their foreign policies ought to operate. The moral code of one nation flings the challenge of its universal claim into the face of another, which reciprocates in kind. Compromise, the virtue of the old diplomacy, becomes the treason of the new; for the mutual accommodation of conflicting claims, possible or legitimate within a common framework of moral standards, amounts to surrender when the moral standards themselves are the stakes of the conflict. Thus the stage is set for a contest among nations whose stakes are no longer their relative positions within a political and moral system accepted by all, but the ability to impose upon the other contestants a new universal political and moral system recreated in the image of the victorious nation's political and moral convictions.[30]

Rhee used moral suasion to influence the United States. Whether he consciously understood the forces of nationalistic universalism is quite

[29] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (3d ed.; New York: Knopf 1960), 337.
[30] *Ibid.*, 256.

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beside the point. What is important is that he was successful in making the United States recognize the fact that she simply could not afford to ignore the moral arguments of the cold war while at the same time trying to convince a host of small nations of the fundamental ideological incompatibility of Communism and democratic ideals. It is in this context that the United States was in no position to ignore the strong moralistic postures of the South Korean President. To have done so would have negated the very foundation of the American position, which was based on nationalistic universalism.

Rhee opposed the truce on ethical and moral grounds. He argued that it was morally unjustifiable to negotiate with the Communists, for such a negotiation would result in an inevitable compromise of much-cherished principles. Since diametrically opposed ideologies competed for the loyalties of people, Rhee considered it justifiable to continue military hostilities against the Chinese and North Korean Communists in order to accomplish the UN resolution of October 7, 1950, which called for the destruction of the enemy forces and the unification of the whole of Korea. When, in the spring of 1953, the United States and the Chinese and North Korean Communists were about to sign the truce agreement, Rhee tried to persuade Eisenhower on moral grounds:

> We are at a point where we cannot drag on any longer. . . . If the United States wants to save democracy for the world, it had better do it now. Please do not destroy the anti-Communist and democratic people all over the world.
>
> The world requires great leadership. The Kremlin will think twice before it starts another World War. Do not be weak. Do not turn back. Democracy must not go backwards. Some day the United States will have to fight alone. Do not wait for that day.[31]

He tried to influence the United States on the question of forced repatriation of prisoners of war by putting forth three arguments which mixed moral appeal with empirical arguments.[32] First, to negotiate with the Communists was morally indefensible; and, since the Chinese

[31] Clark (fn. 1), 270.

[32] When serious debate on the problems of prisoners began in December 1951, the original position of the United Nations Command was to propose an all-for-all exchange of prisoners. (Joy [fn. 14], 150.) That position was subsequently changed to a voluntary repatriation plan under which each prisoner was to be given an appropriate opportunity to choose whether or not to return to the Communist country from which he came or to remain in South Korea. Under this scheme, each prisoner was to be interviewed by the Repatriation Commission for his freely determined choice. The Chinese and North Korean Communists strongly rejected the United Nations proposal and continued to insist that the prisoners should be exchanged on an all-for-all basis.

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and North Korean forces were on the defensive after the spring of 1951, Rhee believed that the United Nations' armies could drive the enemy out of their defensive positions. Second, forced repatriation would deter potential defection from Communist countries: the non-Communist nations in Asia would never again trust the sincerity of the United States when she said that she believed in freedom and justice for all. Finally, Rhee argued that forced repatriation could be considered tantamount to a political victory for the Chinese and North Korean Communists who had been denied a military victory. The Communists were determined to bring back all or most of their prisoners because of possible political repercussions. They had insisted all along that their societies were free and democratic. If their prisoners refused to be repatriated, their political propaganda would be exposed as a myth to the world. Rhee and the United States Government were both aware of this fact. Rhee was determined to deny such a political victory to the Communists, and in this he was quite successful. The Eisenhower Administration, unlike its predecessor, firmly rejected an all-for-all exchange of prisoners and stood on the principle of not forcing Communist prisoners to return to their homelands against their will.[33]

VI. Summary and Conclusion

Of the five techniques employed by Rhee to influence the conduct of the American Government, two were effective: the call for assistance and the call for mutual cooperation. Rhee's formal request for American aid immediately after the outbreak of the Korean War made American action in Korea less controversial both at home and abroad. The Truman Administration would have come to the aid of South Korea even without Rhee's request, but the United States would have been placed in an awkward position. Rhee's timely decision to place South Korean troops under the direct command of General MacArthur voluntarily also facilitated the American involvement in Korea; while it was obviously the sensible thing to do, the timing was a skillful diplomatic gesture. By not waiting for the request, Rhee was able to

[33] Speaking at a dinner of the New York State Republican Committee at the Waldorf Astoria on May 7, 1953, President Eisenhower said: "People that have become our prisoners cannot by any manner of means be denied the right on which this country was founded . . . the right of political asylum against the kind of political persecution they fear. . . . Consequently, to force those people to go back to a life of terror and persecution is something that would violate every moral standard by which America lives. Therefore, it would be unacceptable in the American code, and it cannot be done." Robert J. Donovan, *Eisenhower: The Inside Story* (New York: Harper 1956), 118.

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not only improve the chances of victory for his country, but to gain the goodwill of MacArthur.

The techniques of both the calculated policy proposal and the refusal to cooperate were less successful in influencing American policy. Although South Korea extracted a firm guarantee from the United States to protect her security, the American Government, while giving in on less important issues, refused to budge on the fundamental issue, the unification of Korea. The U.S. simply could not afford to unify Korea militarily, for such an action might have escalated the local conflict into a global one, and Washington was determined to prevent that.

However, the American Government had to temporize its position from time to time in order to be responsive to the wishes and aspirations of the Republic of Korea. In part, the deference to South Korea was rooted in the imperatives of the cold war: as the unofficial leader of the free world, the United States could have ignored Rhee's moral posture only at the risk of jeopardizing her own ideological posture vis-à-vis the Communist world. Whether Rhee understood the nature and effect of moral suasion is beside the point. What is important is that his appeal to morality forced the United States into reaffirming the ethics of the cold war. In that way, the Republic of Korea was most effective in employing moral suasion to influence the United States.

In the final analysis, both the United States and South Korea exerted a reciprocating influence upon each other, acting as allies rather than unilaterally throughout the conflict. Each country respected the other's interests and policies even at times of acute disagreement. South Korea sought above all to sabotage the truce negotiations and to continue military operations in an attempt to unify Korea. To achieve these objectives, the Rhee government employed techniques of noncooperation in order to influence the American Government. The overriding interest of the United States in Korea was that of limiting the conflict to Korea proper, since an enlargement of the war would carry risks to basic global policy objectives. Thus, the emphasis was on reaching a truce agreement with the Chinese and North Korean Communists. The United States was looking beyond the immediate to her global priorities, objectives, policies, and commitments.

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THE ROLE OF DETERRENCE IN NATO DEFENSE STRATEGY:

Implications for Doctrine and Posture

By DAVID N. SCHWARTZ*

THE two principal goals of NATO defense are the deterrence of any kind of aggression by Warsaw Pact forces upon NATO countries, and the response to and containment of such aggression should NATO fail to deter it. Thus, the important choices facing NATO planners today deal with both deterrence and war-fighting postures. How can NATO build these postures, maintain them, and fit them into an overall NATO defense doctrine? To what end, be it NATO security, West European security, or general European security, should it do so? To what extent must NATO rely on its nuclear component as its prime deterrent? And, perhaps most importantly, what underlies the success NATO has had in reaching these goals over the last twenty-five years?

We will deal with the military problems first; political issues will be discussed at a later point in the article. Although the line between military and political issues is not always clearly definable, by drawing such a line at the outset we can present some of the arguments, if not strictly realistically, at least more clearly.

I

The building of a strong NATO deterrence posture is possible only given certain crucial assumptions. One such assumption is that the "quick grab," entailing small-scale, quick, and highly localized aggression for very limited territorial and political gain, is not a viable option in Warsaw Pact military doctrine. It would involve military and political costs to the Warsaw Pact countries which would make the option worthless. NATO is effectively forced into making this assumption, since no way has ever been conceptualized to deter the quick grab. A quick grab is by definition a surprise; as such, NATO would have to arm every mile of potentially hostile frontier with conventional

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forces strong enough to counter a large concentration of Warsaw Pact forces. To do so would be almost an impossibility in practice; surprise gives the attacker the advantage, and NATO just does not have the manpower to make such defense feasible. (For that matter, neither do the Warsaw Pact countries.) Although the Warsaw Pact countries are aware of NATO's tendency to avoid confrontation until critically provoked, a nuclear response to the quick grab is noncredible, since the limited loss of territory could hardly be judged worth a NATO nuclear response.

Since the Warsaw Pact allies probably view the quick grab as an unviable offensive tactic, NATO can feel fairly comfortable in planning around that contingency. Instead, the primary focus of NATO deterrence strategy has been on large-scale, sustained aggression. Aggression is conceivable between this extreme and the quick grab; but the assumption has been that if NATO can plan prudently, it will be able to deter a wide range of aggressive acts. As such, several further assumptions have been made: that any conceivable Warsaw Pact aggression will be conventional at the outset; and that, since a nuclear war could escalate and thus have disastrous consequences for both sides, the Warsaw Pact countries will seek to maintain strictly conventional levels in any war.

Given these assumptions, which seem fairly realistic, the problem for NATO planners becomes largely one of *threshold manipulation*. At what point in a conventional engagement would NATO go nuclear? How would it go about crossing the nuclear threshold? And finally, how best can NATO make these decisions so that the Warsaw Pact forces will be deterred?

Several deterrence postures have been proposed for NATO. The *Unambiguous Threshold* posture implies the threat of a strong conventional defense against Warsaw Pact aggression until a specified point in the conflict, at which time the nuclear threshold would be crossed. The *Ambiguous Threshold* posture is similar, except that in the former the threshold would be publicly announced beforehand, whereas in the latter there would be no such announcement. The *Shot Across the Bow* posture implies the use of a nuclear weapon as a warning against further provocation. The *Quick Linkage* posture calls for a rapid escalation from tactical nuclear war to strategic nuclear war. The *Limited Nuclear War* posture implies that if NATO is forced to cross the nuclear threshold, it will attempt to control carefully any tendencies toward nuclear escalation. The first two postures examine deterrence as a function of *where* NATO might put the nuclear thresh-

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old, the latter three as a function of *how* the threshold would be crossed. These five postures will now be examined in detail.

A. THE UNAMBIGUOUS THRESHOLD

The Unambiguous Threshold posture threatens a conventional response to conventional aggression up to a publicly specified "threshold" —be it temporal, geographic, or intensity/security-oriented in nature— at which point NATO would initiate the use of nuclear weapons. Since the threat of an immediate nuclear response is not a credible one, given the perceived reluctance of NATO to use nuclear weapons, Warsaw Pact members know that NATO will try to avoid nuclear war until there appears to be no alternative. Thus, the threat of conventional response is the prime deterrent; the announced threshold must be fairly far along in the escalation process.

Such an announced posture would probably not deter aggression *up to* the nuclear level unless the nuclear threat were coupled with a very strong conventional threat from the outset of the conflict. Otherwise, the Warsaw Pact allies might perceive no cost involved in pushing the NATO forces to the brink of the threshold. Here we must confront a fundamental issue with which we shall deal later: What is it that *at present* deters the Warsaw Pact countries from aggression? It may be the fear that if a conventional conflict got out of NATO's control, NATO might resort to nuclear weapons; and that these weapons, because of an inherent pressure to use them before they are captured, could cause the conflict to escalate out of control.

So the tactical nuclear arsenal seems to be a risky deterrent when applied by itself; a strong conventional component must be coupled with it. In order for it to be a strong deterrent, a conventional force would at least have to *appear* as if it could respond to and hold back a conventional assault.

One major problem of the Unambiguous Threshold posture as a deterrent is how to make the threat of nuclear action credible after a certain point in the conflict has been reached—how to "announce" the threshold. Public pronouncements on this matter might be greeted with skepticism. Reason indicates that the best way would be, as Schelling suggests, to "burn our bridges behind us"; that is, to make it impossible for NATO *not* to respond with nuclear weapons after a certain well-defined provocation.[1] Strategists have considered emplacing a line of

[1] See Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press 1963), 35-43.

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Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADM's) along the NATO-WP frontiers to try to fulfill this prescription by making any military thrust by Warsaw Pact forces into NATO territory subject to an automatic nuclear response. However, the flaw in this plan is that it would lock NATO into a response which could be either premature or grossly inappropriate to the nature of the attack. Once the Warsaw Pact forces perceived that such a response would be inappropriate to a certain level of aggression, they might be tempted to call NATO's bluff and proceed at that level. Thus, in addition to being an inflexible option, ADM's might well be a nonbelievable threat under certain potentially dangerous circumstances. More flexibility might be provided by placing the ADM's back far enough from the East-West border to allow the NATO chiefs time to think before having to use them. But here we begin to encounter a political question: how far back would NATO place them? Would West Germany agree to be overrun before the war went nuclear, or would it insist on the threshold line being placed close to the border with East Germany? Even if political problems did not arise, there would still be the possibility of premature use; use of the weapons in a given situation might be tactically wise (for they would be captured if they are not used), but strategically unsound (for a tactical nuclear war at any particular moment might give an advantage to the Warsaw Pact forces).

In short, the Unambiguous Threshold posture suffers from three weaknesses which could be mitigated by the following three countermeasures:

—the maintenance of a strong conventional component;
—the establishment of a nuclear threshold at a point where it is clearly in NATO's best interests to go nuclear;
—the assurance that the threat of crossing that threshold is perceived as credible by the Warsaw Pact chiefs.

The first of these measures is feasible, as we shall see. However, for the reasons already given, the last two would probably be very difficult to implement, revealing the inherent weakness of the posture as a deterrent.

B. THE AMBIGUOUS THRESHOLD

The Ambiguous Threshold posture involves the threat of conventional response to conventional aggression up to an unspecified point, either temporal or geographic, at which time NATO would cross the nuclear

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threshold. Although the Warsaw Pact forces could expect intense conventional resistance to any conventional aggression, they could never be sure as to when that resistance would become nuclear. This is essentially the posture that NATO maintains today, although some members of the NATO coalition do not support it. The same kinds of issues on the conventional level are involved in this posture as in the previous one; that is, how can NATO go about making its conventional forces look strong enough to Warsaw Pact leaders to deter conventional aggression? That question will be dealt with at length further on. However, the basic ambiguity of the *nuclear* threshold in this posture strengthens its deterrence value. The Warsaw Pact countries could never be certain whether or not a given conventional attack would provoke a nuclear response. They probably fear two things: that such a response could give NATO some limited tactical advantage on the battlefield, and more importantly, that such a response could trigger escalation to an intolerable level. This double fear, combined with a strong conventional threat, would serve to deter the Warsaw Pact forces from attacking at all.

C. THE SHOT ACROSS THE BOW

The Shot Across the Bow posture is accurately termed the "nuclear warning." It involves the use of a nuclear explosion as a warning to the enemy that further fighting will probably provoke a nuclear response. As long as NATO has the capability to continue to use nuclear weapons if the warning fails, the posture will contribute to the deterrence of further aggression. However, it may be difficult to apply this posture in practice, the major problem being: how could NATO be sure that the Warsaw Pact forces distinguish a *warning*, with all its implications, from a *military use* of the weapon, which would necessitate a response in kind? If the explosion occurred at what the enemy perceived to be a military target, it could be interpreted as heralding the beginning of a nuclear war, and thus compel retaliation with nuclear weapons. But even if NATO could successfully avoid an explosion near a military target, the Warsaw Pact's interpretation of the explosion would be uncertain. Only with very explicit and convincing communication could the Shot Across the Bow be interpreted as a warning. Since this kind of communication becomes almost impossible to rely on in a crisis situation, especially between antagonists, NATO could not count on the Shot Across the Bow to deter further aggression beyond the nuclear threshold.

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D. QUICK LINKAGE

The Quick Linkage posture involves a deliberate decision to escalate the conflict quickly from the tactical to the strategic level. Since the inevitable result of continued Warsaw Pact aggression would be the destruction of the Soviet homeland, the adoption of this posture supposedly would make any such aggression unthinkable to the Warsaw Pact forces. That is the position of several factions in Europe, most notably the West German Government. In fact, owing to the strategic nuclear balance and the assured destruction capability of the Soviet Union, it is very difficult to make this threat credible; *there is probably no priority in Europe for which the U.S. could credibly threaten to commit suicide*. Political conflicts arise here, stemming from the fact that although West Germany, and to greater or lesser degrees many other West European states, interpret NATO doctrine along the lines of Quick Linkage, Washington, which has the ultimate control over Western strategic nuclear options, does not interpret it so. The United States feels more comfortable with the following posture, which many West Europeans are understandably reluctant to accept.

E. LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR

The Limited Nuclear War posture involves the idea that if NATO were to go nuclear in a war, it would try to limit the use of these weapons to "tactical" targets, to limit the collateral damage incurred by their use, and to make the war more "fightable" for its own troops. There is a great deal of controversy as to whether NATO could successfully "limit" such a nuclear engagement. Many analysts agree that there would be a powerful tendency for a limited nuclear engagement to become unlimited, to escalate out of control quite rapidly. This view itself leads us to some interesting conclusions. The Warsaw Pact countries would be deterred if they thought NATO really meant to try to use the Limited Nuclear War posture. They would think that NATO would behave as though such limitations were possible—irrespective of whether or not this were true—thus endangering Europe with nuclear escalation. If they thought NATO was bluffing, there would still be no guarantee that the weapons would not eventually be used; thus, the Warsaw Pact would still be deterred. The deterrent strength of this posture increases when applied as a complement to the Ambiguous Threshold posture. It follows that NATO's capability to limit nuclear war is somewhat irrelevant in considering the deterrent strength of the

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Limited Nuclear War posture, if the deterring factor is indeed the small but not negligible chance that NATO will use such weapons at an unpredictable point with potentially disastrous results.

Alternatively, the Warsaw Pact partners could believe that *controlled and limited nuclear escalation is not only possible, but that* NATO will be able to use such escalation to its own military advantage. This consideration might also deter a rational decision-maker attempting to avoid nuclear war. But to the extent that deterrence rests on the fear that a nuclear war might escalate quickly, any attempts to make escalation more gradual and controllable might have a dampening effect on deterrence. Thus, we have an interesting paradox: the Limited Nuclear War posture seems to have more of a positive effect on deterrence if the feasibility of the posture remains somewhat questionable.

II

The preceding analysis suggests that the strongest deterrent postures are the Ambiguous Threshold and the Limited Nuclear War postures, as complements to each other. What kinds of forces are needed to create such postures for NATO?

A strong conventional force would be needed to provide a credible Ambiguous Threshold. Just how strong it would have to be is uncertain. As anyone who has attempted it can attest, the task of military estimation and comparison in peacetime is an art rather than a science. But it is crucial that the NATO conventional force at least *appear* as strong as its Warsaw Pact counterpart—suggesting rough equivalencies in manpower, divisions, arms, and overall military structure.

There are several ways of accomplishing this end. NATO could restructure its ground forces around small "cadre" divisions which are capable of being widely dispersed and easily "fleshed out" in time of crisis. It could shift from an emphasis on support troops to an emphasis on combat troops. It could also standardize its military hardware. The net effect of these policies would be to make NATO forces more similar to Warsaw Pact forces, and thus provide a visible basis for comparison. This in turn would make a stronger deterrent, for the power of NATO forces would be readily visible to the Warsaw Pact leadership. More importantly, by making the NATO conventional fighting force a more efficient organization, these measures might strengthen NATO in the eyes of the Warsaw Pact states, and thus reinforce deterrence.[2]

[2] Robert W. Komer, "Treating NATO's Self-Inflicted Wound," *Foreign Policy*, No. 13 (Winter 1973-1974), 34-48.

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The importance of conventional deterrence cannot be overstated. Historically, the reason for maintaining a NATO nuclear force has been the assumption that the Warsaw Pact was NATO's superior in conventional weapons. Since NATO's "inferior" conventional forces could not hope to deter Warsaw Pact aggression, tactical nuclear weapons were introduced to increase the aggregate NATO strength and thus give NATO a more powerful deterrent. By doing so, however, NATO effectively chose to ignore the possibility of relying on its conventional component's deterrent power; NATO did not recognize that a strong conventional component was within reach, and thus that it could reduce its risky reliance on the nuclear arsenal as a deterrent. However, U.S. experts over the past ten years have seriously questioned the assumption of the Warsaw Pact's conventional supremacy in Europe, and have argued quite convincingly that if NATO's conventional component is indeed inferior to that of the Warsaw Pact, the marginal difference is so small that NATO could rectify the imbalance without undue strain on the military budget; some have even suggested that NATO's conventional capability is fully equal to that possessed by the Warsaw Pact.[3] Thus, by making the types of adjustments mentioned above, NATO could improve its conventional component to the point where its reliance on nuclear weapons could be substantially reduced.

From these considerations the question arises naturally whether a conventional standoff is sufficient to deter any aggression, conventional or nuclear, on the part of the Warsaw Pact; whether, once NATO achieves conventional parity, it can drop the nuclear component completely and rely on the conventional component to deter any aggression, conventional or nuclear, by the Warsaw Pact. Unfortunately, the answer would seem to be "no." Of course, there is the possibility that if the Warsaw Pact partners saw NATO remove the nuclear component from its posture, they might be encouraged to start a conventional war, knowing that should the offensive fail on the conventional level, the Warsaw Pact would be guaranteed success, at least in the short run, on the nuclear level. Even if the Warsaw Pact states chose to refrain from military action, they could mount intense political pressure on the powers of Western Europe. So the presence of some nuclear weapons in NATO would at present seem to be a prudent hedge against any undue pressure from the Warsaw Pact.

The Limited Nuclear War posture, in terms of what exactly is needed

[3] Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much Is Enough?* (New York: Harper and Row 1971), 117-64.

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to make NATO's force structure conform to it, is much more difficult to assess than the Ambiguous Threshold. As previously stated, the real deterrent factor in this posture is the possibility that a limited nuclear war might not remain limited for very long. If the Warsaw Pact leaders believed that NATO would use the nuclear option at some unstated point in the conflict, they would be deterred to the extent that they believed either NATO or themselves to be incapable of limiting such a war. If they believed that NATO could in fact limit such a war but that they could not, they would still be deterred. However, if they believed that both they and NATO were perfectly capable of maintaining such limitations, they might be encouraged to engage in such a conflict, since the perceived costs in doing so would be relatively low. This reasoning leads us to repeat our previously stated paradox, with some specific implications: prudent NATO planners will publicly adopt the Limited Nuclear War posture for the deterrent aspects we have mentioned earlier, but will *not* make corresponding technological improvements in the stockpile to make the option strictly usable. By making it usable, they would be removing the rationale behind the deterrent; that is, that a limited nuclear war would not remain limited.

Certain things could be done to the stockpile, however, which would minimize the possibility of a premature crossing of the threshold while not endangering the stockpile's deterrent value. Making the longer-range missiles—such as the Pershing—more invulnerable would tend to ease the pressure for their use during a time of crisis. Moving nuclear artillery components away from the line of conventional battle would, although making them more difficult to use at a moment's notice, minimize the possibility of their capture by oncoming Warsaw Pact troops, and could thereby also minimize the pressures for their use. Needless to say, strong command and control procedures must be maintained so that the decision to cross the threshold would remain in the hands of the top political leadership.[4] A stockpile changed in such a manner, although not making nuclear war a more appetizing option, could go a long way toward providing a safer deterrent.

[4] Superficially, this comment would seem to contradict the credibility of a deterrent based on the premise that a small nuclear war would quickly get out of control. The ultimate assurance that a nuclear war would in fact get out of control quickly would be to allow all battlefield commanders complete and sovereign control over their own share of nuclear weapons, under the assumption that uncontrolled escalation is a greater and more visible possibility in the absence of centralized control. However, this *reductio ad absurdum* stretches generally valid concepts irresponsibly.

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III

The problem of deterrence is pre-eminent; NATO cannot ignore plans for fighting a war should it occur, but its primary concern should be to keep it from occurring in the first place. However, the postures discussed above do have important implications for NATO war-fighting plans.

To make the Ambiguous Threshold a credible deterrent, an efficient fighting force is necessary. This force would then provide a good war-fighting capability should deterrence fail. As suggested before, NATO's conventional component might fill the bill at present; the massive air superiority of NATO forces, the essential equivalence in total manpower between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the fact that the U.S. officers in NATO have almost all had recent combat experience in Vietnam, all tend to reinforce the assertion that NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces are roughly equivalent in strength.[5] Several things could be done, however, to make the NATO conventional forces even more effective: restructuring along more dispersed and flexible lines, reallocation of manpower, and standardization of military hardware are but a few. One additional way of making the most of NATO's conventional potential would be to add a short-war capability to its present long-war capability. Steven Canby states the problem bluntly:

> If NATO continues to ignore its short-run combat weaknesses, NATO's long-run capabilities could be rendered useless by Pact's [*sic*] initial onslaught. A military force structured for a short war can usually fight a long war if necessary, provided long lead time items are hedged and economic resources are available. But a military force that is structured for a long war (and consequently weak in short-war capabilities) may not survive to marshal its potentially superior power.[6]

The Ambiguous Threshold posture implies that if the conventional response to conventional aggression is unsuccessful, the nuclear option will be used. But who will judge whether the situation is grave enough to warrant the use of nuclear weapons? What West Germany might view as grave might not be viewed as such by the United States, Britain, Belgium, or, for that matter, by any other NATO country. Let us assume for the moment that NATO could make this judgment coher-

[5] Enthoven and Smith (fn. 3).

[6] Steven Canby, "NATO Muscle: More Shadow Than Substance," *Foreign Policy*, No. 8 (Fall 1972), 38-49.

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ently and thus could cross the nuclear threshold as an alliance. It has been argued that NATO should then be prepared to fight with nuclear weapons in a militarily meaningful manner: the weapons should be capable of target destruction and territory denial, and should allow for great troop mobility. The present stockpile does not fulfill these qualifications. The weapons are too indiscriminate to be used in any militarily efficient way, and are too "dirty" (they produce "rainout" and radio-active debris) to be used on a battlefield with any safety to the user.[7]

As we have suggested previously, changing the stockpile by making the weapons militarily more useful could weaken the Limited Nuclear War deterrent to the degree that the Warsaw Pact is deterred by the fear that such a war would quickly escalate to undesirable proportions. But even if the deterrent were not weakened, there would be many problems associated with technological improvements in the tactical nuclear stockpile. The most obvious of these is the immense financial cost of developing these weapons. Another is that this weapons doctrine assumes that the Warsaw Pact countries will use nuclear weapons that are similarly changed; otherwise, the nuclear battlefield will still be dirty and probably devoid of any meaning. In fact, there is no evidence that they are interested in making such improvements; the feeling of Warsaw Pact leaders might be that by doing so, they would be weakening their own deterrent against NATO aggression. Stockpile improvements by NATO would be an expensive exercise in futility if they were not matched by corresponding improvements by the Warsaw Pact allies, unless it is assumed that the weapons would be used exclusively on Warsaw Pact territory with highly localized effects. A third problem is, of course, that extensive improvements in the tactical nuclear stockpile might remove much of the psychological incentive to make improvements in the more important aspect of the posture—the conventional component.

IV

The preceding discussion has almost completely ignored the political problems and realities which provide the context for the doctrinal debate. A brief mention of these is now in order, since the heart of the problem of Western European security, or the security of any nation, is politics. Much of what follows here will seem to assume the inevitability of full-scale conflict. Obviously, such conflict is not inevitable.

[7] Charles Schultze and others, *Setting National Priorities: The 1972 Budget* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution 1971), 96-100.

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The past decade has demonstrated that the chances of conflict can be reduced to a minimum if political decision-makers on both sides deliberately set out to do so. Nor is it proper to assume that conflict will necessarily occur in the NATO-WP mode; there are several "gray" areas, such as Yugoslavia, where a conflict could arise between the national elements and eventually involve the major alliances. How the NATO forces would be involved is beyond the scope of the present examination. It is important to note, though, that a direct NATO-WP confrontation is unlikely. What follows is a study of the problems involved in preventing this unlikely scenario from occurring.

NATO defense policy is in no sense unified. It seems unlikely that a group of countries like NATO could ever agree on a common defense doctrine or posture. Each country has its own distinctive security problems, reflecting very different perceptions of strategic distances between itself and its enemies. Two examples should suffice to illustrate this point: the conflict between American and West German interpretations of NATO defense policy, and the special problem created by France.[8]

The United States wants to avoid strategic nuclear war with the Soviet Union unless its very existence is threatened and it perceives no other alternatives. This attitude is rooted in the present strategic stand-off between the two superpowers. Neither has the capability to attack the other without the very credible threat of unacceptably high retaliatory damage. As a result, the U.S. views the European nuclear escalation ladder as being somewhat independent of the strategic exchange ladder. Although it has never publicly declared so, the United States would probably prefer to fight the Soviet Union on a European battlefield until Europe is destroyed rather than risk the destruction of American cities. There is little reason to expect the U.S. to commit nuclear suicide for any objective in Europe.

Washington does, however, recognize a special interest in West European security; historical, political, cultural, and economic ties between the United States and Western Europe are so deep and pervasive that it is unquestionably in the interest of the U.S. to help defend Western Europe. For America to relax and assert that a Soviet-controlled Western Europe would not threaten U.S. interests would require a world vastly different from today's. Thus, the United States has various arrangements by which NATO countries have limited access to nuclear weapons, subject to U.S. approval; it maintains a force of 300,000 military personnel in NATO countries; and it concentrates much of

[8] Many of these points are taken up in Lord Gladwyn, "The Defense of Western Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 51 (April 1973), 588-97.

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its defense thinking on problems of Western European security. But all this does not alter the basic fact: given the choice between a demolished Europe and a demolished homeland, U.S. political leaders would inevitably choose the former.

This fact is somewhat unsettling to Western Europeans, to whom the Warsaw Pact represents a more direct potential threat. The West Germans in particular have a great deal to lose even from short, limited conventional exchanges which might take place on their territory. Thus, they are hesitant to allow any military concession before going nuclear. But not only do they want the nuclear threshold placed lower than does the United States; they would expect the U.S. to threaten escalation automatically along the Quick Linkage posture—that is, directly from tactical to strategic nuclear war. Their prime concern is almost diametrically opposed to that of the U.S.; they wish to avoid, at all costs, being victims of a protracted U.S.-Soviet duel, either nuclear or conventional. However, by asking the United States to agree to a Quick Linkage posture, they have chosen to ignore the fact that this is not in the best interests of the U.S., and therefore fundamentally not a credible posture.

As if this political conflict were not enough, there is the problem of France. France does not view participation in NATO defense planning as being in its best interests. As a result, the French have developed a small, independent tactical nuclear force, the backbone of which is the Pluton missile. The Pluton has a range of about 80-100 miles; thus, lined up at the easternmost borders of France, they would still fall well inside West Germany. It is in the best interest of the French to hold the Warsaw Pact forces as far from French frontiers as possible. That interest is clearly not served by noncooperation with NATO. By cooperating, the French might be able to place the Plutons closer to the preliminary thrust and thus have a chance of repelling, either by use or by threat of use, an attack well before it reached France. To add to the problem, France could conceivably use these weapons at the present time in a situation which NATO might deem inappropriate or premature; such action might commit NATO to nuclear war against its own wishes, or otherwise dangerously limit NATO's options.

How NATO could persuade France at least to consult the NATO allies on the use of French nuclear weapons in Europe is unclear. As France sees it, the predominance of the United States in NATO defense planning is highly objectionable, given the strategic nuclear balance between America and the Soviet Union. France feels that the U.S. might find itself unable to protect Western Europe in a crisis

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situation in which the American homeland is credibly threatened by Soviet nuclear weapons, and would therefore not be a very reliable protector. There seems to be a kernel of truth to that; the future role of the U.S. in NATO is unresolved, owing to the uncertainty of the nature of an American reaction to a crisis in Europe. The Conference on European Security and the Conference on Mutual (and Balanced?) Force Reductions, which have taken place between the Warsaw Pact and the NATO representatives, seem to point to a need for a new definition of the role of the United States in NATO defense. These conferences are raising very fundamental political questions: How much of a threat is the Warsaw Pact likely to be in the foreseeable future? Can the United States continue to provide a large segment of NATO defense manpower and supplies? Should it continue to do so? What role do U.S. troops play in deterring aggression merely by the fact that they represent the power of the United States? To what extent is cohesion in NATO doctrine and posture attainable, necessary, or even desirable?

All the above questions are important and need to be answered. For example, whether or not the Warsaw Pact is likely to pose a threat to NATO in the future depends upon the future postures of the Moscow leadership, the intra-alliance tensions in the Warsaw Pact, and a whole gamut of unforeseeable events. Unfortunately, the scope of this paper limits us to a careful analysis of the last question alone.

V

Given the preceding political discussion, it should be obvious that NATO is a single entity in name alone. Its doctrine is fragmented, a coherent posture is undiscernable, and there seems to be a fundamental conflict of assumptions among its members as to the security needs of Western Europe. This fact poses an interesting question: If NATO has been so disorganized all these years, what has kept the Warsaw Pact forces from attacking?

Several possibilities come to mind. The first is that perhaps the Warsaw Pact is largely a defensive organization, willing to take risks when the costs seem negligible, but otherwise unwilling to shift from a defensive stance. Perhaps the primary purposes of the Warsaw Pact are the same as those of NATO: to deter aggression and to respond appropriately if it cannot deter. All military activity of the Warsaw Pact forces over the past two decades, with the possible exception of the Berlin blockade, has been undertaken with the apparent purpose of

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consolidating internal Warsaw Pact cohesion. An argument can be made, for example, that the reason Warsaw Pact forces marched on Czechoslovakia in 1968 was that the Warsaw Pact leadership thought its alliance looked weak to potentially expansionist NATO countries, thus diminishing the Warsaw Pact's ability to deter aggression. *Perhaps neither alliance has ever had any intention of attacking the other, but has perceived its counterpart as being hostile and expansionist.*[9]

A second possibility is that the Warsaw Pact perceives itself to be merely equal, if not inferior, in conventional arms to its Western counterpart. Just the opposite has always been assumed by NATO; that is, that the Warsaw Pact perceives itself to be strong enough conventionally to overwhelm NATO's conventional capability. But, given the difficulty NATO has had over the years in comparing the two forces, is it reasonable to assume that Warsaw Pact leaders perceive the balance the same way NATO does? It is totally conceivable that the Warsaw Pact generals have for years secretly complained to their leaders that, despite its public claims, NATO's conventional forces are dangerously superior to those of the Warsaw Pact.

Another answer may well lie in the presence of 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons in the hands of NATO countries. Once again we come back to a familiar theme. What probably deters the Warsaw Pact in part is the fear that since the NATO alliance has nuclear weapons, these might be used unexpectedly with disastrous results. No matter what NATO says or how it behaves, if it has them it might use them, and the risk may just be great enough to keep the Warsaw Pact from attempting any adventurous undertakings in Western Europe.

These three possibilities have one common implication: perhaps coherency in doctrine and posture are somewhat irrelevant in deterring the Warsaw Pact forces from attacking NATO countries. If our first explanation is correct, then as long as NATO is not overtly expansionist, it is unnecessary for its strategists to worry about posture, since the Warsaw Pact allies never intended to attack in the first place. If our second explanation is correct, then no radical changes in NATO posture would seem to be necessary in the foreseeable future, for the Warsaw Pact countries are making no great attempts to rectify what they perceive to be an imbalance of conventional forces. In fact, many analysts argue that the Warsaw Pact's capability is growing weaker because of military pressure on the Soviet Union along the Chinese

[9] This interpretation is suggested, on the basis of massive content analysis of newspaper coverage of the cold war, in William Gamson and André Modigliani, *Untangling the Cold War: A Strategy for Testing Rival Theories* (Boston: Little, Brown 1971).

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border. If our third explanation is correct, the presence of a coherent doctrine and posture might even be dysfunctional in deterring Warsaw Pact aggression, to the extent that such coherency would imply better capabilities to keep a nuclear war limited, to avoid uncontrollable escalation and severe collateral damage, and might consequently make such a war more fightable or even more desirable.

How these observations contribute to the task of arms control in Western Europe is unclear. They do suggest, however, that the quality and the size of NATO's nuclear stockpile is only a small part of what deters the Warsaw Pact; perhaps the reliance on these weapons could be diminished with no appreciable harm. Thus, careful consideration should be given to reducing the number of tactical nuclear weapons that NATO now maintains in Europe, and to increasing its capability and reliance on conventional defense.[10]

Our purpose here has not been to suggest any clear-cut answers, for the scope of this brief paper is too narrow to discuss them adequately. Rather, it is hoped that some of the questions raised on the relationship of doctrine, posture, and deterrence in NATO will be adequately considered in the seemingly endless debate on how to defend Western Europe.

[10] See, for example, Victor Gilinsky, *Arms Control Aspects of the Deployment of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe* (Santa Monica: Southern California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar 1971).

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THE MEANING OF DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION

By WILLIAM R. SCHONFELD*

Carole Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory*. London and New York, Cambridge University Press, 1970, 122 pp., $6.50.

Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality*. New York, Evanston, San Francisco, and London, Harper and Row, 1972, 428 pp., $5.95.

Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-on Kim, *The Modes of Democratic Participation: A Cross-National Comparison*. Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage Publications, Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, 1971, 80 pp., $2.80.

THE term "participation" has been applied to a wide range of conceptually and empirically distinct phenomena running the gamut from psychological characteristics of individuals to structural traits of organizations. Conflict among students of participation stems, in part, from alternative labelling procedures. But there also appears to be sharp disagreement at a more profound level.

The work of some political scientists is consonant with the assumption that "asymmetry"[1] is a fact of organizational life. That is to say, within social and political units, "abilities to produce intended effects and derive benefits are unequally distributed; . . . someone affects more than he is affected, controls more than he is controlled, and/or gets more of what is allocated."[2] Democracy is a type of hierarchical relationship which mutes and reduces asymmetry through participation.

Other work explicitly argues that symmetry is possible or at least might be approached. While asymmetry may be modal in practice, examples of "real democracy" (all members of the organization sharing equally in decision making) do exist and should serve as objects for emulation.

In this article, I shall examine the meaning of democratic participa-

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[1] The terms "asymmetry" and "symmetry" are taken from Harry Eckstein, "Authority Patterns: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry," *American Political Science Review*, LXVII (December 1973), 1142-61.

[2] *Ibid.*, 1146.

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tion according to the asymmetric and symmetric perspectives. First, work which seems to be in harmony with the assumption of asymmetry will be analyzed. The relevant literature is extensive and by no means free of conflict. However, research conducted under the direction of Sidney Verba not only provides some guidelines for synthesizing and integrating the findings and ideas of his predecessors, but also carries their common mode of inquiry to new heights of empirical and conceptual sophistication.

Second, work which adopts a symmetric perspective will be considered. Analysis will focus on Carole Pateman's book—a work which is significant for its clear formulation of an operational theory of participatory democracy and the presentation of data designed to carry this conception beyond asserting the desirable and toward demonstrating its empirical viability.

Third, and last, I shall provide a synthesis of these two perspectives.

I. The Asymmetric Perspective

Most contemporary researchers of democracy seek to *describe* how such authority systems "do in fact operate and to *explain* why they operate this way."[3] Relevant cases and precise definitions are arrived at denotatively. That is to say, conceptualizations are based on the functioning, first, of political systems (because the word "democracy" has historically been associated with polities and not with other social units) and, second, of a particular subset of such systems—e.g., those in the United States, England, and France. The distinguishing aspects of these polities are isolated and presented as the defining traits of democracy.

Joseph Schumpeter was one of the first to adopt the denotative approach. For him, "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote."[4] Many contemporary theorists echo Schumpeter's definition. Lipset defines "democracy in a complex society" as "a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office."[5] Harry Eckstein argues

[3] Robert A. Dahl, "Further Reflections on 'The Elitist Theory of Democracy,'" *American Political Science Review*, LX (June 1966), 298.

[4] Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York and London: Harper and Row 1942), 269.

[5] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, Doubleday 1963), 27.

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that democracy "denotes . . . regularized choice between competing political elites" and declares that "elections in such systems must decide, in some basic way, the outcome of the competition for power and policies; for what else can one mean by democracy?"[6]

When the term "participation" is invoked, elections continue to be the focal point, but they are no longer the only relevant phenomenon. Almond and Verba regard participation in the democratic state as "the opportunity" which "the ordinary man" has, "to take part in the political decision-making process as an influential citizen."[7] Voting, working through groups, and directly contacting public officials are the kinds of activities in which the participating citizen is involved. Robert Dahl locates "two somewhat different theoretical dimensions of democratization": "liberalization"—that is, "the extent of permissible opposition, public contestation, or political competition," and "inclusiveness,"—that is, "the proportion of the population entitled to participate on a more or less equal plane in controlling and contesting the conduct of government."[8] This second dimension becomes, theoretically, "the right to participate in elections and office," and, empirically, the extent of electoral suffrage.[9]

Democracy, therefore, like all political systems, has separate strata of governed and governors. Democracy is distinct because citizens periodically select who shall "rule" them, and can exert influence over the "rulers" once they are in office. Within such an asymmetric relationship, in the words of Verba and Nie, "Political participation refers to those activities that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take" (p. 2). But, what activities are participatory? What are the criteria for inclusion in this category? Most importantly, do such activities provide the ordinary citizen of a democracy with any influence?

Ten types of activities are often cited in the literature on political participation:[10] (1) running for or holding public (or party) office,

[6] From Eckstein, *A Theory of Stable Democracy*, reprinted in Eckstein, *Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1966), 235n. and 229.

[7] Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1963), 4.

[8] Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1971), 4.

[9] *Ibid.*, 5-6.

[10] This compilation is drawn from the following articles and books: Philip E. Converse and Georges Dupeux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXVI (Spring 1962), 1-23; Giuseppe Di Palma,

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(2) belonging to a party or other political organization, (3) working in an election, (4) attending political meetings or rallies, (5) making a financial contribution to a party or a candidate, (6) contacting a public official, (7) publicly expressing a political opinion to convince others, (8) partaking in political discussion, (9) voting, and (10) exposing oneself to political stimuli.[11]

There seem to be two principal standards for inclusion;[12] speculation suggests that these activities either indicate "involvement" in politics,[13] or may provide the average citizen with "influence."[14] The criterion of involvement embraces two conceptually distinct phenomena: the psychological involvement of ordinary citizens in public affairs, and a set of activities in which citizens partake (their behavioral involvement in politics). It might be inferred from the literature that psychological involvement leads to behavioral involvement which results in having influence. As attractive as this progression might appear, there is some question about its validity.

For instance, Ulf Himmelstrand's Swedish data fail to support the notion of a necessary connection between psychological and behavioral involvement.[15] Seymour Martin Lipset, in *Political Man*, argues that behavioral involvement is "neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition" for having influence.[16] And, according to Alex Inkeles, Almond and Verba's "model of a democratic citizen" who "is expected to take

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Apathy and Participation: Mass Politics in Western Societies (New York: Free Press 1970); Georges Dupeux, "France," *International Social Science Journal*, XII (No. 1, 1960), 40-52; Alain Lancelot, *La participation des Français à la politique* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1971); Robert E. Lane, *Political Life: Why and How People Get Involved in Politics* (New York: Free Press 1959); Herbert McClosky, "Political Participation," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, XII (New York: Macmillan and Free Press 1968), 252-65; Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics?* (Chicago: Rand McNally 1965); Norman H. Nie, G. Bingham Powell, and Kenneth Prewitt, "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, I," *American Political Science Review*, LIII (June 1969), 361-78; Stein Rokkan, "Introduction," *International Social Science Journal*, XII (No. 1, 1960), 7-14.

[11] For a breakdown of the authors who refer to each of these activities, see William R. Schonfeld and Marie-France Toinet, "Les abstentionnistes ont-ils toujours tort? La participation électorale en France et aux Etats-Unis," *Revue Française de Science Politique*, XXV (August 1975), Table V.

[12] The availability of previously gathered data seems to be an additional criterion. For example, see Nie, Powell, and Prewitt (fn. 10), 364.

[13] See, for example, Milbrath (fn. 10).

[14] See, for example, McClosky (fn. 10).

[15] Himmelstrand, "Depoliticization and Political Involvement: A Theoretical and Empirical Approach," in Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology* (New York: Free Press 1970), 64-92.

[16] Lipset (fn. 5), 183.

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an interest in politics, engage in political discussion, participate by voting and other actions, have knowledge of politics, and express a general sense of competence to influence the government" (in other words, one who is psychologically and behaviorally involved in politics), is equally applicable to the citizen of a modern "extremist or totalitarian regime."[17]

By implication, if there is something special about participation in democracies, it must be that citizens actually exert some real control. But we cannot assume that such influence automatically flows from participatory activities. More than two hundred years ago, Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued: "The English people believes itself to be free; it is gravely mistaken; it is free only during the election of Members of Parliament; as soon as the Members are elected, the people is enslaved; it is nothing."[18] Similarly, Maurice Duverger has suggested that, in France under the Fifth Republic, the people choose a "supreme chief" whom they cannot control between elections; under the preceding regimes, they chose "500 second-rank chiefs" over whom they had no control between elections.[19] Perhaps Duverger and Rousseau are right;[20] or perhaps those who imply that influence flows from all the various participatory acts are correct.

To go beyond choosing between such opposing views on the basis of speculation or ideological conviction, more than an accumulation of responses to similar survey items is needed. Ideally, we would want a comprehensive typology of participatory acts, an explanation of the reasons why individuals partake in these activities, and, most important of all, a measure of the influence which stems from them.

Sidney Verba and his colleagues have taken a significant step in that direction.[21] First, before setting out on a large cross-national survey

[17] Inkeles, "Participant Citizenship in Six Developing Countries," *American Political Science Review*, LXIII (December 1969), 1123.

[18] Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, trans. by Maurice Cranston (Baltimore: Penguin Books 1968), 141.

[19] Duverger, *La démocratie sans le peuple* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil 1967), 11.

[20] Note that Rousseau and Duverger do *not* suggest that citizens in existing "democratic" polities are without any freedom or influence, but rather that the freedom and influence citizens have are limited to the vote.

[21] In addition to the books listed in the masthead, see Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, and Jae-on Kim, "Political Participation and the Life Cycle," *Comparative Politics*, VI (April 1974), 319-40; Sidney Verba, "Cross-National Survey Research: The Problem of Credibility," in Ivan Vallier, ed., *Comparative Methods in Sociology: Essays on Trends and Applications* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1971), 309-56; Sidney Verba, Bashiruddin Ahmed, and Anil Bhatt, *Caste, Race and Politics: A Comparison of India and the United States* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications 1971); and Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, Ana Barbic, Galen Irwin, Henk Molleman, and Goldie Shabad, "The Modes of Participation: Continuities in Research," *Comparative Political Studies*, VI (July 1973), 235-50.

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(to be conducted in Austria, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the United States, and Yugoslavia), they conceptualized and operationalized "political participation." Once data had been gathered and analyzed, the initial conception was slightly modified to grasp the empirical findings more fully. Four distinct "modes of activity" were found in each of the seven nations studied:[22] voting, campaign activity, communal activity (e.g., active membership in community problem-solving organizations), and particularized contacts (contacting a local or extralocal official in regard to problems having a personal referent). These four clusters of behavior vary along three dimensions: the amount of conflict they entail, the scope of the potential outcome (collective or particularized), and the amount of initiative required to engage in the act. (Verba, Nie, and Kim, 11-44; Verba and Nie, 44-81.) The authors maintain that the four modes also differ with regard to influence: "how much pressure they exert" upon decision makers and "how much information they convey about the preferences of citizens." (Verba and Nie, 47.)

Second, both of the Verba-Nie volumes analyze the process which brings people to participate. In the United States, the data support the "standard socioeconomic model of politicization" whereby the wealthier and better educated develop "a general set of 'civic' attitudes"[23] leading to their "overparticipation."[24] When other factors are considered—e.g., membership in voluntary associations and affiliation with a political party—the effects of socioeconomic status are accelerated. (The only significant countervailing force is group consciousness among blacks.) As might be expected, there are differences in the process of politicization according to the mode of participation: the socioeconomic model fits communal and campaign activity best; it fits voting less well, and particularized contacting rather poorly. (Verba and Nie, 125-264.)

Apparently, socioeconomic status is also a factor in mobilizing citi-

[22] Verba, Nie, and Kim analyze the data from Austria, India, Japan, Nigeria, and the United States. In the article in *Comparative Political Studies, ibid.*, data from the Netherlands and Yugoslavia are analyzed.

[23] The civic attitudes characteristic of the "highly participant" are "psychological involvement in politics (measured by a variety of items dealing with expressed interest in and attention to political matters), a sense of political efficacy, information about politics, and a sense of contribution to the community" (Verba and Nie, 133).

[24] It is important to note that in their analysis Verba, Nie, and Kim "assume a particular causal ordering . . . by which attitudes such as psychological involvement lead to activity. This is an assumption, not something demonstrated in the data. One could redraw . . . the causal arrows running from participation to the orientations. And there is a tradition in democratic theory that would suggest this alternative ordering—the tradition that considers participation to be an educative experience" (p. 73). That tradition is exemplified by Carole Pateman's work which is discussed in the next section of this article.

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zens for politics in Austria, India, Japan, and Nigeria.[25] But there are national variations in regard to the relative explanatory power of this model for the different modes of participation. (Verba, Nie, and Kim, 53-61 and 75-79.) Verba, Nie, and Kim also suggest that "there may be other processes by which individuals come to participation than the standard socioeconomic one," and briefly identify three "that might work for one mode of activity rather than another": "the partisan mobilized model," "the group consciousness model," and "the personal relevance of government model" (pp. 61-62).

Third, and most important, *Participation in America* investigates the impact of citizen participation on government leaders:

> Analyses usually focus on the individual citizen, either ignoring the question of the effects of citizen activities and beliefs or dealing with the question by speculation. We wish to go further and attempt to measure the impact of participation on the responsiveness of political leaders to the citizenry. Responsiveness is what democracy is supposed to be about and, more specifically, is what participation is supposed to increase. But responsiveness, as far as we can tell, rarely has been defined precisely, almost never has been measured, and never has been related to participation (p. 300).

Verba and Nie do not examine the "most meaningful" sense of responsiveness—community leaders successfully dealing with citizens' desires. Rather, they analyze concurrence—"the extent to which citizens and leaders in the community choose the same 'agenda' of community problems" (p. 302).

Verba's and Nie's findings are of special interest due to the virginity of the terrain they investigate. Let me note some of their more significant conclusions.

(1) Community leaders are more likely to concur with the problem priorities of participators than with those of nonparticipators.[26]

(2) The relationship between participation and responsiveness is curvilinear:

> Where participation is lowest, the level of leader responsiveness to the public as a whole is low; but active citizens receive no more responsiveness than inactive ones. As participation rates rise in a community, the

[25] I use the term "apparently" because Verba, Nie, and Kim (pp. 53-61) study the "causal paths" from *education* (not socioeconomic status) through political orientations to the four modes of activity. Moreover, "social status [measured in somewhat different ways] has a closer relationship to political participation in the United States" than in any other country (except India), surveyed by either Almond and Verba in *The Civic Culture*, or Verba, Nie, and Kim. (Verba and Nie, 339-40.)

[26] Participators, it should be remembered, come disproportionately from the highest socioeconomic level.

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level of leader responsiveness goes up but the equality of responsiveness declines. In more active communities, there is a wide gap between the responsiveness received by active and inactive citizens.

In the most active communities, however, though inactive citizens receive less responsiveness than active ones, the former receive more responsiveness than do similarly inactive citizens in less active communities (p. 333).

(3) A high rate of voting seems to be a necessary condition for responsiveness:

In communities where voting rates are high, the other three modes of activity are quite powerful in increasing concurrence. Where voting turnout is low, the other modes of activity make little difference (p. 326).

The work of Verba and his associates is both more sophisticated and more comprehensive than previous research has been. The attractiveness of the conceptual scheme and the elegance of statistical analysis inspire confidence in the findings. Yet, caution demands that some attention be focused on the building blocks of the model. I shall subsequently consider what Verba and his associates have learned about the actual influence citizens have over the selection of decision-makers and the policies they adopt.

CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION

Verba and his associates have operationalized "participatory acts" in a distinctive fashion. On the one hand, discussing politics and exposing oneself to political stimuli are not considered "acts," but are elements of Verba's and Nie's "Index of Psychological Involvement in Politics"; consequently, they are variables used to explain participation[27] (pp. 367-69). On the other hand, many of the measures of communal activity either tap phenomena which have habitually been used to explain participation (membership in a voluntary association),[28] or direct attention toward activities which have not previously been studied by students of political participation.[29]

[27] Certain other "participatory acts" are not studied at all—e.g., running for or holding public or party office.

[28] The variable used by Verba and Nie is more refined: active membership in an organization which, according to the respondent, "takes an active role in attempting to solve community problems" (p. 31).

[29] Two of the communal activity variables are clearly new: working with others in the community to try to solve some community problem, and taking part in forming a new group or organization to try to solve some community problem (pp. 31 and 352). Another variable, labelled contacting "a local government official about some issue or problem" (p. 31), is based on the following interview item:

We were talking earlier about problems that you and the people of this com-

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Two questions arise from this special operationalization. First, can findings from this multinational research endeavor serve to disconfirm existing hypotheses? For example, Verba and Nie reject Milbrath's thesis (accepted by Butler and Stokes and given some credence by Lane) that there is a "hierarchy" of political acts, and citizens who engage in the more difficult ones will also engage in easier ones.[30] Rather, Verba and Nie argue that those who engage in activities within one "mode of participation" are more likely to engage in other activities within that same mode, but that there is no hierarchy among modes (pp. 44-94). Since the competing hypotheses are based on different sets of activities, it may be that both are exact: depending on the behaviors studied, participation may be either multidimensional or relatively hierarchical.

Second, what criteria led to the selection of activities made by Verba and his associates? Perhaps they attempted to develop an exhaustive list of behaviors which might permit ordinary citizens to exercise influence over the choice of political leaders and the policies they adopt. That would fit with their definition of political participation, while simultaneously making sense of the exclusion of such activities as discussing politics and running for office, and the inclusion of, for example, working with others in the community to try to solve community problems. But, in fact, Verba and his coauthors say that even the modes of participation—and therefore obviously the set of specific activities surveyed—are not intended to be exhaustive. (Verba and Nie, 47; Verba, Nie, and Kim, 11.) Rather, the modes represent a "number of alternative ways in which citizens can attempt to influence the government." (Verba and Nie, 47.)

In their article in *Comparative Political Studies*, analyzing the modes of participation in Yugoslavia and Holland, Verba and his colleagues report in a footnote:

> Three additional acts that had no direct parallel elsewhere were asked about in the Dutch survey. Each involved a kind of "direct" political activity. One was signing a petition on some public issue (39% said they had); another was writing a letter to a newspaper (7%); and the

munity have—have you ever personally gone to see or spoken to, or written to—*some member of the local community* about some need or problem? (p. 352; emphasis added).

Although contacting a local government official is often considered an act of political participation, contacting some member of the local community is not. So, we have not only a questionable translation of a survey item into a "concept" but also a new type of behavior being studied.

[30] Milbrath (fn. 10), 17-18; David Butler and Donald Stokes, *Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice* (New York: St. Martin's Press 1969), 25; Lane (fn. 10), 93-94.

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third was taking part in a protest demonstration (6%). We put these items into a factor analysis with the others and found they formed a separate distinct factor, leaving the structure of the other items unchanged.

The analysis suggests that our original four modes are distinctive, but by no means exhaustive of the possible distinctive modes of activity.[31]

Thus, the four "basic" modes are a sample of participatory acts. Is the sample representative? If not, we shall have difficulty assessing the significance of general conclusions about influence and involvement (psychological as well as behavioral) drawn from an analysis of the four modes. I am particularly troubled by the failure to study "direct" political activity. This mode might provide more influence than, for example, particularized contacting or communal activity. (The assertion that demonstrations, petitions, and letter writing to newspapers in Holland has "no direct parallel elsewhere" is just wrong; such activities exist in virtually every Western democracy.)

The criteria for inclusion adopted by Verba and his associates appear somewhat capricious. Most disturbing is their failure, in the innovative study of participation in America, to break with the established tradition of not considering protests and demonstrations. This exclusion is odd because such behaviors seem designed to influence the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take, and, hence, fall under the rubric of political participation. Most scholars have not even sought to justify this omission. At least Verba and Nie are nonconformist in that respect.[32] However, the justifications they provide are not convincing.

[31] Verba, Nie, and others (fn. 21), 249.

[32] Lester Milbrath is also a nonconformist. He explains: "Although political demonstrations are considered a legitimate expression of political feeling in a democracy and are widely held, it is a behavior used by only certain sectors of the society. Many other sectors look upon demonstrations as undignified and refuse to use them. Thus, this type of behavior does not fit into the hierarchy of political involvement in the United States" (Milbrath [fn. 10], 18). Whether this behavior is more or less restricted to certain "sectors" of society than other participatory acts—e.g., active membership in a political party—is an empirical question. In order to respond to it, the meaning of the term "sector" would have to be specified and appropriate data gathered; Milbrath has done neither. More importantly, even if demonstrations were comparatively restricted, would that constitute a theoretically valid reason for excluding them from consideration? Such a criterion, if generally employed, could lead to excluding all behaviors; none is not in some way restricted. In addition, this procedure causes an unwanted and counterproductive confusion between definitional and empirical issues. (As long as a definition of political participation includes demonstrations within its purview, no empirical characteristics of demonstrations, or attitudes of other groups toward this activity, can be considered a justification for omission.) Finally, excluding an activity from our purview because some consider it "undignified" just makes no sense. After all, many citizens of democratic polities view running for office as undignified.

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On the one hand, they note:

> We are not dealing with what can be called "ceremonial" or "support" participation, where citizens "take part" by expressing support for the government, by marching in parades, [etc.] (p. 2).

On the other hand:

> Our present concern is with activities "within the system"—ways of influencing politics that are generally recognized as legal and legitimate. This eliminates *many* of the tactics of political protest. The importance of these tactics has grown in recent years, at least for particular groups and for particular interests. Our focus on "ordinary" political participation does not imply that these other means are unimportant or inappropriate. . . . But the study of these other modes would be another book, not the one we have written (p. 3; emphasis added).

This justification very neatly glosses over the failure to consider political protests which are "generally recognized as legal and legitimate" —for instance, the Poor People's March on Washington. Such activities could be the most effective means citizens have to influence the policy choices of their government. That no studies of participation analyze this phenomenon, that only Milbrath and Verba-Nie discuss its exclusion, and that no one has criticized this omission, seems extremely curious.[33]

Two pragmatic reasons for this neglect should be cited. First, relatively few people generally seem to participate in protests.[34] Therefore, given the tendency to study representative samples of total populations, only a limited number of cases will fall into the category, and statistically significant extrapolations will be impossible.[35] But such an argument does not apply to conceptual work, only to its operationalization.

Second, the subject matter of participation seems relatively large, and since some kinds of demonstrations—support and illegal ones—are supposedly excludable by definition,[36] the other kinds, by implication, may be forgotten. To do so makes research more manageable in scope. How-

[33] It is especially interesting that the symmetricists—who accuse the "empirical" democratic theorists of having a conservative normative bias in favor of the status quo and a tendency to regard Anglo-American democracy as an ideal—have never drawn attention to this oversight.

[34] Exceptions appear with some frequency. Among the more noteworthy contemporary examples is the May crisis of 1968 in France.

[35] For example, Verba and Nie (chap. 15, esp. p. 283), briefly discuss protestors in the context of an examination of the varieties of public opinion—depending on which public is being regarded—and explicitly refer to the sampling problem.

[36] There is reason to doubt that exclusion on the grounds of illegitimacy is relevant; after all, the problem is to understand how citizens can and do influence their governments.

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ever, the price paid for this advantage may be too great if such activities are effective forms of influence.[37]

PARTICIPATION AND INFLUENCE

Concurrence is not a demanding measure of influence; in fact, it may not be a measure of influence at all. To agree upon problems does not preclude sharp disagreement over solutions. Moreover, democratic politics often seem to be characterized by agreement on what the problems are but disagreement on how to solve them. Finally, on *a priori* grounds, are higher levels of concurrence more likely in democracies or in those regimes which Inkeles considers "extremist or totalitarian"?

In the light of these considerations, Verba's and Nie's findings are weak building blocks for discussing influence. The problem is exacerbated when the seven types of leaders interviewed in each community are identified: highest local elected official, highest elected official of the county, heads or presidents of the largest local Democratic and/or Republican organizations or clubs, business leader (either the president of the local chamber of commerce or the proprietor of the largest commercial or manufacturing establishment), resident editor or publisher of the largest newspaper, and head of the local school board (pp. 410-11). Given the leader sample and the nature of concurrence, it is questionable whether "we can consider our concurrence measure to be an indicator of how much an individual or group gets from *the government*" (Verba and Nie, 337; emphasis added).

There are no other data which cast even the most indirect light on actual influence. In this context, the most prudent approach would be to await more direct study of the influence ordinary citizens have over their government. Nevertheless, it is clear—even without such evidence—that ordinary citizens in those regimes which are denotatively labelled democratic do have *some* influence over the *selection* of governmental personnel. How much influence the right to vote in competitive elections actually entails is certainly subject to dispute. Does influence increase as the range of choice increases? Does it increase to the extent that the media are "free," not only legally and practically, but also intellectually?

[37] Michael Lipsky's study of protest by relatively powerless groups suggests that such participatory activities (at least in the United States) may only provide symbolic rewards. ("Protest as a Political Resource," *American Political Science Review*, LXII [December 1968], 1144-58.) However, if Murray Edelman's perspective on American politics is accepted, then Lipsky's findings are symptomatic and not specific to protest. See Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press 1964).

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Regardless of how we might deal with the above questions, voting in competitive elections is the only participatory activity considered by Verba and Nie for which we can be *sure* there is some influence. Interestingly enough, even were my scepticism toward the interpretation of concurrence unfounded, the findings presented in *Participation in America* are consonant. Specifically, voting was found to be the key element in increasing concurrence.

A term coined by Harry Eckstein (but never employed in any of his written work), would label government in France, Great Britain, and the United States as "alterocracy": it is characterized by the alternation between ruling groups. Within alterocracies, the right to choose between opposing political candidates *may* be the only way for citizens to exert influence. That they at least have one sure way is not to be dismissed, even though it is far from our everyday image of democracy.

II. The Symmetric Perspective

A distinct group of scholars[38] is bothered by the tendency to adjust conceptions of democracy to fit the empirical reality of ongoing political systems. Without really disputing the basic research findings, they are appalled by the absence of "real democracy" in the "so-called democracies" and the consequent decision to convert democracy into "alterocracy."[39] Democracy is not an asymmetric relationship; it is symmetric. The issue is: how can actual conditions be transformed into democratic ones?

The symmetricists derive their theoretical notions from a synthesis of the ideas of selected "classical" political thinkers rather than from the observation of concrete reality; participation refers to *direct involvement* in making and determining decisions and policies. They focus attention on behavior within selected nongovernmental social units, especially work groups, and argue that a participatory society is necessary in order to have a genuine democratic polity.

Until the publication of *Participation and Democratic Theory*, the symmetric perspective could easily be regarded as simply dealing in prescriptive notions, while the asymmetric perspective grasped how

[38] See, for example, Peter Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique* (Boston: Little, Brown 1967); Dennis Kavanaugh, "Political Behaviour and Political Participation," in Geraint Parry, ed., *Participation in Politics* (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1972), 102-24; and Jack L. Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy," *American Political Science Review*, LX (June 1966), 285-95.

[39] The major thrust of their attack is centered on "exposing" the normative character and the undesirability of the values which are, supposedly, propounded by the behavioralists.

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things really were.[40] Carole Pateman weakens the first part of this argument. She synthesizes the writings of J.-J. Rousseau, J. S. Mill, and G. D. H. Cole into a theory of participatory democracy. Then, she attempts to demonstrate the theory's empirical validity by proving that industry can be organized on participatory lines, and suggesting that there is a link between workplace and governmental participation. The linchpin of her argument is the self-sustaining and self-propelling quality attributed to participation: "Participation develops and fosters the very qualities necessary for it; the more individuals participate the better able they become to do so" and the more they want to do so (pp. 42-43).

THE CONCEPT OF WORKPLACE PARTICIPATION

Drawing upon a conception advanced by French, Israel, and Ås,[41] Pateman argues that "participation must be participation *in* something; in this case, participation in decision-making" (p. 68). Thus, "techniques used to persuade employees to accept decisions that have *already* been made by the management" are, "following Verba," "*pseudo participation*" (pp. 68-69).[42] "A typical example would be the situation where the supervisor, instead of merely telling the employees of a decision, allows them to question him about it and to discuss it" (p. 69). Two types of "real" participatory situations are distinguished:

> [*P*]*artial participation* . . . is 'a process in which two or more parties influence each other in the making of decisions but the final power to decide rests with one party only' (p. 70).
>
> [*F*]*ull participation* . . . is 'a process where each individual member of a decision-making body has equal power to determine the outcome of decisions' (p. 71).

Both types of participation are possible at the lower and/or the higher levels of management.

> [The] lower level refers broadly to those management decisions relating to control of day-to-day shop floor activity, while the higher level refers to decisions that relate to the running of the whole enterprise, decisions on investment, marketing and so forth (p. 70).

Industrial democracy is that system in which "the opportunity for full higher level participation by employees" exists (p. 72).

[40] A critique in this vein was presented by Dahl (fn. 3), 298.

[41] John R. P. French, Jr., Joachim Israel, and Dagfin Ås, "An Experiment in Participation in a Norwegian Factory," *Human Relations*, XIII (No. 1, 1960), 3-19.

[42] See Sidney Verba, *Small Groups and Political Behavior* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1961), 220-21.

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SYMMETRY IN THE WORKPLACE

Is it possible for industry to be organized along participatory lines? First, Pateman deals with this question in the immediate job environment. She carefully culls the literature of industrial relations for evidence that: (1) most workers desire more participation in decisions that directly concern their work (p. 56); (2) industrial-participation experiments have shown that an increase in worker participation results in greater job satisfaction and productivity (p. 58); (3) small-group experiments also support the hypotheses of the participatory theory (p. 62), as well as suggesting, for example, that experience in participaton reduces an individual's authoritarian and hierarchical tendencies (p. 64); and, most importantly, (4) certain groups of workers in the British automobile and mining industries at the lower management level function in a world of "full participation" (pp. 60-62).[43]

Next, Pateman turns to some examples of higher-level participation in British industry. She does not unearth cases of full participation. But she does discover genuine partial participation, thereby indicating (according to her) that industrial relations can be more democratic than others have assumed. (Harry Eckstein is cited; p. 83.)

Finally, Pateman discusses full participation at the higher level, identifying one British case—the Rowen Engineering Company Limited (p. 87)—and examining the Yugoslav Workers' Councils. These Councils are both elected by and composed of workers: "There is competition for places; in the Split shipyard visited by Stephen, for example, there were 76 candidates for 35 places in 1967" (p. 93). Furthermore, the councils do take decisions that "elsewhere fall to top management and the senior and medium level executives" (p. 95). Hence, "in one sense . . . the possibility of a democratic authority structure in industry has been demonstrated; the 'government' is elected into office by the whole collective, is accountable to the electorate and replaceable by them" (p. 96). And, it should be remembered, economic expansion and efficiency have characterized the Yugoslav experiment (p. 91).

In sum, participation as direct involvement can occur in the real world—even though the only totally unambiguous case is the Rowen Company. This finding seems crucial for the symmetric perspective, because the notion of a participatory organization cannot be considered exclusively prescriptive. However, skeptics would not quibble over an occasional social unit which functions under direct involvement. Rather, can a whole society, or a meaningful segment of it, be organized in

[43] Specifically, workers at the Coventry Standard car plant and in the Durham coal fields.

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this way? The answer is ambiguous as a consequence of the difficulties in obtaining a full and clear picture of the Yugoslav case. As Pateman notes, "One would not wish to claim that the system of workers' self-management in Yugoslavia provides a successful example of the democratisation of authority structures, or that the evidence presented here allows many firm conclusions to be drawn. Much more information is needed on many points . . ." (p. 101). Yet, the government of the enterprise is certainly more participatory in Yugoslavia than in Western democratic polities:[44] workers are not only able to influence the management's decisions and exert some real control over their immediate job environment, but, in addition, they are, at least to a certain extent, directly involved in determining the enterprise's policies. Consequently, a notion of participation which goes beyond the idea of influencing does not seem unrealistic or unrealizable in nongovernmental domains.

THE POSSIBILITY OF A SYMMETRIC POLITY

Pateman suggests that there is "a link between participation in the workplace and other non-governmental spheres and participation at the wider national level" (p. 44). In particular, she regards participatory experiences on the job as having " 'crucial significance' " (p. 49). Her linkage argument, like most, posits a conditional and not an absolute relationship:[45] "it is not clear, even though the individual would

[44] Such a view is shared by one of Pateman's prime *bêtes noires*, Robert Dahl. In *After The Revolution: Authority in a Good Society* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press 1970), Dahl notes: "Yet if Yugoslavia is less democratic than the United States in the government of the state, it is more democratic in the government of the enterprise" (p. 130).

[45] Linkage arguments connect an individual's nongovernmental experiences and his political behavior. They may be distinguished according to the domain considered (e.g., a kind of social activity or sociological category) and the strength of the specified relationship. Scholars may focus on such phenomena as specific social and/or economic categories, socialization experiences, authority patterns to which an individual is habituated, or membership in voluntary associations. Within each domain, there are a variety of arguments. For example, in regard to organizational membership, Nie, Powell, and Prewitt argue that "those who are organizationally involved participate in politics at rates far greater than those who are not involved"; but Verba and Nie, after controlling for the basic socioeconomic variables, find that it is "active membership combined with exposure to political stimuli" within voluntary associations which is "associated with political participation." See Norman H. Nie, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., and Kenneth Prewitt, "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships II," *American Political Science Review*, LXIII (September 1969), 813; and Verba and Nie, 194-95.

Regardless of the social activity or sociological characteristics being considered, such linkages are usually judged conditional. For example, Almond and Verba (fn. 7), note: "The individual who has had opportunities for non-political participation, compared with someone who has not had these opportunities, will be more likely to choose a participatory response *if* a political situation arises in which there is some chance to participate" (p. 307). Absolute linkage arguments do not exist, but there do appear

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have more *opportunities* for political participation in a participatory society, how far the paradigm of direct participation can be replicated under conditions where representation is going to be widely necessary" (p. 44; emphasis added). Consequently, she carefully hedges her bets as to the likelihood or the possibility of a polity characterized by full participation, but does not subscribe to the view enunciated by another symmetricist, Peter Bachrach: "the main thrust of the elitist argument is incontestable. . . . [P]articipation in key political decisions on the national level must remain extremely limited."[46]

The data upon which Pateman draws to support her notion of linkage are very weak. Primarily she turns to Almond and Verba, whose findings she understands as leading to the following conclusion: "Evidence has now been presented to support the argument of the theory of participatory democracy that participation in non-governmental authority structures is necessary to foster and develop the psychological qualities (the sense of political efficacy) required for participation at the national level. Evidence has also been cited to support the argument that industry is the most important sphere for this participation to take place . . ." (pp. 50-51).[47] But, in fact, the "evidence" in no way supports such a conclusion. First, the notion of political efficacy—which Almond and Verba label "competence"—is not a measure of actual political participation, but rather a self-perception of one's ability to influence the government. Second, Pateman distorts the significance given to workplace participation by the authors of *The Civic Culture*: they specifically point out that such experiences *cannot* substitute for nonparticipatory family and school environments, but that a high level of education can.[48] Thus, their data impugn the very hypothesis of the necessity of actual participation, especially on the job, which Pateman supports on the basis of their findings. Third, what Almond and Verba tapped under the rubric of participation in nongovernmental spheres bears little relationship to what Pateman means by workplace participation. In the family and in the school, Almond and Verba were concerned primarily with the respondents' "freedom to complain about decisions and the actual complaining they remember doing."[49] In the

to be some pseudo-linkage arguments. That is the case for Verba and Nie, in that they connect political discussion in nonpolitical environments with political activity (pp. 195-96).

[46] Bachrach (fn. 38), 98.

[47] Pateman also cites Robert Blauner, *Alienation and Freedom: The Factory Worker and his Industry* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1964), in support of the point that an individual's work environment affects his social character (Pateman, 52).

[48] Almond and Verba (fn. 7), 370.

[49] *Ibid.*, 334.

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workplace, they associated participation with being "consulted when decisions are made on the job," feeling "free to protest on the job if a decision is made of which they do not approve," and actually complaining about decisions.[50] These three phenomena may refer to "pseudo-participation," but certainly not to either partial or full participation. Thus, there is no evidence that behavioral patterns adopted by ordinary citizens on their jobs will have an effect on their behavior toward the government; nor, consequently, is there even indirect support for the possibility of a symmetric polity.

THE SELF-PROPELLING QUALITY OF PARTICIPATION

My conclusion is undermined if participation is self-sustaining and self-propelling, as Pateman asserts. She argues that "empirical evidence" shows that "participation is apparently so effective in its psychological impact on individuals even in the smallest possible doses; it appears that even the mere feeling that participation is possible, even situations of pseudo-participation, have beneficial effects on confidence, job satisfaction, etc. It would be reasonable to suppose that actual participation would be more effective" (p. 73). That is a reasonable supposition only if two notions which lie at the very core of Pateman's perspective are accepted. The first is that pseudo-, partial, and full participation are points on a common continuum rather than distinct phenomena.[51] Second, participation is good for the soul, *and* perceived as such by actors—that is, people want to participate, and to participate more, both in that particular social unit and in all others to which they belong, including the polity. On both logical and empirical grounds, there is reason to question the validity of these two propositions.

Each of the three types of participation is associated with distinct behavioral patterns and psychological dispositions. In general, it seems probable that most subordinates in any social unit will be dissatisfied with certain policies and/or decisions—although there will not be a consensus as to which items are unsatisfactory. An environment characterized by pseudo-participation permits such subordinates to voice their complaints without incurring any responsibility for policy making; frustration is relieved through letting off steam, and, psychologically, superordinates are available as scapegoats, the easily visible sources of all one's problems and difficulties.

In a world of partial participation, subordinates have genuine re-

[50] *Ibid.*, 342-43.

[51] Pateman does not explicitly connect the concept of pseudo-participation to the two types of "real" participation; her discussion treats this phenomenon as the first step on the "participatory road."

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sponsibilities; if someone is dissatisfied with something, either he must regard himself as being partly to blame for the situation or he must decide to commit time and effort to an attempt to change conditions—an attempt which may or may not succeed. Subordinates have an opportunity to affect their environment, but this chance is paid for in terms of real costs in time and effort, the genuine risk of losing, and a reduction of the psychological convenience provided by readily available and unambiguous scapegoats.

Full participation creates a fundamentally different world, a world of co-equals in which the very idea of superordinates and subordinates disappears: responsibility is total, the chances for getting one's way are not, and no unambiguous object for scorn is available.

Given these differences, it may be assumed that transition from one type of participatory experience to another will be difficult. Pateman does not concur, because she feels that participation has a self-propelling quality: people express a desire to participate and, if given the chance, will do so, moving up to the highest stage of full participation. No evidence is presented to support this view. Rather, Pateman makes three isolated observations: (1) workers, in general, say they want to exert greater control over their immediate job environment; (2) experiments demonstrate that workers are more satisfied and more productive under partial participation than under no participation; and (3) a few atypical enterprises do function under a genuine participatory setup.

There are, however, some relevant data upon which speculation may be based.[52] Specifically, Michel Crozier, in his study of French workers, suggests that people may be ambivalent toward participation. He notes:

> On the one hand, people would like very much to participate in order to control their own environment. On the other hand, they fear that if and when they participate, their own behavior will be controlled by their coparticipants. . . .
>
> Retreatism can be a very rational form of behavior whenever the individual concerned has good reason to believe that the rewards he is offered [by participation] are not commensurate with his efforts, and feels that there is a good chance that he will be manipulated. The will to participate, finally, depends to a large extent on the degree of trust and openness in inter-personal relations characteristic of the cultural

[52] What happens when a compulsory system of voting is transformed into a voluntary one may also be relevant. The self-propelling quality of participation would lead us to expect a relatively constant or increasing level of turnout. Yet, in Holland and Switzerland (the canton of Vaud), turnout dropped significantly when the vote was made voluntary. See Galen Irwin, "Compulsory Voting Legislation: Impact on Voter Turnout in the Netherlands," *Comparative Political Studies*, VII (October 1974) 292-315; and Roger Girod, "Facteurs de l'abstentionnisme en Suisse," *Revue Française de Science Politique*, III (April-June 1953), 358.

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norms to which people adhere. In a society where proving one's own independence is considered to be a value in itself, retreatism is the most satisfactory mode of adjustment as long as the proposed participation does not adequately insure full rights of control.[53]

Ambivalence toward participation does not seem to be peculiarly French.[54] For instance, this notion can be used to make sense out of American faculty members' participation in committees which make decisions that affect their everyday organizational life. Many professors simply avoid such activities whenever possible; others seem to flip in and out. For most, there seems to be a tension between wanting to have influence on departmental policy and the incurred costs—in terms of a reduced opportunity to do research, writing, and teaching, in terms of time and effort expended in participating, and in terms of frustration and deception which must be borne when your side loses. These costs can be avoided through nonparticipation, and herein lies the attractiveness of that alternative.

Pateman ignores this possibility. She only sees participation as giving an individual greater control over his own destiny. If that were all it involved, then the accelerator effect would be logically sound. But participation is not simply the obtaining of rewards; it also involves costs. To share in the decision-making process on the job calls for sacrifices in terms of other values, such as leisure time, the feeling of independence, and the avoidance of responsibilities. Expressing a desire to shape the world in which we live seems natural; assuming the sacrifices which are demanded by full participation seems reasonable only for some people; accepting these sacrifices in all the social and political units to which we belong would be most exceptional. The escape from freedom is also an escape from a participation filled with costs and uncertainties. Most people may *want* greater control over their own destiny; but for many of them, the price to be paid for this control may be too high.[55] Consequently, as a general principle one should not hypothesize that an individual's desire to participate will lead, if occasions present themselves, to actual, sustained participation.[56]

[53] Michel Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1964), 204-06.

[54] Crozier, for example, cites numerous research findings from non-French settings. (*Ibid.*, footnotes 33, 34, and 36 on p. 205.)

[55] For example, Ralph W. White and Ronald O. Lippitt found that the American children who took part in their experiments preferred autocracy to *laissez-faire* (a type of relationship which is rather close to symmetrical democracy). *Autocracy and Democracy: An Essay in Experimental Inquiry* (New York: Harper and Brothers 1960).

[56] That is so despite the fact that neither the research which argues for a hierarchy of political involvement nor that directed by Verba contradicts the notion of participation as self-propelling. If there were an accelerator effect, those who accomplish the

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To sum up, Pateman has demonstrated that in organizational life, a notion of participation which goes beyond the idea of "influencing" is required to make sense of the full gamut of real-world environments. While her argument is very appealing, its linchpin—the self-propelling effect of participation—does not seem to be universally tenable; and if it is not, neither is the theory of participatory democracy. However, if there were cultural contexts in which participation were a supreme value and consequently had an accelerator effect, Pateman's theory would provide a set of reasonable guidelines for seeking to achieve a participatory society and maybe even a participatory polity.

III. Conclusion

The distinction between the asymmetric and symmetric perspectives is based on divergent conceptions of participation in a democracy. The two schools of thought also employ contrasting definitional strategies and focus primary attention on dissimilar units of analysis. Finally, the prime "consequences" of participation are systemic for the asymmetricists and psychological for the symmetricists.

These differences are significant. But they do not necessarily prevent a reconciliation between the alternative meanings of democratic participation that have been advanced. Synthesis may be possible precisely because distinct empirical settings are studied. In particular, I would like to speculate on the relationship between the contrasting notions of participation put forward by the symmetricists and the asymmetricists, and the differential importance apparently attributed by people to their membership in the workplace and in the polity. On the basis of this speculation, I shall present a conception of democratic participation which embraces the ideas of both schools of thought.

Most people seem to attribute importance to their job—even if only as an instrumentality for obtaining a salary which is necessary for their continued existence. In sharp contrast, at least in those polities which are denotatively labelled democratic, most ordinary citizens consider politics unimportant to them. According to Robert Dahl, "in New Haven as in the United States generally one of the central facts of political life is that politics—local, state, national, international—lies for most people at the outer periphery of attention, interest, concern and activity."[57] Similarly, Butler and Stokes suggest that for the ordinary

most demanding acts would also be expected to do the less demanding ones—in conformity with the hierarchy hypothesis. The relationship between Pateman and the modes of participation research has been discussed in fn. 24.

[57] Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press 1961), 279.

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British subject, politics is very "remote."[58] The French, according to Alain Lancelot, have very little "interest" in politics.[59] And Ralf Dahrendorf analyzes the ordinary German who is "unpolitical because the political is deeply unimportant for him."[60]

Robert Dahl has suggested that politics acquires importance for the individual whenever it "becomes attached to the primary activities"—"activities involving food, sex, love, family, work, play, shelter, comfort, friendship, social esteem and the like."[61] He goes on to indicate that "this happens rarely, if at all," for "men may be frustrated in their primary activities without ever turning to politics for solutions. . . . Since the primary activities are voracious in their demands for time, political activity must enter into competition with them. For most people it is evidently a weak competitor."[62]

This does not mean that people will not discuss or be interested in politics. Quite to the contrary, to be interested in politics "can be a kind of escape from politics"; it "allows one to indulge in a great variety of emotional responses." It is comparable to "the passionate curiosity of a housewife anxiously awaiting the next installment of her favorite soap opera."[63]

In sum, for the ordinary citizen, whose proximate activities demand his time and attention, the remoteness of politics may well serve certain important needs. The frustrations of everyday life may be somewhat alleviated and momentarily forgotten through vicarious involvement in the distant affairs of government. If this is so, it may be inferred that most people value a *distant* government. They want the government to do its business and leave them alone—that is, to provide a safe environment in which they can carry out the affairs that matter to them. When government interferes with their everyday life, they may become active to halt that interference; otherwise, their involvement will be rather limited and passive.

The kind of influence ordinary citizens have in alterocracies fits into this context. They have some control over *who* shall rule them. They may even have some *direct* influence over the decisions leaders make. And they probably do have some *indirect* influence, because politicians seek to be reelected.

[58] Butler and Stokes (fn. 30), 24-27.
[59] Lancelot, *L'Abstentionnisme électoral en France* (Paris: Armand Colin 1968), 164-67.
[60] Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, Doubleday 1969), 377.
[61] Dahl (fn. 57), 279.
[62] *Ibid.*, 280.
[63] *Ibid.*

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In the political arena, the costs of active involvement are likely to be greater than the potential benefits, given the lack of importance ordinary people attribute to politics. In the workplace, the explicit importance which most individuals seem to attribute to the job and the connection between employment and other primary activities suggests that the benefits to be achieved by participation may be significant. Even if the costs of workplace participation were identical to the costs of participation in politics, the difference in potential benefits could account for distinct levels of behavioral involvement. Specifically, workers and employees might reasonably be expected to seek more control over their job environment than over their government. Furthermore, the type of control sought would change—given the difference in size between polity and workplace[64]—from playing a role in the selection of leaders to playing a role in determining the policies adopted in the social unit. In other words, most citizens of contemporary democracies usually do not attempt to exert control over the decisions which are made by their government, but do attempt to exert control over the leader-selection process; the reverse holds true in social units like the workplace.

Thus, democratic participation refers to the control ordinary members of a collectivity have over the selection of their superordinates and the policies and procedures adopted in the collectivity. For there to be democratic participation, there must be some control. How much control actually exists in a given unit, and how this compares to the situation in other units, are subjects to be investigated. In certain polities, citizens, in addition to playing some role in the selection of public officials, may also exert control over the decision-making process. In certain enterprises, workers do play a role in determining policy, and they may even select their superordinates.

In all (or in virtually all) authority systems, *some* people play a role in determining who shall govern and/or what policies will be adopted. In democratic authority systems the overwhelming majority of members have an opportunity to play one or both of these roles, and a good proportion actually do. These authority systems are characterized by democratic participation. We might distinguish such systems according to whether ordinary members play both roles or only one. Furthermore, the amount of control ordinary members actually exert over leadership selection and policy making might permit further useful

[64] On the relationship between size and democracy in government, see Robert A. Dahl and Edward R. Tufte, *Size and Democracy* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press 1973).

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distinctions among democratic collectivities. The most democratic situation would be one in which all members join together to make the group's decisions. Such a possibility seems limited to units of small size, and even then seems very rare.

The above conception of democratic participation merges the ideas of the symmetricists and the asymmetricists. One advantage of such a synthesis is that it avoids restricting the application of the term "democratic participation" to any single type or group of social units; no basic concept in the social sciences should be so delimited. Yet, many scholars seem to confine democracy and democratic participation to the polity, by requiring competitive elites and periodic elections. Clearly, alterocratic families, schools and workgroups are either nonexistent or rare. But the average American teenager, for example, appears to have more control over the decisions made in his family and in his school than his parents have over the decisions made by their government. These distinct observations simply indicate that playing a role in the selection of superordinates need not overlap with playing a role in the decision-making process.

Distinguishing democracy from alterocracy would have the additional advantage of eliminating a slight contradiction which occurs in the writings of some asymmetricists. Robert Dahl, for example, asserts that in political parties, economic enterprises, trade unions, and universities "democratization has not gone as far as in the state."[65] (By implication, democracy is a dimension upon which concrete cases can be classified.)[66] Dahl continues his argument in the following terms: "Even in institutions where the ostensible claim to legitimacy by those who wield authority is that leaders are democratically chosen, as in the political party and trade union, everyone knows that internal democracy is mainly a fake. In the United States only one important union has a two-party system."[67] In other words, to have a "real" democracy, there must be a competitive party system—that is, elections involving competitive elites. But polities and social units either have or do not have competitive, periodic elections—this is a category rather than a dimension. By conceiving of democratic participation in the way I have suggested, the confusion between categorical and dimensional theorizing can be avoided.

The proposed conceptualization would alter the way in which po-

[65] Dahl (fn. 44), 7.

[66] The same implication may be drawn from Dahl's comparison of the United States with Yugoslavia; see the quote in fn. 44.

[67] Dahl (fn. 44), 7.

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litical scientists look at social units. Relationships and behavior in such groups, rather than being independent variables to be considered by students of government, would become dependent variables to be studied in their own right.[68] This perspective highlights a number of theoretically significant problems; some have been analyzed by asymmetricists and symmetricists; others have basically been ignored. For example, what effect does a unit's size, structure, and function have on the methods available to subordinates for exerting control over the direction of the organization? Is an individual's in-unit behavior affected by the amount of importance he attributes to his membership? If so, how? Under what conditions do individuals attribute importance to their government? How much control do citizens and employees have over the operation of their collectivity and the selection of their superordinates? Searching for answers to these questions would certainly be more valuable than focusing on the incompatibilities between the symmetric and asymmetric perspectives.

[68] This merges well with Harry Eckstein's suggestion that politics be equated with the study of authority relations (fn. 1).

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